Taj Mahal Hotel v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. and Ors. (Civil Appeal no. 8611 of 2019)

Facts of the case: 

1. On the night of 01.08.1998, at around 11 p.m., Respondent No. 2 visited the hotel in his Maruti Zen car. While the car was insured with Respondent No. 1 the Appellant-hotel had taken a non- industrial risk insurance/liability policy from Respondent No. 3. Upon reaching the hotel, Respondent No. 2 handed over his car and its keys to the hotel valet for parking, and then went inside the hotel. The parking tag handed over to him with the condition that, the vehicle is being parked at the request of the guest at his own risk and responsibility in or outside the hotel premises.
2. When Respondent No. 2 came out of the hotel at about 1 a.m., he was informed that his vehicle had been driven away by another person. Upon enquiry with the security officer, he found that three young boys had come to the hotel in their separate car, parked it, and gone inside the hotel. After some time, they came out and asked the valet to bring their car to the porch. During this process, one of the boys, one Deepak, picked up the keys of the car of Respondent No. 2 from the desk, went to the car parking, and stole the Maruti Zen car. Though the security guard tried to stop him, he sped away. A complaint was lodged with the police, but the car remained untraced.
3. Respondent No. 1 (car insurer) settled the insurance claim raised by Respondent No. 2 (car owner) in respect of the stolen car for Rs. 2,80,000/-. Thereafter, Respondent No. 2 executed a Power of Attorney (POA) and a letter of subrogation in favour of Respondent No. 1. They both then approached the State Commission by filing a complaint against the Hotel seeking payment of the value of the car and compensation for deficiency in service. State commission dismissed the complaint and held that the insurance company acting as subrogee cannot qualify as a consumer. Hence, Respondent no. 1 has filed an appeal before National commission.
4. National Commission held that the liability of a hotel cannot be precluded by a printed notice on the parking tag disclaiming liability. Consequently, the appeal against the order of the State Commission was dismissed, although the interest awarded was modified from 12% per annum to 9% per annum. Hence, the present appeal.

Judgment:

1. Learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant made submissions as; with respect to the locus standi of Respondent No. 1, he argued that Respondent No. 1 does not qualify as a consumer. On merits, he vehemently submitted that the decision of the National Commission is erroneous inasmuch the principle of infra hospitium is not established under Indian law. He further relied on the decisions by Supreme Court to argue that a bailment necessarily exists under a contract, the terms of which are summarized in the parking tag in this case. Since the liability for theft is specifically precluded under the terms stated on the parking tag, he submitted that the Appellant cannot be held liable.
2. Counsel for Respondent No. 1 submitted that it is entitled to file a joint complaint with the original consumer in its capacity as a subrogee. Further, he relied on Klaus Mittelbachert v. East India Hotels Ltd^[1]. and Hotel Hyatt Regency v. Atul Virmani^[2], to argue that the duty of care owed by 5-star hotels is higher, and the Appellant must therefore be subject to the highest standard of insurer liability in case of theft of goods from its premises. 
3. with respect to liability for vehicles bailed to a hotel as is the case with valet parking, that such vehicles would normally be parked in the hotels own parking facility, or in the vicinity of the hotel, the hotel staff is well-placed to ensure safe custody of the vehicle and monitor its condition. Though valet parking may be offered as an optional complimentary service in some instances, more often than not, guests visiting the hotel have no other option but to entrust their vehicles to the hotels custody, especially given the congested urban areas where such hotels are located. As emphasized earlier, the guest has an implicit expectation that the repute and standards of 5-star hotels would entail adequate safety of the vehicles handed over for valet parking. Thus, in such a scenario, if the hotel is allowed to exclude its liability for negligence by way of a contract, the standard of care imposed under Section 151 will become illusory and virtually redundant, rendering consumers vulnerable without any remedy. In our view, the standard of care required to be taken by the hotel as a bailee under Section 151 is sacrosanct and cannot be contracted out of.
4. However, this does not mean that the hotel would be liable in all scenarios or that it cannot impose any exemption clause through a contract. There may be situations where the loss or damage may be caused due to the negligence of third parties, the bailors own negligence or unforeseen circumstances beyond the bailee’s control, which could not have been foreseen with ordinary diligence. This would include, for example, acts of God, seizure of the vehicle under legal process.

The Supreme Court has come to a conclusion that; the hotel-owner cannot contract out of liability for its negligence or that of its servants in respect of a vehicle of its guest in any circumstance. Once possession of the vehicle is handed to the hotel staff or valet, there is an implied contractual obligation to return the vehicle in a safe condition upon the direction of the owner.

^[1] AIR 1997 Del 201

^[2] III (2008) CPJ 281 (NC)

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Sastri Yagnyapurushadji and Ors. v. Muldas Brudardas Vaishya and Anr. [1966 SCR (3) 242]

Facts of the case: 

1. The appellants, who are the followers of the Swaminarayan sect and known at Satsangis, filed a representative suit: (i) for a declaration that the relevant provisions of the Bombay Harijan Temple Entry Act, 1947, as amended by Act 77 of 1948, did not apply to their temples, because, the religion of the Swaminarayan sect was distinct and different from Hindu religion and because, the relevant provisions of the Act, were ultra vires, 
2. And (ii) for an injunction restraining the 1st respondent and other non Satsangi Harijans from entering the Swaminarayan temple. The Trial Court decreed the suit.  Pending the 1st respondent’s appeal in the High Court, the Bombay Hindu Places of Public Worship (Entry Authorisation) Act, 1956, was passed, and since the 1947 Act gave place to the 1956 Act, it became necessary to consider whether the 1956 Act was intra vires. The High Court allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit holding that the followers of the Swaminarayan sect professed Hindu religion and that the Act of 1956 was constitutionally valid. Therefore, the present appeal is preferred before the Supreme Court. 

