PALANI GOUNDAN V. EMPEROR, MANU/TN/0395/1919

MATERIAL FACTS

With his wife, the appellant had an altercation. The appellant, infuriated throughout the disagreement, struck his spouse on the head with a ploughshare that caused the spouse to lose consciousness.
The appellant presumed she was mortally wounded and the accused attempted to manipulate with the facts and proofs of the scene of the crime in anticipation of being prosecuted for murder. Also, to establish the groundwork for the fabricated argument of suicide, which he eventually built, he managed to string her by a knot on a beam.
Subsequently, when the post mortem was carried out on the spouse’s body, it revealed that the first hit was not a lethal one and she managed to survive the ploughshare’s strike and was merely insentient then. The suffocation and oxygen deprivation by hanging, which was the appellant’s act, was the consequence of death.

ISSUE

Whether the accused is liable for the offense of Murder or is this case of Culpable Homicide?

LEGAL PROVISIONS

Sections 299 and 300 of Indian Penal Code, 1860

JUDGEMENT

The Hon’ble High Court overturned the session court’s decision and maintained that the appellant cannot be held liable for the offense of murder or culpable homicide. Conversely, he can only be held liable for the grievous hurt engendered when the ploughshare was being used to strike the victim and for interfering with proof.

ANALYSIS

One can infer from the findings in Palani Goudan v. Emperor that the appellant did not intend to cause the death of his wife when he struck her with the ploughshare. Asphyxiation was the catalyst for the victim’s death. A crucial factor of both meanings is the intention to trigger the death of an individual while reflecting on the explanations of culpable homicide and murder.

The victim had no intention of causing her death when he strung her up with a rope as he had presumed she was already dead and one cannot kill a dead person once again. This was not a case of murder or culpable homicide as the primary element of intention to cause death, was absent in both scenarios, when the accused hit the wife with a ploughshare and when he hanged her body.

Since the appellant had believed she was dead, he had no ‘mens rea’ of causing her death when he hanged her, as one cannot end the life of a person who is already dead. In both cases, when the appellant struck the spouse with a ploughshare and when he hanged her body, these were not the instances of either murder or culpable homicide as the main element of- ‘intention’ to trigger the death was missing.
Like in the commonly associated illustration of a shot fired at A (one individual) results in the killing B (another) or poison planned for A being consumed by another, B. It is not mandatory that intention should prevail with respect to the actual person whose death had been incurred. The requisite mens rea or intention persists even in such a case, and the homicide would contribute to murder. It is referred to as transferred mens rea.
Although, the intention is still a matter of fact and it may be an alleviating element and a valid consideration that the offender did not intend and plan to cause the injury which the victim endured, which saved the appellant from the charges of culpable homicide and murder, in the present case because no intention was proved from his side.
One can say that ‘causing death’ means to bring an end to one’s existence: and so all three intentions must be aimed either consciously to bring an end to one’s life or inflict any bodily injury that is likely to occur in causing the death of one’s life as per the knowledge of the offender. Knowledge must relate to the specific situations in which the offender is put. Undeniably, if a man stabs the heart of a human body, he performs an act which if it happens; he knows will bring an end to life.
It is evident that if a man kills someone by firing at what he thinks is a third individual he wants to kill, but which is actually the stub of a tree, he will be liable for culpable homicide. This is because he had such an intention towards what he considered to be a living human being, although he had no malicious intent towards any human being actually in life.

CONCLUSION

The inference that the intention of the offender must be determined is unavoidable, not only in the context of the real instances which took place but also in the sense of what the instances were intended to be. It implies that if one’s intention was exclusively guided to what he thought was a dead body; an individual cannot be convicted for culpable homicide/murder in this case.

