Manohar Lal Sharma vs. Narendra Damodardas Modi and others WP (Crl.) 225/2018; RP (Crl.) 46/2019

Fact of case:

The issues arising in this of writ petition relate to procurement of 36 Rafale Fighter Jets for the Indian Air force. The procurement in question, which has been sought to be challenged, has its origins in the post Kargil experience that saw a renewed attempt to advance the strategic needs of the armed forces of the country.

In 2007, the Ministry of Defence issued tenders for the purchase of 126 fighter aircraft, in line with the procedure set out in the Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP). In particular, the Union would purchase 18 from abroad in ‘fly-away’ condition, while 108 would be manufactured in India by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) via a ‘tranfser of technology’ from a foreign company. After an extensive selection process, the Union selected the French company Dassault. Dassault manufactures the Rafale twin-engine fighter aircraft. By 2015, price negotiations were in their final stage.

However, in March 2015 Prime Minister Narendra Modi and the President of France announced a new deal for the purchase of only 36 Rafale fighter aircraft. The Ministry of Defence subsequently announced that the tender for 126 aircraft had been withdrawn. The new deal included a 50% offset clause, which required Dassault (and the other foreign companies involved, such as Thales and Safran) to invest 50% of the contract value back into India via the purchase of Indian goods and services. In October 2016, Dassault and Anil Ambani’s Reliance Group announced a joint venture – Dassault Reliance Aerospace Ltd (DRAL) – with Dassault specifying that intends to invest $115 million to partially fulfill its offset obligation. 

In 2018, multiple litigants were filed petitions in the Supreme Court, claiming that the Rafale Fighter Jet Deal suffers from serious procedural irregularities.

Issues:

1. Does the Rafale Fighter Jet Deal suffer from pricing irregularities, considering that the per unit cost of the new deal is higher than what was earlier negotiated under the UPA government?

2. Is the Rafale Fighter Jet Deal an inter-governmental agreement between India and France?

3. Did the Central Government follow proper procedure, given that it went from purchasing 126 aircraft to only 36 aircraft?

4. Did the Central Government propose Reliance Defence Ltd as Dassault Aviation’s Indian Offset Partner without the approval of the Minister of Defence, as required by Clause 8.6 of the Defence Offset Guidelines?

Judgement:

In 2018, the court in a unanimous judgment decided not to order a court monitored investigation of the Union government’s purchase of Rafale fighter aircraft. In 2019, it rejected to review its judgment.

On 21 Feburary 2019, the court agreed to hear a review petition challenging the judgment, filed by Yashwant Sinha, Arun Shourie and Prashant Bhushan. These review petitioners allege that the judgment rests on incorrect factual claims made by the government.

In view of the courts findings on all the three aspects, and having heard the matter in detail, we find no reason for any intervention by this Court on the sensitive issue of purchase of defence aircrafts by the Indian Government. Perception of individuals cannot be the basis of a fishing and roving enquiry by this Court, especially in such matters. We, thus, dismiss all the writ petitions, leaving it to the parties to bear their own costs. We, however, make it clear that our views as above are primarily from the standpoint of the exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 32 of the Constitution of India which has been invoked in the present group of cases.The Court’s approach was pretty simple and straightforward: there are severe limits to the Court’s jurisdiction while examining a case of defence procurement. Lest the point was lost on the average reader, the Court concluded the judgment with the following words: “We however make it clear that our views as above are primarily from the standpoint of the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 32 of the Constitution of India which has been invoked in the present group of cases.”

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Narmada Bachao Andolan vs Union of India and others AIR 2000 SC 3751

Fact of case:

On behalf of the petitioners, the arguments of Sh. Shanti Bhushan, learned senior counsel, were divided into four different heads, namely, general issues, issues regarding environment, issues regarding relief and rehabilitation and issues regarding review of Tribunals Award. The petitioners have sought to contend that it is necessary for some independent judicial authority to review the entire project, examine the current best estimates of all costs (social, environmental, financial), benefits and alternatives in order to determine whether the project is required in its present form in the national interest or whether it needs to be re- structured/modified. It is further the case of the petitioners that no work should proceed till environment impact assessment has been fully done and its implications for the projects viability being assessed in a transparent and participatory manner. This can best be done, it is submitted, as a part of the comprehensive review of the project.