Judgment:

1. The development of Hindu religion and philosophy shows that from time to time saints and religious reformers attempted to remove from the Hindu thought and practices elements of corruption and superstition and that led to the formation of different sects. Buddha started Buddhism; Mahavir founded Jainism; Basava became the founder of Lingayat religion, Dnyaneshwar and Tuk-aram initiated the Varakari cult; Guru Nank inspired Sikhism; Dayananda founded Arya Samaj, and Chaitanya began Bhakti cult; and as a result of the teachings of Ramakrishna and Viveka-nanda, Hindu religion flowered into its most attractive, progressive and dynamic form. If we study the teachings of these saints and religious reformers, we would notice an amount of divergence in their respective views; but underneath that divergence, there is a kind of subtle indescribable unity which keeps them within the sweep of the broad and progressive Hindu religion.
2. There are some remarkable features of the teachings of these saints and religious reformers. All of them revolted against the dominance of rituals and the power of the priestly class with which it came to be associated; and all of them proclaimed their teachings not in Sanskrit which was the monopoly of the priestly class, but in the languages spoken by the ordinary mass of people in their respective regions.
3. The plea raised by the appellants that the Satsangis who follow the Swaminarayan sect form a separate and distinct community different from the Hindu community and their religion is a distinct and separate religion different from Hindu religion, is entirely inappropriate. Philosophically, Swaminarayan is a follower of Ramanuja, and the essence of his teachings is that every individual should follow the main Vedic injunctions of a good, pious and religious life and should attempt to attain salvation by the path of devotion to Lord Krishna.
4. Acceptance of the Vedas with reverence recognition of the fact that the path of Bhakti or devotion leads to Moksha, and insistence on devotion to Lord Krishna unambiguously and unequivocally proclaim that Swaminarayan was a Hindu saint who was determined to remove the corrupt practices which had crept into the lives of the preachers and followers of Vallabhacharya, and he wanted to restore the Hindu religion to its original glory and purity. 
5. The present suit began its career in 1948 and it was the result of the appellants’ apprehension that the proclaimed and publicised entry of the non-Satsangi Harijans would constitute a violent trespass on the religious tenets and beliefs of the Swaminarayan sect. The appellants must no doubt, have realised that if non-Satsangi Hindus including Harijans enter the temple quietly without making any public announcement in advance, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to bar their entry; but since respondent No. 1 publicly proclaimed that he and his followers would assert their right of entering the temples, the appellants thought occasion had arisen to bolt the doors of the temples against them; and so, they came to the Court in the present proceedings to ask for the Court’s command to prevent the entry of respondent No. 1 and his followers.
6. The Constitution came into force on the 26th January, 1950 and since then, the whole social and religious outlook of the Hindu community has undergone a fundamental change as a result of the message of social equality and justice proclaimed by the Indian Constitution. 

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Kalu @ Laxminarayan v. State of Madhya Pradesh (Criminal Appeal no. 1677 of 2010)

Facts of the case:

1. The deceased was married to the appellant approximately six to seven years back. Both of them were living alone in the house with their minor child. 
2. On 14.10.1994, late in the evening, family members of the deceased, who resided about 35−40 kms. away, received a telephone call that their daughter had died. 
3. They came the next morning at 06.00 AM and found the body of the deceased in the middle room of the house, lying on the ground covered with a white sheet. The first information report was lodged at about 07 am, the inquest report was prepared same day as also the post mortem was done in the afternoon. 
4. The police after completing investigation submitted charge sheet under Section 306 and 498A, IPC. During the course of the trial, considering the nature of evidence that emerged, the Sessions Judge also added Section 302, IPC in the charges. 
5. The Sessions Judge held the charge under Section 302 to be established as the deceased had been strangulated to death. The High Court in appeal opined that the deceased had been hanged to death. Both the courts have unanimously held that the deceased did not commit suicide but that it was a homicidal death.
6. Appellant, aggrieved by the decision of High Court convicting him under Section 302 of Indian Penal Code, come before Hon’ble Supreme Court.

Judgment:

1. Learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant, submitted that the deceased had committed suicide. The conviction of the appellant under Section 302 IPC was not justified. The appellant has been acquitted of the charge under Section 498A. It was impossible for the appellant to have alone forcibly hanged the deceased from a height of 11 feet.
2. Learned Addl. Advocate General appearing on behalf of the respondent State, submitted that all the circumstances in the case inevitably point towards the guilt of the appellant. Death was homicidal in nature. The nature of oral, physical and medical evidence completely rules out the defence of a suicide by the deceased.
3. The injuries on the person of the deceased, as noticed in the inquest report as also in the post mortem report, are clearly indicative of a struggle or resistance put up by the deceased in the last hour. It is unusual that if the deceased had committed suicide by hanging herself, her right hand would be lying on the stomach and the left hand would be on the ground with both fists half open. This is more of a probability if the deceased was strangulated when life ebbed out of her slowly. The fact that the neck of the deceased was not found stretched and elongated, considering that the body was still fresh, rules out any possibility of suicide by the deceased. The tongue was not protruding. Scratches and abrasions would not be present in case of a suicide. There is no fracture or dislocation of the bones in the neck area. 
4. The High Court opined that the deceased had been hanged to death. Suicide was ruled out as the wooden log in the room used for storing grains from which a piece of a rope was found hanging was 11 ft. 2 inches in height from the floor.
5. Court while coming towards conclusion opined that, the general rule in a criminal case is that; the burden of proof is on the prosecution and Section 106 is certainly not intended to relieve it of that duty. On the contrary, it is designed to meet certain exceptional cases in which it would be impossible, or at any rate disproportionately difficult, for the prosecution to establish facts which are especially within the knowledge of the accused and which he could prove without difficulty or inconvenience.
6. Where an offence like murder is committed in secrecy inside a house, the initial burden to establish the case would undoubtedly be upon the prosecution, but the nature and amount of evidence to be led by it to establish the charge cannot be of the same degree as is required in other cases of circumstantial evidence. In view of Section 106 of the Evidence Act, there will be a corresponding burden on the inmates of the house to give a cogent explanation as to how the crime was committed. 

