R. BALAVENKATRAMAN V. T.L. NATARAJAN MANU/TN/7669/2018

MATERIAL FACTS

P.L. Ranganathan was the father of R. Balavenkatraman (the Appellant), one Gourammal, and one R. Ayyasamy. The mother of the appellant passed away a considerable time ago, and the father preceded his mother, too. The appellant’s brother and sister namely, R. Ayyasamy and Gourammal died on 15/9/2005 and 29/9/2005 respectively. Both brother and sister of the Appellant were not married and they had no problems. Thus, the Appellant submitted he was the only existing Legal Heir out of the said R. Ayyasamy and Gourammal as per the Indian Succession Act.
The respondent was the paternal uncle of the Appellant here, nevertheless, and had claimed that the Appellant was not the sole legitimate successor to the late Gourammal, but that the Respondent and his brothers and sisters, as well as other stepbrothers and stepsisters, were the rightful successors to the late Gourammal, and that the Appellant had therefore lodged this petition withholding these particulars. The respondent, thus, requested for the termination of the same.

ISSUE

Whether the lower court had come to the erroneous line of reasoning in finding that when stepbrothers and stepsisters are present, could the appellant have made them relevant claimants to the dispute?

RULE OF LAW

Section 18 of Hindu Succession Act, 1956

ANALYSIS

Referring to section 3 of the Act, it was evident that an individual to be recognized as full blood must be conceived to a full blood father and mother, half-blood being common to the father, and mothers are distinct individuals. Therefore, when this Court had gone through the disclosures, it was observed that the full blood brother of the deceased Gourammal was the Appellant here. Via his father’s second wife, he had stepbrothers and stepsisters and they are all half-blooded individuals.

Owing to section 15 of the Act and the said Rules provided in section 16 of the aforementioned Act, it is only if there are no sons, daughters, and husband that it passes to the husband’s descendants if those people do not survive, then it passes on to father and mother; if father and mother do not live, it passes to the father’s descendants, and even if that option is not available, then it ultimately goes to the descendants of the mother. Consequently, since he is the brother of the deceased Gourammal, the Appellant becomes the father’s heir. As per Section 18, the other individuals such as stepbrothers and stepsisters born through the Second Wife may be considered only half-blood brothers and sisters, full blood brother must be preferred to the half-blood-related heirs. The Appellant, therefore, becomes the heir to the estate of the deceased Gourammal, because he is the full-blooded brother.

Likewise, they were not reasonably made as parties by the Appellant since they have no entitlement to benefit in the property of the late Gourammal (sister) conceived through the First Wife. The offspring of the Second Wife is qualified to be the father’s heirs and not the deceased half-blooded sister’s estate. The Appeal was, therefore, permitted. The decree issued by the learned Principal District Judge was discarded and the matter was referred back to the Authority to issue the required certificate of succession within six weeks of the date of the order.

CONCLUSION

Hence, the benefit to the estate of the deceased persons is only available to class-one descendants who are the brothers or sisters by full blood. Therefore, if the Appellant by full blood is the sibling, he solely is eligible to the said estate, not the Respondent therein. Half-blood brothers and sisters were disregarded after the Court had ruled in favor of the appellant, and thus the full blood brother (appellant) alone was favored. The issue of alleging that the appellant was paternally associated with the First Respondent and others and that they were, therefore, qualified to the claim was dismissed.

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Govindbhai Chhotabhai Patel and others vs Patel Ramanbhai Mathurbhai

Background

The appellants were sons of Chhotabhai Ashabhai Patel who died on December 6, 2001. During his lifetime, he executed a gift deed in favor of defendant Ramanbhai Mathurbhai Patel.
The parties went to trial on the following issues:
(i) Whether the plaintiffs prove that the disputed gift deed is fabricated?
(ii) Whether the plaintiffs prove that the suit properties are ancestral properties and late Chhotabhai Ashabhai had no right to execute the gift deed?
(iii) Whether the plaintiffs prove that the defendant has no right, title, or interest over the said property?
(iv) Whether the plaintiffs prove that they are entitled to get the relief as prayed for?
(v) Whether the defendant proves that the plaintiffs have no right to file the present suit?
(vi) What order and decree?