While strongly championing the cause of environment and of the tribals who are to be ousted as a result of the submergence, it was submitted that the environmental clearance which was granted in 1987 was without any or proper application of mind as complete studies in that behalf were not available and till this is done the project should not be allowed to proceed further. With regard to relief and rehabilitation a number of contentions were raised with a view to persuade this Court that further submergence should not take place and the height of the dam, if at all it is to be allowed to be constructed, should be considerably reduced as it is not possible to have satisfactory relief and rehabilitation of the ousters as per the Tribunals Award as a result of which their fundamental rights under Article 21 would be violated.

While the State of Madhya Pradesh has partly supported the petitioners inasmuch as it has also pleaded for reduction in the height of the dam so as to reduce the extent of submergence and the consequent displacement, the other States and the Union of India have refuted the contentions of the petitioners and of the State of Madhya Pradesh. While accepting that initially the relief and rehabilitation measures had lagged behind but now adequate steps have been taken to ensure proper implementation of relief and rehabilitation at least as per the Award. The respondents have, while refuting other allegations, also questioned the bona fides of the petitioners in filing this petition. It is contended that the cause of the tribals and environment is being taken up by the petitioners not with a view to benefit the tribals but the real reason for filing this petition is to see that a high dam is not erected per se. It was also submitted that at this late stage this Court should not adjudicate on the various issues raised specially those which have been decided by the Tribunals Award.

Issues:

1. Whether the environmental clearance granted by the Union of India for the construction of a dam had been granted without proper study and understanding of the environmental impact of the project?
2. Whether the environmental conditions imposed by the Ministry of Environment had been violated and if so, what was the legal effect of the violations?

Judgement:

The Supreme Court of India declined to get involved in a petition against damming the Narmada River. In so doing, the Court noted that a lengthy decision-making process had been behind the damming, and that the Court should not try to second-guess something which had been given such great consideration already. Thus, the Court essentially gave the go-ahead for the displacement of indigenous and tribal populations which were in the path of the damming.

While issuing directions and disposing of this case, two conditions have to be kept in mind by the court The completion of project at the earliest and ensuring compliance with conditions on which clearance of the project was given including completion of relief and rehabilitation work and taking of ameliorative and compensatory measures for environmental protection in compliance with the scheme framed by the Government thereby protecting the rights under Article 21 of the Constitution.The court ordered compensatory measures for environmental protection in compliance with the scheme framed by the Government and ordered the construction to continue while the alleviate measures were carried out.

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M Siddiq (D) Thr Lrs vs Mahant Suresh Das & Ors Civil Appeal Nos 10866-10867 of 2010

Fact of case:

Lord Rama was born in Ayodhya on the banks of the river Sarayu, according to the Ramayana. This place is identified with Ayodhya in present-day Uttar Pradesh. As per Hindu beliefs, an ancient temple stood at the birthplace to mark the spot. And that it was demolished in 1528 by first Mughal emperor Babur when he built a mosque – Babri Masjid – which was subsequently demolished by kar sevaks on December 6, 1992. The disputed property is of immense significance to Hindus and Muslims. The Hindu community claims it as the birthplace of Lord Ram, an incarnation of Lord Vishnu. The Muslim community claims it as the site of the historic Babri Masjid built by the first Mughal Emperor, Babur.

• 1528– The Babri Masjid constructed on orders of emperor Babur. As per local tradition, it was built after demolishing the temple at the birth spot of Rama.
• 1859– The colonial British administration put a fence around the site, post a communal clash, denominating separate areas of worship for Hindus and Muslims.
• 1949– Idols were placed inside the mosque. Both sides to the dispute filed civil suits. The government declared the area to be disputed and locked the gates of the building. The matter was held to be sub-judice.
• 1984– The movement to build a temple at the site, gathered strength when Hindu groups formed a committee to spearhead the construction of a temple at the disputed site.
• 1986- An order was passed by the district judge to open the gates of the mosque and allow the Hindus to worship inside the structure.
• 1989- In the month of November, the Vishwa Hindu Parishad laid foundations of a temple on land adjacent to the disputed structure. There were sporadic clashes in the country subsequent to this.
• 1990- The then BJP president Lal Krishna Advani took out a cross-country rathyatra to garner support for the move to build a Ram temple at the site.
• 1992- The then Chief Minister, Kalyan Singh took steps to support the movement such as making entry into area easier, promising no firing on Karsevaks, opposing decision of central government to send Central Police force in the area, etc.
• On 6th December, the mosque was demolished by nearly 2,00, 000 kar sevaks. This led to communal riots in many parts of the country.
• 2010- The Allahabad High Court pronounces its verdict on four title suits relating to the Ayodhya dispute on 30 September 2010. Ayodhya land to be divided into three parts.