Therefore, Supreme Court has stated that, in view of section 106 of the Evidence Act, there will be a corresponding burden on inmates of the house to give a cogent explanation as to how the crime was committed. The inmates cannot get away simply acting quiet. Supreme Court thus dismissed the appeal.

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The Durgah Committee, Ajmer and Anr. V. Syed Hussain Ali and Anr. [1962 SCR (1) 383]

Facts of the case: 

1. Khwaja Saheb came to India sometime towards the end of the 12th Century A. D. and settled down in Ajmer. His saintly character and his teachings attracted a large number of devotees during his lifetime and these devotees honoured him as a great spiritual leader. Khwaja Saheb belonged to the Chishti Order of Soofies. He died at Ajmer in or about 1236 A. D., and naturally enough after his death-his tomb became a place of pilgrimage.
2. The respondents’ case further is that after his death the tomb under which the saint was interred was a kutcha structure and continued to be such for nearly 300 years thereafter. The petition alleged that a pucca structure was built by the Khilji Sultans of Mandu and over the said pucca structure a tomb was constructed. Thereafter successive Muslim Rulers, particularly the Moghul Emperors, made endowments and added to the wealth and splendour of the shrine.
3. Khwaja Syed Fukhuruddin and Sheikh Mohammad Yadgar, who originally accompanied the Khwaja Saheb Syed to India, were his close and devoted followers. After the saint’s death both of them looked after the, grave and attended to the spiritual needs of the pilgrims. The descendants of these two disciples gradually came to be known as Khadims. For generations past their occupation has been that of religious service at the tomb of Khwaja Saheb. The- respondents belong to this sect or section of Khadims. They claim that they are members of a religious denomination or section known as Chishtia Soofies. Their petition further avers that throughout the centuries the Khadims had not only looked after the premises of the tomb but also kept the keys of the tomb and attended to the multitude of pilgrime who visited the shrine and acted as spiritual guides in the performance of religious functions to, with the Fateha (act of prayer) for which they received Nazars (offerings). These Nazars were the main source of income for the livelihood of the Khadims and have in fact always constituted their property.
4. Thus the respondents challenged the vires of the Act on the ground that its material provisions take away and/or abridge their fundamental rights as a class and also the fundamental rights of the muslims belonging to the Soofi Chishtia Order guaranteed by Arts. 14, 19 (1) (f) and (g), 25, 26, 31(1) and (2) as well as 32.

Judgment: 

1. The appellants pleaded that according to Islamic belief offerings made at the tomb of a dead saint are meant for the fulfilment of objects which were dear to the saint in his lifetime and they are meant for the poor, the indigent. the sick and the stiffering so that the benediction may reach the soul of the., departed saint. The averments made by the respondents in regard to their fundamental rights and their infringement were challenged by the appellants and it was urged that the Act in general and the provisions specified in the petition in particular were intra vires and constitutional.
2. The respondents pleaded that material provisions take away and/or abridge their fundamental rights as a class and also the fundamental rights of the muslims belonging to the Soofi Chishtia Order guaranteed by Arts. 14, 19 (1) (f) and (g), 25, 26, 31(1) and (2) as well as 32.
3. Freedom given under Articles 25 and 26; guarantees to every citizen not only the right to entertain such religious beliefs as may appeal to his conscience but also affords him the right to exhibit his belief in his conduct by such outward acts as may appear to him proper in order to spread his ideas for the benefit of others. 
4. If the right to administer the properties never vested in the denomination or had been validly surrendered by it or has otherwise been effectively and irretrievably lost to it Art. 26 cannot be successfully invoked.

The Supreme Court thus held that, the challenge to the vires of S. 5 and the subsidiary sections which deal with the powers of the Committee on the ground that the said provisions violate the fundamental right guaranteed to the denomination represented by the respondents under Art. 26(c) and (d) fails. And held that; the order passed by High Court is set aside and the petition filed by the respondents is dismissed with costs.

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Case: Antikeros Shipping Corporation having its office at 80, Broad Street, Monrovia Liberia, C/o Eletson Corporation, 118 Koloktroni, St. Piraeus, Greece v. Adani Enterprises Limited, a Company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956 having its office at 7th Floor, Eagle’s Flight, Suren Road, Andheri (East), Mumbai 400 093 (Appeal no. 533 of 2019)

Facts of the case:

1. On 28th February 2008 an agreement was entered into between the appellants (A company incorporated under the Laws of Liberia and thereby outside the territorial jurisdiction of India) and the respondent, a Company incorporated in India.  Under the agreement, the respondent, was to supply bunker fuel to the appellants’ vessel M.T. Antikeros at Mudra Port.  On 5th March 2008 the respondent supplied the fuel.  12 days’ latter, on 17^th March 2008 a dispute arose between the parties regarding the quantity and quality of the fuel supplied.  On 3rd June 2008 the appellant raised a demand towards damages in sum of $1,040,400.
2. The respondent denied liability vide reply dated 25th August 2008 and raised a Counter-Claim in sum of $90,325.00 towards the adjusted cost of the fuel which was offloaded in United Arab Emirates where the vessel was diverted. The agreement dated 28th February 2008 envisaged resolution of the dispute at Mumbai as per the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“Act”) before a Tribunal comprising three Arbitrators. One each to be nominated by contracting parties and 3^rd Arbitrator to be appointed by these two Arbitrators.
3. On 5^th July 2012 the appellant filed its Statement of Claim before the Arbitral Tribunal.  On 15^th October 2012 the respondent filed an application before the Arbitral Tribunal seeking disclosure of documents by the appellant.  On 23^rd October 2012 the respondent filed its Statement of Defence and raised a Counter-Claim before the Arbitral Tribunal and while doing so raised no objection to the constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal or its jurisdiction to decide the disputes.
4. On 25th August 2018 respondent’s counsel sought an adjournment informing that the respondent had sought review of the order dated 21st April 2011 passed by the Hon’ble High Court. On 28^th August 2018 the Tribunal rejected the respondent’s application dated 3rd August 2018 and refused to recall its order dated 3rd July 2013 and 19th September 2013.  On 30th August 2018 the respondent filed a petition seeking review of the order dated 21^st April 2011 passed by this Court.   It also sought 7 years’ delay in filing the Review Application to be condoned.
5. On 22^nd March 2018 the impugned order was passed condoning delay of 7 years’ in seeking review of the order dated 21st April 2011 and simultaneously recalling the said order appointing Ms.J.K. Bhatt as an Arbitrator on behalf of the respondent.

Judgment:

1. The Notice of Motion (L) No. 2015 of 2018 praying that 2680 days’ delay in filing Review Petition (L) No. 13/2018 and the Review Petition have been disposed of by the learned Single Judge.  Both have been allowed.  The two appeals challenge the composite impugned order, one appeal challenging the order in so far Notice of Motion (L) No. 2015/2018 has been allowed condoning 2680 days’ delay in seeking review of the order dated 21st April 2011 and the other Appeal challenging the order in so far review petition No. 13/2018 has been allowed.  
2. Hon’ble High Court held that, both appeals are maintainable regarding the impugned order having been passed in exercise of the review jurisdiction by the learned Single Judge.
3. The learned Single Judge has recognized the fact that under the Act no power of review is vested.  Though not specifically recognized, implicit in the impugned order is the recognition of the fact by the learned Single Judge that unlike the Supreme Court which is vested with a power of review under Art. 137 of the Constitution of India, High Courts are not vested with any power of review under the Constitution.  The learned Single Judge has recognized the difference between a substantive review and a procedural review and has held that the power of substantive review must be vested in a Court by a Statute and in the absence of such power vested, no substantive review can be undertaken by the Court.  But, a procedural review inheres in every Court and Tribunal to review its decision and if a procedural fault is found, to undo the same.
4. Where a Court takes wrong/erroneous decision of a matter and proceeds to pass an order on merits, an application filed pleading that the Court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the matter would relate to a substantive review being sought because the pleadings constituting the review would relate to the substance of the nature of law brought before the Court.
5. Prior to the amendment of the Act by the Arbitration & Conciliation (Amendment) Act 2015 brought into force with effect from 1st January 2016 when in sub-section 4, 5 & 6 of Section 11 of the Act the words ‘the Chief Justice or any person or institution designated by him’ wherever they occur were replaced by the words ‘the Supreme Court or, as the case may be, the High Court or any person or institution designated by such Court ‘ , the position was that under the Act the procedure for appointment in case of sub-section 3 being applicable was to file an application before the Chief Justice of a High Court or any person or institution designated by him,  in a case of domestic arbitration and before the Chief Justice of India or any person or institution designated by him in International Commercial Arbitration.
6. The impugned judgment has a reasoning which is rolled over with respect to the issue of 2680 days’ delay to be condoned. The learned Single Judge has held that by acquiescence and/or by consent jurisdiction cannot be conferred on a Court or an authority having no jurisdiction to take cognizance of a matter and because the learned Single Judge was exercising procedural review jurisdiction to correct a wrong by a Court of record, the issue of delay was irrelevant.  Therefore, the learned Single Judge has not dealt with the sufficiency of the cause shown in the pleadings in the Notice of Motion (L) No. 2015 of 2018.

Hon’ble High Court held that, both appeals are allowed. Impugned order dated 22nd March 2018 is set aside.  Notice of Motion (L) No.2015 of 2018 assigned Notice of Motion No. 1015 of 2019 after disposal whereof is dismissed and so is the Review Petition (L) No.13 of 2018.  The torpedo fired by the respondent is declared to be a dude and it sinks without hitting its target.  appellant would be entitled to costs incurred before the learned Single Judge as also in the instant appeals which quantify at 5 lakhs.