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GHAPOO YADAV AND ORS. V. STATE OF M.P. AIR 2003 SC 1620, 11TH MARCH 1958

MATERIAL FACTS

Ramlal (hereinafter referred to as ‘PW-1’) was the father of Lekhram and Gopal (hereinafter referred to as ‘the deceased’). The accused Janku, Kewal, and Mangal Singh were the sons of the accused, Ghapoo Yadav. Deceased, the witnesses and the accused belonged to the same village and there was a land dispute between them.

The deceased, the witnesses, and the accused resided in the same village, and between them, there was a conflict regarding land. The assessment of the land was carried out by the revenue authority upon a proposal made by PW-1. Land belonging to the accused Mangal Singh was reported to be in the custody of PW-1 and a berry tree stood over the said land. While, originally, the tree was in possession of PW-1, he disjoined with its possession after assessment.

The family members of PW-1 had cut the aforementioned tree a day before the eventuality.
On the date of the incident, that is, 9/6/1986, the accused Janku asked the deceased why the tree had been cut. Lekhram answered that the tree was theirs and was planted by members of their family. The deceased asserted that the tree had not been removed by him. This resulted in heated arguments and confrontations between them. Besides, the accused individuals attacked the deceased, resulting in the rupturing of his leg.

PW-1 and Lekhram sped away from the scene of altercation and returned subsequently with the other inhabitants. The deceased, who was then fighting for breath, was taken to Maharajpur Police Station on a crib. They sent him for diagnosis. The doctor reported 7 wounds on his body upon due examination. Afterward, on 10/6/1986, the deceased died at 2.00 a.m after saying his final words. His dying statement was registered. The trial court observed, on account of the facts on hand, that the accused persons were culpable and subsequently charged and imprisoned them.

ISSUE

1. Whether the appellant was liable for the murder of the complainant under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as I.P.C.)?
2. Whether exception 4 to section 300 of the I.P.C. is applicable?

JUDGEMENT

Exception 4 to section 300 was granted and made applicable. Nonetheless, the appellants were sentenced and a 10-year prison term and fine, under section 304 of the I.P.C., as imposed by the trial court earlier served the purpose of justice.

ANALYSIS

The case of Ghapoo Yadav v. the State of M.P. deals with the applicability of exception 4 to section 300 of I.P.C. It was acknowledged that not only must the defense be able to demonstrate that the crime was committed without premeditation in a sudden conflict in the heat of passion after a sudden dispute in order to trigger Exception 4 to Section 300, but more significantly, it must be demonstrated that the perpetrator ‘did not take undue advantage and did not behave in a cruel or unusual way’.

The sudden fight must accompany a sudden argument or quarrel. A ‘sudden fight’ means mutual aggression on both parts. In such a fight, the issue of who attacks and who defends is totally entirely irrelevant and relies on the strategies adopted by the respective rivals. There can be no possibility of a sudden fight in the context of the court’s direct finding that the aggressor was one of the parties.

If there is ample time for passion to dissipate allowing the accused time to premeditate and the fighting takes place afterward, the accused will disqualify the Exemption for gaining benefits as the killing amounts to murder with premeditation. It is a matter of fact and whether or not a quarrel is sudden must ultimately depend on the evidence proven in each case.

The perpetuation of the injuries and their existence indicates the intention of the accused-appellants, but it should not be considered that the cause of such injuries is either cruel or abnormal for not benefiting from Exception 4 to Section 300 I.P.C., meaning that the number of injuries sustained during the incident is not a determining factor, but what is relevant is that the incident must have been sudden and the perpetrator must have behaved in a fit of rage. The perpetrator must not, for example, have taken an unfair advantage or have behaved in a cruel way.

CONCLUSION

Therefore, after taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances, exception 4 to Section 300, of the I.P.C. was perspicuously pertinent. This indicates that the accused had inflicted injuries to the deceased in the heat of passion after a sudden argument preceded by a fight, but had not behaved in an unfair or unnatural way.

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Introduction:

Penal Laws are one of the various tools for the effective regularization of society. It provides a systematized and efficacious mechanism for punishing offenders for the commission of such acts that institute an imbalance in the basic working of the society and disturbs public peace and order by creating an unsafe environment. The Indian Penal Code is the most important of them. The sections in the code are exhaustive and interlinked with others as well.