Judgement:

The 5-judge bench of Ranjan Gogoi, CJ, S.A. Bobde, Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, Ashok Bhushan and S. Abdul Nazeer, JJ, sat down on a Saturday morning, otherwise a holiday, to finally put an end to the Ayodhya Title dispute and held that the disputed land is to be given to Trust for construction of Ram Mandir. In an effort to balance the interest of both the parties involved, the Court directed that a suitable plot of 5 acres must be granted to Sunni Waqf Board to set up a Mosque.

It said, “justice would not prevail if the Court were to overlook the entitlement of the Muslims who have been deprived of the structure of the mosque through means which should not have been employed in a secular nation committed to the rule of law.”

“The allotment of in respect of the possessory claim of the Hindus to the composite whole of the disputed property stands on a better footing than the evidence adduced by the Muslims.”

Though it held that Ram Mandir be built at the disputed site, the Court, however, directed

“Having weighed the nature of the relief which should be granted to the Muslims, we direct that land admeasuring 5 acres be allotted to the Sunni Central Waqf Board either by the Central Government out of the acquired land or by the Government of Uttar Pradesh within the city of Ayodhya.”

Directions by the Court:

• Central Government to formulate a scheme for he setting up of a trust with a Board of Trustees or any other appropriate body within 3 months. Nirmohi Akhara to be given adequate representation in the Trust.
• Possession of the inner and outer courtyards shall be handed over to the Board of Trustees of the Trust or to the body so constituted. Possession of the disputed property shall continue to vest in the statutory receiver under the Central Government till then.
• A suitable plot of land admeasuring 5 acres be allotted to the Sunni Central Waqf Board either by
  • The Central Government out of the land acquired under the Ayodhya Act 1993; or

The State Government at a suitable prominent place in Ayodhya.

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Zahira Habibulla H Sheikh and Anr. Vs. State of Gujarat others Appeal (criminal) 446-449 of 2004

Fact of case:

The night of March 1, 2002 witnessed the unruly burning of Best Bakery at Vadodara, one of the many ghastly alleged retaliations to the Sabarmati Coach S-6 fire. Zahira, the main eye-witness of the gruesome incident, is the first appellant in this case which serves as the first grave condemnation of the possibly collapsing criminal justice system in India by one of its own at the apex court. In so doing, the two judge Bench of the Supreme Court, comprising of Doraiswamy Raju and Dr. Arijit Pasayat, JJ., raises important questions relating to the role of the court, the public prosecutor, investigating agencies, and the State in a criminal proceeding. State-sanctioned and sponsored criminal bouts of communal violence pose the unique problem of the State prosecuting the State, and in extension, every officer of the prosecuting State undertaking every effort to ensure the acquittal of accused officers of the State. This case is then is relevant to acknowledge a phenomenon pervaded by official bias, chart the gravity of its implications on criminal jurisprudence, and succinctly identify the normative role of various State instrumentalities to revamp the collapsing system of criminal justice in India.

This case has its matrix in an appeal filed by Zahira Habibullah hereinafter referred to as ‘Zahira and Another namely, Teesta Setelwad’ and another appeal filed by the State of Gujarat. In the appeals filed before this Court, the basic focus was on the absence of an atmosphere conducive to fair trial. Zahira who was projected as the star witness made a grievance that she was intimidated, threatened and coerced to depart from the truth and to make statement in Court which did not reflect the reality.

The trial Court on the basis of the statements made by the witnesses in Court directed acquittal of the accused persons. Before the Gujarat High Court an application under Section 391 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short the ‘Code’) highlighting the necessity for accepting additional evidence was filed. The foundation was the statement made by Zahira.