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Case: Amit Kumar Roy v. Union of India (Civil Appeal no. 4605 – 4606 of 2019)

Facts of the case:

1. The appellant was enrolled on 12 January 2004 as an Airman in the Indian Air Force. His regular engagement was to come to an end on 11 January, 2024. An advertisement was issued by the Bank of India on 7 August 2010 inviting applications for filling up 2,000 posts of Probationary Officers. While posted at the Three Base Repair Depot, the appellant responded to the advertisement and applied for the post of General Banking Officer in the pay scale of Rs. 14,500 – 25,700 in August 2010.
2. The appellant applied for the post without completing the mandatory period of service of seven years. Moreover, he did not obtain the prior permission of his unit authorities. This was (according to the Air Force authorities) in breach of the provisions of Air Force Order 14/2008 which was then in force. The appellant applied for the issuance of a No Objection Certificate 3 and a Discharge on 30 May 2011.
3. By then he had appeared at the written test held by the Bank on 16 March 2011 and for an interview at which he was declared to be successful. His application for an NOC and discharge was forwarded to the competent authority at Air Headquarters by the Headquarters Maintenance Command on 4 July 2011. On 28 July 2011, the appellant received an order of appointment as a Probationary Officer with the Bank. On 16 August 2011, he moved the AFT4 at its Regional Bench in Chandigarh seeking directions for the grant of an NOC and for discharge from the IAF to join a civil post with the Bank of India.
4. On 18 August 2011, the AFT issued an interim direction to the IAF authorities to provisionally issue an NOC and discharge appellant so as to enable him to take up new assignment before 24 August 2011. On 9 April 2012, when his OA came up before the AFT the Air Force authorities had already passed an order rejecting his application. Hence on 11 April 2012 the OA was dismissed as having become infructuous, though with the observation that the interim order dated 18 August 2011 will have its force. The appellants review application was dismissed on 25 May 2012. On 2 June 2012, the appellant filed writ proceedings 6 before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana. He was protected by an interim order dated 15 June 2012, against being treated as a deserter. On 22 June 2012 Air Headquarters cancelled the provisional NOC dated 2 September 2011 and the provisional discharge issued in compliance with the order of the AFT dated 11 April 2012 noting that an order of reinstatement in the service of the IAF was issued on 18 June 2012, to take effect from 16 July 2012. The appellant was called upon to join duties at his last unit, Three Base Repair Depot, failing which it was stated that he would be liable to disciplinary action.
5. Since the appellant had not received a clean discharge certificate, his services were terminated by Bank of India on 30 April 2014. Challenging his termination, the appellant moved writ proceedings 7 in which by an order dated 17 September 2014, the termination was stayed. The High Court held that it had no jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition filed by the appellant under Article 226 and while leaving it open to him to pursue an alternate remedy before the AFT.
6. The appellant now seeks to challenge the decision of the AFT rendered on 11 April 2012 together with its order dated 25 May 2012 declining to review its decision. The AFT came to the conclusion that the OA had been rendered infructuous since in the meantime, in pursuance of the orders of this Court a speaking order had been passed by the Air Force authorities on 26 March 2012 rejecting the application for an NOC. In the review order, the AFT declined permission to the appellant to amend the OA.

Judgment:

1. Mr. Gopal Sankaranarayanan, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant submitted that, the appellant has a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(g) to choose his place of employment. The provisions of Article 19(1)(g) in their application to the members of the Air Force are not any different from their application to any other branch of government.
2. Mr. R. Balasubramanian, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the Union of India and the Air Force authorities submitted that, the appellant has proceeded on a misconceived assumption that though he is a member of the Air Force, he is entitled to leave employment at his will in view of the fundamental right guaranteed by Article 19(1)(g).
3. He further submitted that, there is a myth that, a person enrolled in the armed forces of the Union (in this case the IAF) is entitled to leave service at will. A person who is enrolled is governed by the discipline of the force. Sections 13,14 and 15 of the Air Force Act 1950 would make it abundantly clearly that there is a statutory obligation to serve during the period of engagement, a breach of which would invite disciplinary action.

The appellant in breach of the provisions contained in AFO 14/2008 applied for the post of a Probationary Officer with the Bank of India, participated in the written test and appeared at the interview without intimation or approval. There was, therefore, a failure of the appellant to comply with his obligations both in terms of his engagement as an enrolled member of the force. Therefore, the Supreme Court has come to a conclusion that, the appellant is responsible for depositing Rs. 3 Lakh to Union of India within two months’ period and final NOC and discharge certificate shall be issued only after the amount is deposited.

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Case: Uttam R. Patil v. The State of Maharashtra and Ors. (Writ Petition no. 4959 of 2017)

Facts of the case:

1. The petitioner has been working in the post of lecturer in Marathi N.K. Varadkar Art and R.V. Belose Commerce College, Dapoli, Dist. Ratnagiri. Since 1^st July, 1992. The Petitioner had been selected for the post of lecturer in Marathi in the said college after interview by the duly constituted Selection Committee against the open post. It is stated in the Petition that during the said year 1992 the Selection Committee although formed and interviews fixed, the subject expert did not attend the interview. Thus, the Selection Committee procedure was completed during the next year.
2. However, the selection relates back to the initial appointment i.e. on 1st July, 1992. The Petitioner after working in the post of lecturer for about three academic years, the management of the college terminated his services on 20th April, 1995. The Petitioner filed Appeal No.24 of 1995 before the University and College Tribunal, Mumbai challenging the said termination. The University and College Tribunal, Mumbai allowed the Appeal by an order dated 20th June, 1996 thereby setting aside termination and directed the management to continue the Petitioner’s services and pay him the wages due to him.
3. The Petition refers to a letter dated 26th March, 2008 sent by the University of Mumbai by which the Respondent No.4 was intimated that the Petitioner was exempted from NET / SET qualification. It is stated in the said letter that since no NET qualified / NET exempted candidate was available at the time of interview, exemption may be granted for U.G. teaching only in respect of the two named candidates, which included the Petitioner as a teacher in the subject of Marathi.
4. Government Resolution dated 27th June, 2013. By the said GR, it was clarified that the prior GR dated 19th September, 1991 which was made applicable on 23rd October 1992 cannot be applied with retrospective effect. The said GR dated 27th June, 2013 expressly states that the NET / SET requirement would not be applicable to the teachers who were appointed prior to 23rd October, 1992. The Petitioner having been appointed on 1st July, 1992 i.e. prior to 23rd October, 1992 is exempt from the NET / SET requirement.
5. Being aggrieved by the decision of the University of Mumbai, granting approval to the appointment of the Petitioner with effect from the date he completed his M.Phil on 10th August, 1994 and the Respondent not according approval of the Petitioner from the date of his appointment i.e. 1st July, 1992, the Petitioner has filed the present Petition.