The High Court framed five substantial questions of law and after giving findings on such substantial questions of law, the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Court on February 10, 2014, and the judgment and decree passed by the First Appellate Court on October 9, 2017, were set aside.
The findings recorded by the High Court, are that execution of the gift deed was not specifically denied in the suit filed. Therefore, it is not necessary for the Donee to examine one of the attesting witnesses in terms of proviso to Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. It was also held that the suit property is not ancestral property. The property was purchased by Ashabhai Patel, father of the Donor and it was by virtue of Will executed by Ashabhai Patel, the property came to be owned by the Donor in the year 1952-1953. The High Court, thus, held that the Donor was competent to execute the gift deed.

The relevant findings on such questions which arose for consideration in the second appeal read as under:
According to the plaintiffs, the suit properties were purchased by their grandfather and those properties came to be devolved upon their father by Testamentary disposition. The Hindu Law clearly postulates that if it is a self-acquired property of the father, it would fall into the hands of his sons, not as a coparcenary property, but would devolve on them in their individual capacity. Where the property is a self-acquired property of the father, it falls into the hands of his son in his individual capacity and not as coparcenary property in such case son— s son cannot claim right in such property.
The plaintiffs held that the suit properties devolved upon the father of the plaintiffs could not be said tube coparcenary property. The properties were purchased by the grandfather of the plaintiffs, as pleaded and admitted by the plaintiffs themselves. Such self-acquired properties of the grandfather came to be devolved upon the father of the plaintiffs by way of a ‘ will— i.e. testamentary disposition. In such circumstances, it could be said that the properties are self-acquired properties of the father of the plaintiffs. The succession would have been in accordance with Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act. When the properties could be said to be self-acquired properties of the father of the plaintiffs, then the father could have transferred those properties by way of a gift deed.

Appellants Contention

The appellants submitted that the High Court had exceeded its jurisdiction in the second appeal as findings recorded by the First Appellate Court were not specifically dealt with. It was argued that the interference in the second appeal was contrary to the judgment of this Court in Thulasidhara & Anr. v. Narayanappa & Ors.4. It was argued that the appellants had produced an old revenue record and from the documents, the property was proved to be ancestral, and such was the finding recorded by the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court. It was argued that the findings recorded by the High Court that the property devolved on the Donor by virtue of a Will, therefore, it ceased to be an ancestral property was contrary to the judgment of this Court in C.N. Arunachala Mudaliar v. C.A. Muruganatha Mudaliar & Anr.5. The reliance was also placed upon the judgment of this Court in Shyam Narayan Prasad v. Krishna Prasad & Ors that self-acquired property of a grandfather devolves upon his son as ancestral property.

Respondents Contention:

The Respondents argued that the plaintiffs had failed to prove that the property was ancestral property after admitting that their grandfather had purchased the property and given it under Will to their father to the exclusion of other family members. It was argued that the argument raised by the appellants that the High Court had exceeded its jurisdiction by reversing the findings of fact recorded by the First Appellate Court did not hold good as the very reasoning recorded has been found to be illegal. It was argued that judgment in C.N.Arunachala Mudaliar was to the effect that the property bequeathed or gifted to a son by Mitakshara father will be treated as self-acquired property in the hands of Donee.

Court’s Observation:

The court said that the first and the foremost question required to be examined was as to whether the appellants had proved that the property in the hands of Donor was ancestral property.
The court noted that Govindbhai Chhotabhai Patel (PW-1) had stated, vide, that the property in question was purchased by his grandfather Ashabhai Patel and after the death of his grandfather, the property was owned by the Donor according to the inheritance since 1952-1953. The court thus said that it was the Donor who had acquired the property not as self-acquired property but as ancestral property. The court found that a statement in the cross-examination that there was a partition between the Donor and his two brothers would not make the property ancestral in the hands of the Donor. The Will executed by the father of Donor had not been produced by the appellants to show as to what was intended by his grandfather when the Will was executed in favor of Donor and It was admitted fact that grandfather purchased the property, thus, such self-acquired property came to be bequeathed to the Donor even as per the judgment relied upon by the Appellant.
The court remarked that a bequest by will, therefore, is a gift made in contemplation of death. It only differs from a gift in the fact that it takes effect at a future time instead of immediately. But it must clearly be governed and controlled by the general rules regarding the gift. Now, there is no doubt that a man can give away self-acquired property to whomsoever he pleases, including his own sons; and there is no doubt that property so given would be considered self-acquired in the hands of the donee. It would, therefore, follow that property given by will would equally be self-acquired in the hands of the devisee.’
The court noted that in view of the undisputed fact, that Ashabhai Patel purchased the property, therefore, he was competent to execute the Will in favor of any person. Since the beneficiary of the Will was his son and in the absence of any intention in the Will, a beneficiary would acquire the property as self-acquired property in terms of C.N. Arunachala Mudaliar case(AIR 1953 SC 495). The court said that the burden of proof that the property was ancestral was on the plaintiffs alone and it was for them to prove that the Will of Ashabhai intended to convey the property for the benefit of the family to be treated as ancestral property.
The other material question was whether the appellants have specifically denied the execution of the gift deed in terms of proviso to Section 68 of the Evidence Act, to make it mandatory for the defendant to examine one of the attesting witnesses to prove the Gift deed in his favor.
The court noted that a gift deed is required to be compulsorily attested in terms of Section 123 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 and that similar is the provision in respect of the execution of a Will which is required to be attested in terms of Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925. Section 68 of the Evidence Act makes it mandatory to examine one of the attesting witnesses for the purpose of proving of the execution of Will but such limitation is not applicable in respect of proof of execution of any document which has been registered in accordance with provisions of the Indian Registration Act,1908 unless the execution is specifically denied.
The court reiterated that though the learned Trial Court had discussed the evidence on the record but in view of the finding that the property is ancestral, no finding was recorded whether the gift deed is forged or not as per the issue framed. The First Appellate Court in a short judgment affirmed the finding of the learned Trial Court. The Trial Court had not returned any finding that the gift deed is forged. Therefore, the High Court was within its jurisdiction to decide Issue No. 1 based on evidence led by the parties.
The court said that specific denial of execution of gift was an unambiguous and categorical statement that the donor did not execute the document. It meant not only that the denial must be in express terms but that it should be unqualified, manifest, and explicit. The court said it should be a certain and definite denial of execution. What has to be specifically denied is the execution of the document. Other contentions not necessarily and distinctly referring to the execution of the document by the alleged executant cannot be gathered, for the denial contemplated in the proviso.
The court said that the Defendants had no case that no document was executed by Anandan Nambiar. Their case was that the document was not valid because it had been executed under circumstances which would render the document invalid.
The court found that there was no specific denial of the execution of the document.
The court found the facts of the present case kin to the facts which were before the Kerala High Court in Kannan Nambiar. The appellants had not denied the execution of the document but alleged forgery and fabrication. In the absence of any evidence of any forgery or fabrication and the absence of specific denial of the execution of the gift deed in the manner held in Kannan Nambiar, the Donee was under no obligation to examine one of the attesting witnesses of the gift deed.

Judgment:

As per evidence on record, the Donee was taking care of the Donor for many years. The appellants were residing in the United States but failed to take care of their parents. Therefore, the father of the appellants had executed a gift deed in favour of a person who stood by him. The court found that there was no error in the findings recorded by the High Court.

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V. Kalyanaswamy (D) by Lrs. and Anrs. Vs L. Bakthavatsalam (2020)

Abstract

On 17th July 2020, the Supreme Court passed a judgment for a family dispute that rose in 1955. The SC dismissed all the appeals against the judgment given by the Madras High court in 2007. It also stated that the coparcener has no right to execute a will with respect to Joint Family Property prior to the Hindu Succession Act. The court held that the Will dated 10-05-1955 executed by Late Mr. Rangaswami Naidu was lawful and valid.