The High Court did not accept the prayer and that is why the appeals came to be filed in this Court.

Judgement:

The 2004 judgment is one that has uniquely spoken truth to (political) power in calling out the arbitrariness and impropriety in the application of judicial mind by the High Court of Gujarat, deliberate laxity in investigation and prosecution, and lack of political will by officers of the State who were complicit in, if not actively at the helm of planning and executing, the Best Bakery fire.

In locating religious fanaticism as outside the purview of religion, the Supreme Court stands its ground in declaring communal violence purportedly in the name of a particular religion to not only be criminal but also religiously reprehensible.

By judgment dated 12th April, 2004, the following directions were given:

• Keeping in view the peculiar circumstances of the case, and the ample evidence on record, glaringly demonstrating subversion of justice delivery system no congeal and conducive atmosphere still prevailing, we direct that the re-trial shall be done by a Court under the jurisdiction of Bombay High Court. The Chief Justice of the said High Court is requested to fix up a Court of Competent jurisdiction.
• Since we have directed re-trial it would be desirable to the investigating agency or those supervising the investigation, to act in terms of Section 173(8) of the Code, as the circumstances seem to or may so warrant. The Director General of Police, Gujarat is directed to monitor re-investigation, if any, to be taken up with the urgency and utmost sincerity, as the circumstances warrant.

Sub-section (8) of Section 173 of the Code permits further investigation, and even de hors any direction from the Court as such, it is open to the police to conduct proper investigation, even after the Court took cognizance of any offence on the strength of a police report earlier submitted.”

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Independent Thought vs. Union of India [Writ Petition (Civil) no. 382 of 2013]

Fact of case:

The petitioner is a National Human Rights organization registered in 2009 and has since been working in the area of child rights. The society provides procedural and hand-holding support to non-governmental organizations and also to government and multifaceted bodies in several States in India. It has also been involved in legal interposition, research and training on issues concerning children and their rights. The organization has filed a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution in public interest with a view to draw attention to the violation of the rights of girls who are married between the ages of 15 and 18 years.

According to the petitioner, the sexual intercourse regardless of the consent or otherwise, between a man and his child bride of age between 15 and 18 years amounts to rape. Almost every statute in India recognizes that a girl below 18 years of age is a child and it is for this reason that the law penalizes sexual intercourse with a girl who is below 18 years of age. Unfortunately, by virtue of Exception 2 to Section 375 of the IPC, if a girl child between 15 and 18 years of age is married, her husband can have non-consensual sexual intercourse with her, without being penalized under the IPC, only because she is married to him and for no other reason. The right of such a girl child to physical integrity and to decline to have sexual intercourse with her husband has been statutorily taken away and non-consensual sexual intercourse with her husband is not an offence under the IPC.

Issues:

Whether sexual intercourse between a man and his wife being a girl between 15 and 18 years of age is rape?

Judgement:

On considering these matter in detail the two judges, Justice Madan B Lokur and Justice Deepak Gupta have come with concurring but separate judgment. It says  that  Exception 2 to Sec 375 IPC in so far as it relates to  a girl child below 18 years is liable to struck down on the following grounds:-

• It is arbitrary and violative of rights of girl child and not just or reasonable and therefore violative of Art 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution of India.
• It is inconsistent with the provisions of POSCO, which must prevail.

Therefore, Exception 2 to Sec 375 is read down as follows;

“Sexual intercourse or sexual acts by a man with his own wife, the wife not being under 18 years of age, is not rape”

However, it was clearly stated that the judgment will have only prospective effect.

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Shakti Vahini vs. Union of India & Others [Writ Petition (Civil) No. 231 of 2010]

Fact of case:

The Petitioner Shakti Vahini Organization was authorized for doing a research study on “Honour killings in Haryana and western Uttar Pradesh” by order dated 22.12.2009 passed by National Commission for Women. It was observed that in Haryana, Uttar Pradesh and Punjab trend of honour killings has increased and it creates fear among youth who intend to get married by their own choice. According to NCRB report in the year 2014, 2015 and 2016- 288 cases of honour killing were reported (provisional data).