Judgment:

1. The judgment of the University and College Tribunal which had attained finality clearly held that there was no dispute in so far as the Petitioner being appointed by letter dated 27^th August, 1992 against open category after giving advertisement in the newspaper. His appointment was effective from 1st July, 1992. It was also noticed that the University whilst according approval had not mentioned that the appointment is either on ad hoc or on temporary basis because of the non-passing of the NET / SET examination. It was an open category advertisement and it was held that the word used ‘temporary’ or ‘ad hoc’ appeared to be a device to enable the management to throw out an employee as has been done in present case. It was thus held that, the justification given by management for terminating the services of the Petitioner was not sound and was accordingly set aside.
2. Hon’ble High Court has upheld the judgment given by the University and College Tribunal and held that, this judgment and the findings on facts therein are binding upon the University of Mumbai and the management staff of the college. The petitioner therefore entitled to be accorded regular approval with effect from 1^st July, 1992, which would be date of his appointment as a full time lecturer in Marathi in the said college.
3. Hon’ble High Court also held that, the petitioner would be entitled to the benefit of GR dated 27^th june, 2013, and his appointment being prior to 23^rd October, 1992, would be accorded as a regular approval from his appointment date.

Hon’ble High Court has held that, (i) Respondent no. 3 shall accord regular approval w.e.f. 1st July, 1992 for the appointment of the Petitioner as full time lecturer in Marathi in the College. (ii) Respondent no. 2 shall withdraw or cancel the approval letter dated 15th February, 2012 granting probation approval to the appointment of the Petitioner w.e.f. from the date the Petitioner cleared the M.Phil i.e. on 10th August, 1994. (iii) Respondent No.2 shall issue a fresh letter according regular approval to the appointment of the Petitioner w.e.f. 1st July, 1992.

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Case: Ex. Lac Yogesh Pathania v. Union of India (Civil Appeal no. 14214 of 2016)

Facts of the case:

1. The present appeal under Section 30 read with Section 31 of the Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007 along with IA No. 1 of 2016 seeking leave to appeal arises out of an order passed by the Armed Forces Tribunal, Chandigarh, Regional Bench at Chandimandir.
2. The incident pertaining to the disciplinary proceedings against the appellant happened after 2240 hrs in Dakota ‘A’ Block and at the main gate. A Court of Inquiry was conducted followed by summary of evidences. Thereafter the appellant was tried by District Court Martial on seven charges of misconduct. The District Court Martial has found the appellant guilty of charges.
3. The incident happened is that, on 22.05.2009, there was verbal fight with use of abusive language between Accounts Conversion Course trainees and Module II airmen trainees in the TV Room, over the change of TV channel. Squadron Duty Officer (Sgt BP Singh) and Orderly Officer (JWO JA Rana) got the TV room closed to avoid further fight amongst the trainees. The LAC S. Santra, sensing the possibility of further fight between the two groups of the trainees, informed the situation to WO Agar Singh. WO Agar Singh in turn informed MWO M. L. Ranwan (Cat Asst, Asst Flt Cdr Catering Faculty), who directed Agar Singh and other two faculty instructors Sgt A K Yadav and Sgt D Pradeep to the scene of disturbance Dakota A Block. On reaching to the scene of disturbance Dakota ‘A’ Block they found the trainees hooting, shouting and yelling, whistling and creating nuisance after the lights out time.
4. Before District Court Martial, the prosecution examined 14 witnesses, whereas the appellant examined 3 witnesses in defence. After examining the evidence on record, the appellant was given punishment of rigorous imprisonment for five months and also an order of dismissal from service was passed. Such punishment was confirmed on 09.03.2010 subject to modification of punishment of rigorous imprisonment being reduced to a period of two months. It is thereafter a statutory complaint was filed which was also dismissed.
5. The Tribunal, in appeal under Section 15 of the Act, examined the evidence led by the parties and found no error in the findings recorded by District Court Martial and consequently dismissed the appeal. It is, thereafter, the present appeal with an application for permission to file appeal has been preferred.

Judgment:

1. The allegations against the appellant are that he misbehaved with the senior officers when they visited Dakota ‘A’ Block.
2. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the evidence of the prosecution witnesses has not been taken into consideration by the Tribunal in proper manner and in fact has been misread. The learned counsel for the appellant relies upon the statements of PW 2 Santra, PW 8 D. Pradeep and PW12 Dheeraj Dalal to contend that the statements of such witnesses do not prove the allegation of whistling by the appellant. It is argued that PW12 Dheeraj Dalal Accounts Assistant of 408 Air Force Station was declared hostile. The witness was examined to prove the charge no. 2 that is the appellant at 405 Air Force Station at about 2245h, on 22.05.2009, improperly caused disturbance by whistling at A- 9 billet.
3. Supreme Court after appreciating the evidence; come to a conclusion that there is no need of interference by this court in terms of jurisdiction vested in it, under Sections 30 (1) and 31 (1) of the Armed Forces Act, 2007.
4. And therefore court come to a conclusion that, in terms of Section 31 of the Act, an appeal to this Court is maintainable with the leave of the Tribunal and such leave can be granted on the ground that a point of law of general public importance or it appears to the Supreme Court that the point is one which ought to be considered by that Court. The point on which this Court will exercise jurisdiction is a point of law of general public importance. We do not find that any point of law of general public importance is involved which may warrant grant of leave to the appellant. Consequently, I.A.No.1 of 2016 along with Civil Appeal is dismissed.

