PALANI GOUNDAN V. EMPEROR, MANU/TN/0395/1919

MATERIAL FACTS

With his wife, the appellant had an altercation. The appellant, infuriated throughout the disagreement, struck his spouse on the head with a ploughshare that caused the spouse to lose consciousness.
The appellant presumed she was mortally wounded and the accused attempted to manipulate with the facts and proofs of the scene of the crime in anticipation of being prosecuted for murder. Also, to establish the groundwork for the fabricated argument of suicide, which he eventually built, he managed to string her by a knot on a beam.
Subsequently, when the post mortem was carried out on the spouse’s body, it revealed that the first hit was not a lethal one and she managed to survive the ploughshare’s strike and was merely insentient then. The suffocation and oxygen deprivation by hanging, which was the appellant’s act, was the consequence of death.

ISSUE

Whether the accused is liable for the offense of Murder or is this case of Culpable Homicide?

LEGAL PROVISIONS

Sections 299 and 300 of Indian Penal Code, 1860

JUDGEMENT

The Hon’ble High Court overturned the session court’s decision and maintained that the appellant cannot be held liable for the offense of murder or culpable homicide. Conversely, he can only be held liable for the grievous hurt engendered when the ploughshare was being used to strike the victim and for interfering with proof.

ANALYSIS

One can infer from the findings in Palani Goudan v. Emperor that the appellant did not intend to cause the death of his wife when he struck her with the ploughshare. Asphyxiation was the catalyst for the victim’s death. A crucial factor of both meanings is the intention to trigger the death of an individual while reflecting on the explanations of culpable homicide and murder.

The victim had no intention of causing her death when he strung her up with a rope as he had presumed she was already dead and one cannot kill a dead person once again. This was not a case of murder or culpable homicide as the primary element of intention to cause death, was absent in both scenarios, when the accused hit the wife with a ploughshare and when he hanged her body.

Since the appellant had believed she was dead, he had no ‘mens rea’ of causing her death when he hanged her, as one cannot end the life of a person who is already dead. In both cases, when the appellant struck the spouse with a ploughshare and when he hanged her body, these were not the instances of either murder or culpable homicide as the main element of- ‘intention’ to trigger the death was missing.
Like in the commonly associated illustration of a shot fired at A (one individual) results in the killing B (another) or poison planned for A being consumed by another, B. It is not mandatory that intention should prevail with respect to the actual person whose death had been incurred. The requisite mens rea or intention persists even in such a case, and the homicide would contribute to murder. It is referred to as transferred mens rea.
Although, the intention is still a matter of fact and it may be an alleviating element and a valid consideration that the offender did not intend and plan to cause the injury which the victim endured, which saved the appellant from the charges of culpable homicide and murder, in the present case because no intention was proved from his side.
One can say that ‘causing death’ means to bring an end to one’s existence: and so all three intentions must be aimed either consciously to bring an end to one’s life or inflict any bodily injury that is likely to occur in causing the death of one’s life as per the knowledge of the offender. Knowledge must relate to the specific situations in which the offender is put. Undeniably, if a man stabs the heart of a human body, he performs an act which if it happens; he knows will bring an end to life.
It is evident that if a man kills someone by firing at what he thinks is a third individual he wants to kill, but which is actually the stub of a tree, he will be liable for culpable homicide. This is because he had such an intention towards what he considered to be a living human being, although he had no malicious intent towards any human being actually in life.

CONCLUSION

The inference that the intention of the offender must be determined is unavoidable, not only in the context of the real instances which took place but also in the sense of what the instances were intended to be. It implies that if one’s intention was exclusively guided to what he thought was a dead body; an individual cannot be convicted for culpable homicide/murder in this case.

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GHAPOO YADAV AND ORS. V. STATE OF M.P. AIR 2003 SC 1620, 11TH MARCH 1958

MATERIAL FACTS

Ramlal (hereinafter referred to as ‘PW-1’) was the father of Lekhram and Gopal (hereinafter referred to as ‘the deceased’). The accused Janku, Kewal, and Mangal Singh were the sons of the accused, Ghapoo Yadav. Deceased, the witnesses and the accused belonged to the same village and there was a land dispute between them.

The deceased, the witnesses, and the accused resided in the same village, and between them, there was a conflict regarding land. The assessment of the land was carried out by the revenue authority upon a proposal made by PW-1. Land belonging to the accused Mangal Singh was reported to be in the custody of PW-1 and a berry tree stood over the said land. While, originally, the tree was in possession of PW-1, he disjoined with its possession after assessment.

The family members of PW-1 had cut the aforementioned tree a day before the eventuality.
On the date of the incident, that is, 9/6/1986, the accused Janku asked the deceased why the tree had been cut. Lekhram answered that the tree was theirs and was planted by members of their family. The deceased asserted that the tree had not been removed by him. This resulted in heated arguments and confrontations between them. Besides, the accused individuals attacked the deceased, resulting in the rupturing of his leg.

PW-1 and Lekhram sped away from the scene of altercation and returned subsequently with the other inhabitants. The deceased, who was then fighting for breath, was taken to Maharajpur Police Station on a crib. They sent him for diagnosis. The doctor reported 7 wounds on his body upon due examination. Afterward, on 10/6/1986, the deceased died at 2.00 a.m after saying his final words. His dying statement was registered. The trial court observed, on account of the facts on hand, that the accused persons were culpable and subsequently charged and imprisoned them.

ISSUE

1. Whether the appellant was liable for the murder of the complainant under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as I.P.C.)?
2. Whether exception 4 to section 300 of the I.P.C. is applicable?

JUDGEMENT

Exception 4 to section 300 was granted and made applicable. Nonetheless, the appellants were sentenced and a 10-year prison term and fine, under section 304 of the I.P.C., as imposed by the trial court earlier served the purpose of justice.

ANALYSIS

The case of Ghapoo Yadav v. the State of M.P. deals with the applicability of exception 4 to section 300 of I.P.C. It was acknowledged that not only must the defense be able to demonstrate that the crime was committed without premeditation in a sudden conflict in the heat of passion after a sudden dispute in order to trigger Exception 4 to Section 300, but more significantly, it must be demonstrated that the perpetrator ‘did not take undue advantage and did not behave in a cruel or unusual way’.

The sudden fight must accompany a sudden argument or quarrel. A ‘sudden fight’ means mutual aggression on both parts. In such a fight, the issue of who attacks and who defends is totally entirely irrelevant and relies on the strategies adopted by the respective rivals. There can be no possibility of a sudden fight in the context of the court’s direct finding that the aggressor was one of the parties.

If there is ample time for passion to dissipate allowing the accused time to premeditate and the fighting takes place afterward, the accused will disqualify the Exemption for gaining benefits as the killing amounts to murder with premeditation. It is a matter of fact and whether or not a quarrel is sudden must ultimately depend on the evidence proven in each case.

The perpetuation of the injuries and their existence indicates the intention of the accused-appellants, but it should not be considered that the cause of such injuries is either cruel or abnormal for not benefiting from Exception 4 to Section 300 I.P.C., meaning that the number of injuries sustained during the incident is not a determining factor, but what is relevant is that the incident must have been sudden and the perpetrator must have behaved in a fit of rage. The perpetrator must not, for example, have taken an unfair advantage or have behaved in a cruel way.

CONCLUSION

Therefore, after taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances, exception 4 to Section 300, of the I.P.C. was perspicuously pertinent. This indicates that the accused had inflicted injuries to the deceased in the heat of passion after a sudden argument preceded by a fight, but had not behaved in an unfair or unnatural way.

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