Writ petition has been filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India seeking directions to the respondents- the State and the Central Governments to take preventive steps to fight honour crimes, to submit a National & State Plan of action to control crimes of the said nature and further to direct the State Governments to constitute special cells in each district which can be approached by the couples for their security and protection. Also, it was pleaded to issue a writ of mandamus to the State Governments to launch prosecutions in each case of Honour killing and take appropriate measures so that all such honour crimes and rooted evil in the mind-sets of certain members of the society are dealt appropriately.

Issues:

1. Whether an individual has a right to choose life partner of his/her choice?

2. Whether honour killings undertaken by Khap- Panchayats are legal?

Judgement:

On 27^th March, 2018 the Apex Court gave a landmark ruling that any attempt by Khap Panchayats or any other assembly to destroy or preventing two consenting adults from marrying is absolutely ‘illegal’ and laid down certain preventive, remedial and punitive measures in this regard.  The 54 page judgment was delivered by the three-judges’ bench comprising the Chief Justice of India, Mr. Justice Dipak Misra, Mr. Justice A.M Khanwilkar and D.Y Chandrachud. The court held, “the criminal cases pertaining to honour killing or violence to the couple(s) shall be tried before the designated Court or Fast Track Court as felt necessary by the authority for that purpose. The trial must proceed on day to day basis to be concluded preferably within six months from the date of taking cognizance of the offence. We may hasten to add that this direction shall apply even to pending cases. The concerned District Judge shall assign those cases, as far as possible, to one jurisdictional court so as to ensure expeditious disposal thereof.”The judgment also says that Khap panchayats should not take the law into their hands and cannot assume the character of a law implementing agency for that authority has not been conferred upon them under any law. Khaps are caste and community based assemblies – usually comprising elderly men from the Jat community – in northern parts of India that have a say on several issues, including marriage, dowry and the education of children, based on traditional customs.

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Gujarat vs. Mirzapur Moti Kureshi Kassab Jamat, 2005 [Civil Appeal Nos. 4937-4940 of 1998]

Fact of case:

By the Bombay Animal Preservation (Gujarat Amendment) Act of 1994, the restriction that bulls and bullocks below the age of 16 years could not be slaughtered was enlarged to a to a total prohibition on the slaughter of the progeny of the cow in the State of Gujarat.

The whole controversy arose in the writ petition filed in the Gujarat High Court challenging the validity of the Bombay Animal Preservation (Gujarat Amendment) Act, 1994. By this amendment the age restriction was totally taken away and that means that no bull and bullock irrespective of age shall be slaughtered. This amendment was challenged before the Gujarat High Court. The Gujarat High Court after dealing with all aspects in detail held that amendment is ultra vires. The State of Gujarat appealed the decision to the Supreme Court.

The matter was listed before the three Judges’ Bench. Thereafter, it was taken by the Constitution Bench and the Constitution Bench realizing difficulty that there are already Constitution Bench judgments holding the field, referred the matter to the seven Judges’ Bench for reconsideration of all the earlier decisions of the Constitution Benches. Hence, the present petition along with the other petitions came up before the Supreme Court by Special Leave Petition.

Issues:

Respondents challenge the constitutionality of the Gujarat Amendment, contending that such amendment violates the fundamental rights of butchers under art. 19(1) (g) of the Constitution.

Judgement:

The Hon’ble Chief Justice has dealt in detail the relation of Fundamental Rights with Directive Principles. His Lordship has very exhaustively dealt with all the cases bearing on the subject prior and after decision in Keshwanand Bharti’s case. The court should guard zealously Fundamental Rights guaranteed to the citizens of the society, but at the same time strike a balance between the Fundamental Rights and the larger interests of the society. But when such right clashes with the larger interest of the country it must yield to the latter. Therefore, wherever any enactment is made for advancement of Directive Principles and it runs counter to the Fundamental Rights an attempt should be made to harmonise the same if it promotes larger public interest.

The court also repelled all arguments on the grounds of fundamental rights under Article 14 and 19(1) (g) by stating that, “In the light of the material available in abundance before us, there is no escape from the conclusion that the protection conferred by the impugned enactment on cow progeny is needed in the interest of the nation’s economy. Merely because it may cause “inconvenience” or some “dislocation” to the butchers, restriction imposed by the impugned enactment does not cease to be in the interest of the general public. The former must yield to the latter.”