In India, heinous offences involving a homicide are termed as Murder, Culpable homicide or Non-Culpable homicide. This causes a lot of confusion not only for people but for the judiciary as well; it has been believed to be obscure by many. In the U.S., unlike India, homicidal offences are classified into three types depending upon the severity (or degree) of the crime committed, which are:  (i) First-degree Murder, (ii) second-degree Murder and; (iii) Third-degree Murder^[1].

When we are talking about what are possibly the two most important topics of the Indian Penal Code, 1860^[2](hereinafter, ‘the IPC’) that are most severe, its mandatory to know their definitions as most of the time they seem to be more similar to each other, but they are not synonymous to each other^[3].  This forms the most technical and perplexing part thereof—the difference between S. 299 and S. 300—Culpable Homicide and Murder respectively.

Homicide means the killing of a human being by another human,^[4] an aspect predominantly present in both the aforementioned cases albeit, it can be either lawful or unlawful.  A Homicide is lawful when the cases involve such aspects as to fall under the General Exceptions^[5] i.e. sections 76 to 106 of the IPC. 

The basic difference between culpable homicide and murder lies in the gravity or manner in which the offence has been committed along with the punishment. It has been held by the Supreme Court that, “Culpable Homicide is the genus and murder is the species”^[6].      

Culpable Homicide:

Etymologically, the word Homicide comes from the Latin word ‘homa’ meaning man and ‘cide’ meaning cut or kill.  On the other hand, the word Culpable is derived from the Latin word ‘culpabills’ which means worthy of blame^[7].

Culpable Homicide, under the IPC is usually classified into 2 types:

1. Culpable Homicide amounting to murder, which can simply be termed as murder.
2. Culpable Homicide not amounting to murder. Herein, the difference lies in the degree of criminality. It is defined under Section 299 of the IPC.

It is defined as “Whosoever causes death by doing an act with the intention of causing death or with the intention of causing such bodily injury as it is likely to cause death or with the knowledge that he is likely by such act to cause death, commits the offence of Culpable Homicide.” under Sec 299 of IPC.

Essentials of culpable homicide

For a crime to fall under S. 299 of the IPC, it needs to have certain essentials which are caused by doing an act with 3 factors:

• “The intention of causing death, 
• The intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death,
• The knowledge that such act done is likely to cause death.”^[8]

The Apex Court has held that “it is neither advisable nor possible to state any straitjacket formula that would be universally applicable to all cases for such determination”^[9]. Hence, knowledge of the offender varies from case to case as the court interprets. Furthermore, the intention of the term of ‘causing death’ and ‘causing such bodily injury’ are treated in different manners depending on the crime. Additionally, here “likely” means a possibility^[10].

Therefore, in general, terms, when a person acts in a way that there’s irresponsibility on their part in a situation wherein taking necessary care was a requirement then it ought to be presumed that they possess knowledge of the consequences of the act. Further, it is imperative to note that death must be the consequence of the act to come under the ambit of Section 299.

As S. 299 of the IPC illustrates, “A lays sticks and turf over a pit, with the intention of thereby causing death, or with the knowledge that death is likely to be thereby caused. Z believing the ground to be firm, treads on it, falls in and is killed. A has committed the offence of culpable homicide”^[11].

For instance, in the case of Kusa Majhi v. State of Orissa[12], wherein the accused, infuriated, brought an axe and struck blows on the victim’s shoulder causing her death. The court held it to be a case of culpable homicide since the offence wasn’t planned prior to the commission—it was in the spur of the moment. Furthermore, the blows weren’t on the neck or head region i.e. likely to cause bodily injury which was likely to cause death.      