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Case: State of Uttranchal v. Balwant Singh Chaufal and Ors. (Civil appeal no. 1134 – 1135 of 2002)

Facts of the case:

1. Appeals have been filed by the State of Uttaranchal (now Uttarakhand) against the orders dated 12.7.2001 and 1.8.2001 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Uttaranchal at Nainital in Civil Miscellaneous Writ Petition No. 689 (M/B) of 2001.
2. The appointment of L. P. Nathani was challenged before the High Court in a Public Interest Litigation on the ground that he could not hold the august Office of the Advocate General of Uttarakhand in view of Article 165 read with Article 217 of the Constitution. According to the respondent, Mr. Nathani was ineligible to be appointed as the Advocate General because he had attained the age of 62 years much before he was appointed as the Advocate General. The High Court entertained the petition and directed the State Government to take decision on the issue raised within 15 days and apprise the same to the High Court.
3. The State of Uttaranchal preferred special leave petitions before Supreme Court on 6.8.2001. Supreme Court vide order dated 9.8.2001 stayed the operation of the impugned judgment of the High Court. Thereafter on 11.2.2002, Supreme Court granted leave and directed that the stay already granted shall continue.
4. Despite the service of notice, the respondents who had initially filed the writ petition before the High Court challenging the appointment of Nathani as the Advocate General did not appear before this Court. This clearly demonstrates the non- seriousness and non-commitment of the respondents in filing the petition.

Judgment:

1. In the instant case, the High Court entertained the petition despite the fact that the controversy involved in the case was no longer res integra. The controversy raised by the petitioner in this case was decided 58 years ago in the judgment of Karkare[1] which was approved by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court way back in 1962. Unfortunately, the same controversy has been repeatedly raised from time to time in various High Courts. When the controversy is no longer res-integra and the same controversy is raised repeatedly, then it not only wastes the precious time of the Court and prevent the Court from deciding other deserving cases, but also has the immense potentiality of demeaning a very important constitutional office and person who has been appointed to that office.
2. To settle the controversy, we deem it appropriate to deal with different definitions of the Public Interest Litigation in various countries. We would also examine the evolution of the public interest litigation. DEFINITIONS OF PUBLIC INTERST LITIGATION[2]:

“Public Interest – Something in which the public, the community at large, has some pecuniary interest, or some interest by which their legal rights or liabilities are affected. It does not mean anything so narrow as mere curiosity, or as the interests of the particular localities, which may be affected by the matters in question. Interest shared by citizens generally in affairs of local, state or national government….”

• It has been noticed that such an important jurisdiction which has been carefully carved out, created and nurtured with great care and caution by the courts, is being blatantly abused by filing some petitions with oblique motives. We think time has come when genuine and bona fide public interest litigation must be encouraged whereas frivolous public interest litigation should be discouraged. The Supreme Court broadly tried to curtail the frivolous public interest litigation petitions by two methods – (1) monetary, (2) non-monetary. The first category of cases is that where the court on filing frivolous public interest litigation petitions, dismissed the petitions with exemplary costs. In Neetu v. State of Pubjab & Others[3], the Court concluded that it is necessary to impose exemplary costs to ensure that the message goes in the right direction that petitions filed with oblique motive do not have the approval of the Courts.
• Supreme Court, in the second category of cases, even passed harsher orders. In Charan Lal Sahu & Others v. Giani Zail Singh & Another[4], the Supreme Court observed that, “we would have been justified in passing a heavy order of costs against the two petitioners” for filing a “light-hearted and indifferent” PIL petition. However, to prevent “nipping in the bud a well-founded claim on a future occasion,” the Court opted against imposing monetary costs on the petitioners.” In this case, Supreme Court concluded that the petition was careless, meaningless, clumsy and against public interest. Therefore, the Court ordered the Registry to initiate prosecution proceedings against the petitioner under the Contempt of Courts Act. Additionally, the court forbade the Registry from entertaining any future PIL petitions filed by the petitioner, who was an advocate in this case.
• Supreme Court in instant case allowed the appeals filed by the State and quash the proceedings of the Civil Miscellaneous Writ Petition No. 689 (M/B) of 2001 filed in the Uttaranchal High Court and further directed that the respondents (who were the petitioners before the High Court) to pay costs of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh) in the name of Registrar General of the High court of Uttarakhand. The costs to be paid by the respondents within two months.
• In order to preserve the purity and sanctity of the PIL, it has become imperative to issue the following directions:
• The courts must encourage genuine and bona fide PIL and effectively discourage and curb the PIL filed for extraneous considerations.
• Instead of every individual judge devising his own procedure for dealing with the public interest litigation, it would be appropriate for each High Court to properly formulate rules for encouraging the genuine PIL and discouraging the PIL filed with oblique motives.
• The courts should prima facie verify the credentials of the petitioner before entertaining a P.I.L.
• The court should be prima facie satisfied regarding the correctness of the contents of the petition before entertaining a PIL.
• The court should be fully satisfied that substantial public interest is involved before entertaining the petition.
• The court should ensure that the petition which involves larger public interest, gravity and urgency must be given priority over other petitions.
• The courts before entertaining the PIL should ensure that the PIL is aimed at redress of genuine public harm or public injury.