The Supreme Court sided with the appellant (State of Gujarat), considering that the restriction placed on the fundamental right of butchers is reasonable in that the ban does not run in clear conflict with the fundamental right of butchers, and has been enacted within the legislative competence of the enacting legislature.

“A cattle which has served human beings is entitled to compassion in its old age when it has ceased to be milch or draught and becomes so-called ‘useless’. It will be an act of reprehensible ingratitude to condemn a cattle in its old age as useless and send it to a slaughterhouse taking away the little time from its natural life that it would have lived, forgetting its service for the major part of its life, for which it had remained milch or draught. We have to remember: the weak and meek need more of protection and compassion.”

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Vijay Lakshmi vs. Punjab University and others, 2003 Appeal (Civil) 13393 of 1996

Fact of case:

Preference given to a woman for being appointed as a Principal of the Government College for Girls is held to be violative of Articles 14, 15 and 16 of the Constitution of India. On the face of it, it appears that such reservation in favour of a Woman for being appointed as Principal of exclusive Girls College cannot be held to be violative of right to equality.

However, this question is required to be decided in view of the judgment rendered by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Writ Petition No.11694 of 1994 holding that Rules providing reservation / preference in favour of a woman is violative of Articles 15 and 16 of the Constitution. 

For this purpose, the High Court interpreted Rules 5, 8 and 10 of the Punjab University Calendar Volume – III, which are as under:—

Rule 5. The Principal of a women’s college shall be lady who shall possess at least Master’s Degree in 1st or 2nd Class or an equivalent degree with experience of teaching in a college. This rule shall not apply to Women’s colleges whose men or women Principals have already been approved. Provided that on their retirement, a qualified lady Principal shall be appointed.

Rule 8. As far as possible, ladies shall be appointed as teachers. In case a qualified lady teacher in a particular subject is not available, the college authorities may appoint a man teacher with the prior approval of the Vice Chancellor. A man teacher so appointed shall not be confirmed by the management in his post and he shall be replaced as soon as a suitable qualified lady teacher is available.

Rule 10. The College shall have a hostel in or near the premises of the college. It shall be under the charge of a whole time Woman Superintendent. There shall a part time or whole time women Medical Officer.”

The judgment of High Court is challenged by filing this appeal.

Issues:

Whether reservation in favour of appointment of a Women Principle for Government College of Girls is violative of Right to Equality?

Judgement:

In view of the aforesaid established law interpreting Articles 14 to 16, Rules 5 and 8 of Punjab University Calendar Volume – III providing for appointment of lady principal in Women’s College or a lady teacher therein cannot be held to be violative either of Article 14 or Article 16 of the Constitution, because classification is reasonable and it has a nexus with the object sought to be achieved. In addition, the State Government is empowered to make such special provisions under Article 15 (3) of the Constitution. This power is not restricted in any manner by Article 16.

In the result the appeal was allowed. The impugned judgment rendered by the majority striking down the Rules 5, 8 & 10 of the Punjab University Calendar Volume–III as violative of Articles 14 or 16 is set aside. Minority view holding that the said Rules are not violative of Articles 14 or 16 is upheld.

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Lily Thomas vs. Union of India & Others., AIR 2000 SC 1650

Fact of case:

Lily Thomas is the lawyer of a distressed wife, Mrs. Sushmita Ghosh and other such women who have been a victim to bigamous marriage through religious conversions.

The husband of the petitioner was Hindu before and during their marriage, but he became a Muslim and took another wife. The petitioner argued that he did it in order to avoid the Marriage Act which will convict him of Bigamy or Polygamy although the Muslim law allow such.

Issues:

1. Whether a Hindu husband can solemnise second marriage by converting to Islam?

2. Whether the husband would be liable for bigamy under section 494 of IPC?

Judgement:

Mrs. Sushmita Ghosh v. Union of India and Others, Smt. Sarla Mudgal, Kalyani and others v. Union of India and Others, Sunita & Fatima v. Union of India and Others these petitions were collectively taken by SC to decide the status of bigamous marriage by converting to Islam.

Bigamy is the offence of marrying another while the first marriage still persists and such bigamous relations are illegal and the second marriage is void ab initio.