Relevant provisions for culpable homicide include:

Section 299 (Definition of the offence of culpable homicide), Section 301 (acts which amount to culpable homicide amounting to murder), Section 304 (punishment for culpable homicide not amounting to murder^[13]), Section 304A(provision for—causing death by negligence not amounting to culpable homicide) and Section 308 (Attempt to commit culpable homicide).

Murder:

The term ‘Murder’ traces its origin form the Germanic word ‘Morth’ which means ‘secret killing’^[14]. An offence turns into murder when it doesn’t fall in the criteria of culpable homicide. Section 300 of the IPC categorizes these cases and herein, for a culpable homicide to come within the ambit of this section [murder] the case must satisfy any of the clauses—1, 2, 3, or 4 and must not fall within the five exceptions listed under the said Section.

For instance, in the case of B.N. Srikantiah v. Mysore State^[15], wherein there were more than 24 injuries on the victim with 21 wounds incised on vital parts of the body—head, neck and shoulder. The ‘intention of causing bodily injury’ was established, bringing it in the ambit of S. 300. It was held to be a case of murder.       

Essentials of a murder

An offence is said to be murder when the act done by a person comes under the 4 clauses defined by S. 300:

‘Intention of causing death’ –

this clause includes omission as well as illegal omission. Their intention to kill the person should be conspicuous on the face of it and the person should be in a conscious state and the action must be deliberate. In the case of Bhakua Kampa v. State of Orissa[16], a person’s death was caused because of a head injury by the accused wherein several people were assailants and alone conviction for murder was held to be proper wherein the essentials were present. 

‘Intention to cause a bodily injury that is likely to cause death’ –

There must be an intention to cause a bodily injury with the knowledge (which should be well-known and not a probability) that such an injury will cause death. The court convicted the offender because of the act of striking the asleep victims head which caused a fracture. It was held that the likelihood of causing death should have been apparent. And thus, he was convicted for murder^[17].

‘Intention to cause a bodily injury as is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature (normal sense) to cause death’ – that in the ordinary course of action it is enough if a person has acted to kill/harm a person with full knowledge of causing a bodily injury which is sufficient to cause the death of such person. In the case, Visra Singh v. State of Punjab[18], the Supreme Court ruled that “When the offender fails to prove that the act was done accidentally or unintentionally, then the presumption is that he would have intended to act to cause a deadly injury to the victim of such crime.”

‘Knowledge that the act is imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and commits the act without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury’^[19]. Similar to S. 299 in this clause there must be an understanding of the fact that a certain act is dangerous and sufficient to cause death.

Exceptions to a murder

S. 300 of the IPC mentions 5 exceptions:

Grave and sudden provocation. 

In the situation wherein the offender loses all sense of control over themselves due to sudden provocation, thereby, causing the death of another person, which inherently might be classified as an accident or a mistake, would be liable under S. 299 of the Act. Furthermore, certain principles were laid down in the case of K.M. Nanavati v. State of Maharashtra[20], for determining if a crime consists of the grave and sudden provocation. 

Self defence

This right arises when a person with a bona fide intention exercises their right to defend their person or property while mistakenly exceeding the power (and purpose) given to them resulting in the death of the other person. It was held in the case of Arun v. State of Maharashtra^[21] that, “Right of private defence cannot be used to do away with a wrongdoer unless the person concerned has a reasonable cause to fear the otherwise death or grievous hurt might ensue in which case that person would have the full measure of right to private defence.”

Act of public servant

Anyone authorized by the Public Servants Act or a public servant might fall under this category. While discharging their duty, for justice, if they exceed their powers and cause another person death lawfully and as a necessary duty it wouldn’t be a murder[22]. It needs to be necessary for public security for the act to be of a public servant. If it is not protected under the orders of a superior, it would amount to murder^[23]. 

Without premeditation

To avail the protection of this exception the fight must’ve been unexpected, without premeditation and unintentionally. Furthermore, there shouldn’t be a mala fide to cause the death of another. It needs to be done in a heat of passion and the assailant must not have taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel manner^[24].