[1] G.D. Karkare v. T.L. Shevde & Others AIR 1952 Nagpur 330

[2]  Black’s Law Dictionary (6th Edition)

[3] AIR 2007 SC 758

[4] AIR 1984 SC 309

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Swami Chinmayanand Alias Krishna Pal Singh v. State of U.P. (Criminal Misc. Bail Application no. 44814 of 2019)

Facts of the case:

1. The accused applicant Chinmayanand, Ex-Member of Parliament who once also adorned the post of Minister for internal affairs in the Government of India is suffering incarceration in jail since 20th August, 2019 in connection with Case Crime No. 0445 of 2019, P.S. Kotwali, District Shahjahanpur. The FIR of the case was initially registered by Harish Chandra Sharma, father of the alleged victim, Miss “A”, on 27.08.2019 under sections 364 and 506 IPC at P.S. Kowali, District Shahjahanpur naming the applicant Swami Chinmayanand, Rector of SS Law College, Shahjahanpur as well as certain other persons.
2. In the FIR, lodged by Harish Chandra Sharma, father of the alleged victim, the complainant has admitted that his daughter was persuing her LL.M. Education from SS Law College, Shahjahanpur and she was residing in the hostel of the aforesaid College. He alleged therein that since 23.08.2019, the mobile telephone of the victim was switched off and through the facebook account of (Miss “A”-daughter of Harish Chand) saw certain videos and pictures uploaded by the daughter. For the first time, came to know that her daughter and some other girls were being subjected to sexual misadventures by the accused applicant and they are being extended threats for their lives by his hired goons. 
3. During the pendency of the present bail application, another FIR was lodged and the copy of the same was presented before the Supreme Court. Which was lodged by Om Singh, Advocate on 25/08/2019 bearing CC no. 442 of 2019 under sections 387, 507 IPC and 67 of the Information Technology (Amendment) Act 2008 against unknown holder of mobile No. 8604207465 with the allegation on the holder of above mobile, that the applicant (herein accused) received a call on his mobile no. 9415326300 from the aforesaid phone (No. 8604207465) demanding ransom of Rs. Five Crore and threatening him of defamation in society by making certain nude videos and pictures of the accused, viral in the social network, if the aforesaid ransom demand remains unfulfilled.
4. father of Miss “A”- Harish Chanda lodged CC No. 445 of 2019 on 27.08.2019 in FIR, enrolling applicant as accused and slapping all sort of malicious allegations upon him to reduce his high reputation into ashes. To build up mountain of his argument, learned counsel for the applicant submitted that the complainant of the aforesaid FIR, even has diced his daughter Miss “A” to win the dirty game for the sake of monetary and material gains.
5. After lodging FIR No. 0442 of 2019 against the holder of mobile phone number 8604207465, the police investigated the matter by hotly pursued accused, who were at run, who demanded the ransom amount from the applicant. This fact was also much tossed in the print and in the electronic media and the Hon’ble Apex Court took suo-moto cognizance of both the matters in re: Missing of an LL.M student at Swami Shukhdevana Law College (SS Law College)^[1] from Shahjahanpur under section PIL-W on the new papers report as well as on online new portals stating therein that an LL.M student Miss “A” of the aforesaid College is missing from 24.08.2019, wherein the missing girl levelled certain allegations on the persons running the institutions in SS Law College. 

Judgment:

1. Before adjudicating the bail application, the Court is conscious about the “word of caution” provided by Hon’ble the Apex Court in its recent judgment in the case of Shri P. Chidambaram v. Central Bureau of Investigation^[2]decided by the Hon’ble Apex Court, wherein Hon’ble the Supreme Court had deprecated the practice of giving any finding on the merits, while deciding the Bail Application. 
2. Supreme Court observed that, the jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on the basis of the well-settled principles having regard to the facts and circumstances of each case. The following factors are to be taken into consideration while considering an application for bail: (i) the nature of accusation and the severity of the punishment in the case of conviction and the nature of the materials relied upon by the prosecution; (ii) reasonable apprehension of tampering with the witnesses or apprehension of threat to the complainant or the witnesses; (iii) reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the time of trial or the likelihood of his abscondence; (iv) character behaviour and standing of the accused and the circumstances which are peculiar to the accused; (v) larger interest of the public or the State and similar other considerations.
3. The Court has observed that, however, it does not mean that, bail should be granted in every case liberally rather while adjudicating any bail application, the Court must consider authentic evidence collected during investigation, available on record with humanity and compassion and if it thinks that there are possibilities of granting bail to an accused, the conditions thereof should not be so strict that it turns to be incapable to be complied with and thus making the bail order illusionary.
4. Court was aware of the fact that many times, the learned trial courts sway away be the observations of the Apex Court while adjudicating the bail orders. It is, therefore, earnestly directed that no observation of this Court in passing this order shall effect either ways by the trial court during trial. The trial court would apply its own judicial discretion and accused while adjudicating the trial of the instant case.

Therefore, Supreme Court come to a conclusion that, let the applicant-Swami Chinmayanand alias Krishna Pal Singh, be released on bail on his executing a personal bond and furnishing two heavy sureties each in the like amount to the satisfaction of the court concerned in case crime no. 0445 of 2019, under Sectrions 376-C, 354-D, 342 and 506 IPC, P.S. Kotwali, District Shahjahanpur on condition that, the applicant shall file an undertaking to the effect that he shall not seek any adjournment on the date fixed for evidence when the witnesses are present in court. in case of default of this condition, it shall be open for the trial court to treat it as abuse of liberty of bail and pass orders in accordance with law.  

^[1] Writ (Criminal) No. 2 of 2019

^[2] {Criminal Appeal No. 1603 of 2019 [arising out of SLP (Crl) No. 9269 of 2019] along with Criminal Appeal No. 1605 of 2019 [arising out of SLP (Crl) No. 9445 of 2019]}

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