The SC bench of Justice Sagir Ahmed and Justice Sethi considered second marriage without prior divorce from the first marriage to be void wherein men were converting their religion to Islam to solemnize the second marriage but all of this was considered void unless and until first marriage was dissolved according to the Hindu Marriage Act otherwise the husband would be liable for bigamy under section 494 and 495 of Indian Penal Code.

Marriage resulting from conversion is deemed void even when Muslim Personal Law allows polygamy because such conversion is not exercise of freedom of conscience but rather feigned and fraudulent without change of faith.

This was because converting to Islam would not dissolve the first marriage and the Husband is liable to all the obligations as he would be prior converting to Islam.

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P.A. Inamdar & Others v/s State of Maharashtra & Others., Case no.: Appeal (civil) 5041 of 2005

Fact of case:

In the present case, for the admissions of BDS and MDS for academic year 2013- 14 the petitioners college took permission for conducting their own CET for both UG and PG. the permission was granted by the authorized committee but later on the state asked the petitioners were forced with authoritative pressure to conduct of CET-2013 for Minority Quota admissions for Post Graduate MDS course and first year BDS course for the Academic Year 2013-14.

It is seen that M.A. Rangoonwala Dental College, Pune had requested Samiti to allow the separate CET i.e. MARDC-PGAICET-2013 and MARDC-CET-2013 for admission to MDS and BDS courses respectively, for the Academic Year 2013-14 for Minority Quota admissions. Samiti in its meeting held on 21st December has denied the request made by the said College/Institute on the basis of judgment of Hon’ble SC of India in the case of Islamic Academy vs State of Karnataka (2003).

Meanwhile Samiti in its meeting held on 20th December 2013 approved the admissions of M.A. Rangoonwala Dental College, Pune of First Year BDS and Post Graduate MDS Course for the Academic Year 2013-14 on the basis of report submitted by the Expert Committee. Expert Committee in the said report did not mention as to the source of student as to from which CET they recruited their students for Academic Year 2013-14.

In view of the above Maharashtra University of Health Sciences, Nashik vide its letter dated 28th February 2014 pointing out that Samiti in its meeting held on 20th December 2013 approve the admissions of the aforesaid College for the Academic Year 2013-14. In continuation of these University asking guidelines as to whether the admitted students of M.A. Rangoonwala Dental College, Pune in the Post Graduate and Undergraduate courses for Academic Year 201314 are approved or not.

Expert Committee has therefore submitted the revised report dated in respect of admission process of M.A. Rangoonwala Dental College, Pune. It  stated that the said College/Institute operated the merit list of MARDC-PAGICET-2013 for admissions to MDS course for the Academic Year 2013-14 and merit list of MARDC-CET-2013 for admissions to first year BDS course for the Academic Year 2013-14 conducted by own at Institute level for the admissions to Minority Quota.

According to the petitioners, it was on account of the failure of the Registrar of the MUHS to inform the members of the Committee the details of the decisions of the Apex Court in the case of Christian Medical College case, resulted in passing of the impugned order.

The petitioners, therefore, approached this Court by filing the present petition.

Issues:

The Supreme Court in its judgement on August 12, 2005 ruled on the following issues in relation to minority and non-minority unaided higher education institutions.

• Reservation policy,
• Admission policy,
• Fee structure,
• Regulation and control by the state and
• The role of committees dealing with admission and fees,

Judgement:

The Supreme Court delivered an unanimous judgement by 7 judges bench consisting CJI R.C. Lahoti  Justice Y.K. Sabharwal, D.M. Dharmadhikari, Arun Kumar, G.P. Mathur, Tarun Chatterjee & P.K. Balasubramanyan in the case declaring that the State can’t impose its reservation policy on minority and non-minority unaided private colleges, including professional colleges.

This judgement was an attempt to bring clarity to two previous judgements by the Supreme Court.

One of them is the judgement delivered on October 31, 2002 by 11 judges in the case of T.M.A. Pai Foundation & Ors. vs. State of Karnataka & Ors. (Pai Foundation case) with multiple opinions.

The other is the judgement delivered on August 14, 2003 by a constitution bench that interpreted the Pai Foundation judgement in the case of Islamic Academy of Edn. & Anr. vs. State of Karnataka & Ors (Islamic Academy of Education case), again with multiple opinions.

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