Consensual homicide

The exception of consensual homicide, although rare, involves the deceased being above the age of 18 years and succumbing to death consensually or out of the voluntary decision. In the case of Vijay alias Gyan Chand Jain v. State of MP[25] it was held that “Exception 5 under S. 300 of the I.P.C. must receive a very strict interpretation and in applying the said exception the act alleged to be consented to or authorized by the victim must be considered with very close scrutiny.” 

Relevant provisions for murder include:

Section 300 (defines the offence of Murder), Section 302 (lays down punishment for committing the offence of murder), Section 303 (Capital punishment is made necessary for the person who commits murder while convicted for life imprisonment—under S. 302 r/w S. 34 or S. 149) and; Section 307 (defines attempt to murder).

Conclusion:

‘Culpable homicide’ and ‘Murder’ are two distinct offences which have caused massive debate amongst scholars, jurists and in the legal field in general. The distinction between the two is neither prominent nor are there any clear-cut guidelines to restrict them into specific boxes to relieve the ever-present dilemma in India’s legal climate and the Courts.

The difference between the two was aptly set forth by Melvill, J., in Reg v. Govinda^[26] and by Sarkaria J., in State of A.P. v. R. Punnayya[27]. It was opined that “all ‘murders’ are ‘culpable homicide’ but not vice versa. Speaking generally ‘culpable homicide’ sans ‘special characteristics of murder’ is culpable homicide not amounting to murder.”

Since every case is different from the other; therefore, it must be decided on its specific facts, circumstances, situation, the act itself and calibre of the offence. Hence, the Court’s duty is extremely significant and paramount in this scenario so as to give a fair and just decision in regards to each case. There can be a reliance on precedents but its believed that a different model of classification altogether or at least a better demarcation per se between the two provisions would be advantageous and beneficial.   

^[1] J. Tarunika & K. Roja, A Comparative Study on Murder and Culpable Homicide, 120 IJPAM 735, 735 (2018). 

^[2] Act 45 of 1860.

^[3] Shelal Lodhi Rajput, Criminal Law: Culpable Homicide v. Murder, LexLife (May 25, 2020, 10:38 AM), https://lexlife.in/2020/05/25/criminal-law-culpable-homicide-v-murder/.

^[4] Ganesan v. State, 2011 CIJ 274 ALJ.

^[5] Indian Penal Code, 1860, Chapter IV.

^[6] State of Andhra Pradesh v. Rayavarapu Punnayya & Anr., 1977 SCR (1) 601. 

^[7] Ms. Deepsi Rawat, Culpable Homicide and Murder, Indian Legal Solutions (Dec. 29, 2019), https://indianlegalsolution.com/culpable-homicide-and-murder-best-explained/.

^[8] Indian Penal Code, sec. 299.

^[9] Rampal Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2012) 8 SCC 289.

^[10] Kesar Singh v. State of Haryana, (2008) 15 SCC 753.

^[11] Indian Penal Code, sec. 299(a).

^[12] 1985 Cri. LJ 1460.

^[13] Under the section, the punishment is of imprisonment for life or imprisonment which may extend to ten years and also be liable to fine.

^[14] Supra, note 1.

^[15] AIR 1958 SC 672.

^[16] 1996 CrLJ 350 (Ori).

^[17] Sheik Choollye v. R, (1865).

^[18] 1958 AIR 465.

^[19] See, Abdul Waheed Khan v. State of A.P., 2005 SCC (Cri) 1301. 

^[20] AIR 1962 SC 605.

^[21] (2012) 5 SCC 530.

^[22] Dukhi Singh v. State, 1955 Cri L.J. 905.

^[23] Subha Naik v. R, (1898) 21 Mad. 249.

^[24] Surendar Kumar v. Union Territory, Chandigarh, (1989) 2 SCC 217.

^[25] (1994) 6 SCC 308.

^[26] (1877) ILR 1 Bom 342.

^[27] AIR 1977 SC 45.

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