Facts of the Case

In this case, Late R. Venkituswamy had two sons, Late Lakshmaiah Naidu and Late Ragaswami Naidu. Rangaswami was married to R. Krishnammal but they didn’t have any children, however, Lakshmaiah had four sons. Both the brothers constituted a Joint Hindu family business. But due to an illness, Rangaswami executed a will in which he bequeathed his share in the Joint Hindu Family property and self- acquired properties in favor of this wife R.Krishnammal. The dispute arose when Rangaswamy’s widow filed a case claiming the title of the aforesaid share of properties and recovery of mesne profits from the defendants (sons of Laksmaiah) who were in possession of the property. The Magistrate under section 145 of the Criminal Code of Procedure gave possession to the defendants. Later a series of cases were filed, which resulted in a compromise decree in 1958. However, the dispute resurfaced when R.Alagiriswamy Naidu and V. Kalyanaswamy filed a suit against the compromise decree challenging the validity of the will on the grounds that the will was executed under coercion, undue influence, and fraud by the Respondent. He also challenged that any will executed by a coparcener of his undivided interest in the Joint Hindu Family Property is illegal and invalid.

Judgment

The Trial Court faced a predicament regarding the authenticity of the will made by Rangaswamy Naidu. Although the trial court held that the will was invalid and unlawful the First appellate Court found it to be authentic. Later when an appeal was filed in the Supreme Court it disagreed with the decision made by the High Court regarding the validity of the will but agreed with the verdict of the High court to be the endmost conclusion based on other aspects of the case. Hence the SC pronounced the judgment dismissing all the appeals.

Rationale of the court

The Court decided the following observation about the validity of the will made by the testator herein the issue of the case:
• The will was an unprivileged will under Sec.63 of the Indian Succession Act 1925. Sec 63 deals with proving a document by a way of secondary evidence.
• In order to test the authenticity of the will one of the attested witnesses named in the will have to prove that the will has been duly executed by the testator in presence of at least two witnesses and that the other witnesses had also attested to the will (Sec.68 of Evidence Act 1872)
• Se 69 of Evidence Act has to be applied if the witnesses mentioned in the will have died, have become insane, etc. Sec71 provides that if a witness doesn’t recollect the execution of the will then some other evidenced has to be used.
• In this particular case the Appellants failed to prove that there was coercion, undue influence, or fraud.

Case Analysis

• The court decided on basis of these provisions that the testator had clearly mentioned in his will all the required details of the properties that would be bequeathed to his wife and the manner in which she has to use and dispose off the properties. Further, as the Hindu Succession Act,1956 was not enacted, Hindus were allowed to leave his joint family property along with his self acquired property to another person. Therefore the apex court dismissed all the appeals made by the Appellants.
• The decision made by the court was justifiable and fair. Appellants didn’t have any proper evidence for the claims they made regarding the validity of the testamentary document i.e the will made by Late Rangaswamy. It was held that the effect of the death of Rangaswami Naidu being before the Hindu Succession Act came into force to be that it would deprive persons of rights available in respect of a Hindu who dies intestate after the Act came into force.

Conclusion

This case has proven to be a landmark case regarding a coparcener’s right to execute the will and regarding a women’s right over her husband’s testamentary. The case has come to a halt after 65 long years by dismissing all the appeals of the claims made by the appellants against the decision of the Madras High Court.

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After the independence, the first law pertaining to the property under Hindu law was Hindu Succession Act, 1956. The Act dealt with intestate succession, rights, duties of sons’, daughters’ etc. It provided a detailed framework on the inheritance of sons, daughters etc. Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, has gone through a series of development over the years. 

Section 6 as per Hindu Succession Act,1956:

Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 provides for devolution of property of intestate succession. It provided that the property shall be devolved on male coparceners who have interest in the coparcenary property, such interest in the male coparceners was only limited till three degrees i.e male son, grand son and great grand-son. The interest is devolved by way of survivorship. The Hindu Succession Act, 1956 specifically excluded females from acquiring any share on interest in the property, the wife was not considered as a direct blood line of the deceased.

Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 after 2005 Amendment:

The 1956 Act was amended in 2005 and a major change bought in the amendment was in Section 6 which aimed to remove the gender bias. Section 6 of 2005 Amendment Act provided for equal rights of both sons and daughters as they both are coparceners. The Mitakshara coparcener liabilities would be equally applicable on daughter. The Act was made applicable to three degrees of female coparceners as well – daughters, grand-daughters, great grand-daughters. Thus, Section 6 aimed at giving equal rights to daughters as coparceners as sons have.

Conflicting opinions in regard to Section 6:

Prakash & Ors. v. Phulavati & Ors^[1]

In the present case, the daughter claimed for an equal share in her father’s property as a coparcener and father had died prior to the commencement of the Hindu Succession Amendment Act, 2005. There was a dispute regarding self-acquired property and ancestral property and its retrospective or prospective application. Here, the main issue was whether the Hindu Succession Amendment Act, 2005 will be applied retrospectively or not?  

The Apex Court differed from the decision of High Court and Trail Court and placed reliance on unless the statute expressly states the retrospective applicability, it is implied that the statute is applied prospectively.^[2] The Apex Court stated that as per the notional partition the shares were already allotted under Hindu Succession Act, 1956, herein termed as Principal Act and the same could not be taken away by way of an amendment i.e Hindu Succession Amendment Act, 2005. The Court rejected the contention of the Respondent that as it was a social legislation aimed at removing the inequalities between male and female, it should be applied retrospectively. The Supreme Court expressly stated that the social legislation also cannot be given retrospective application unless provided expressly in the statute. It stated that the Hindu Succession Amendment Act, 2005 will be applicable to ‘living daughters and living coparceners as on 9-9-2005, irrespective of when such daughters were born’ and all the partitions wherein the coparcener has passed away before 9-9-2005, the living daughter will not be entitled to her share in the property.

Danamma @ Suman Surpur vs Amar^[3]

In the present case, there was a dispute as to whether the Appellants (daughters) were entitled to equal share in the property as they were born prior to the enactment of Hindu Succession Act, 1956 or not? 

The Trial Court and High Court rejected the application of the Appellant and stated that she was not entitled to share in the property as she was born prior to the enactment of Hindu Succession Act, 1956 and the original coparcener had died prior to the Hindu Succession Amendment Act, 2005. A Special Leave Petition challenging the order was filed before the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court differed from the judgment passed by Trial Court and High Court. It stated that the original coparcener had died in the year 2001, the suit for partition was filed in the year 2002 and the decree by Trial Court was awarded in the year 2007.During the pendency of the suit the Hindu Succession Amendment Act, 2005 was passed which conferred the status of coparcener to daughter as well and her rights and liabilities were equated to those granted to the son. Thus, the Supreme Court explicitly deliberated that the amendment is applied to the present case as the partition was given affect after the decree passed by lower court in 2007. 

Conflicting interpretations by the Courts with respect to Section 6 gave rise to ambiguities. Danamma’s case failed to delve upon the actual issue of the case and passed a decision in conflict to the previous decision upheld in Phulwati. The date of partition being taken into consideration is not relevant in the present scenario as the issue is whether daughter is entitled to the share if her father passes away before 9-9-2005. In Phulwati’s case, the Supreme Court had fixed a cut-off date that if the father is alive as on 9-9-2005, then the living coparcener (daughter) will be entitled to the share in the property and subsequently will have to forgo her share if the father passes away as on 9-9-2005 or before that. The divergent legal opinions passed in the above two cases created unnecessary ambiguity with respect to the interpretation of Section 6 of Hindu Succession Amendment Act, 2005.

Historic Judgment: Vineeta Sharma v Rakesh Sharma (11^th August 2020)

The question with respect to ambiguous interpretations of Section 6 is addressed to a larger bench as it involved similar issues with conflicting previous judgments. The three judge-bench of the Supreme Court stated the following:

• The Hon’ble Supreme Court stated that it is not necessary for the daughter and the coparcener to be alive as on the date of amendment i.e 9-9-2005. By fixing a cut-off date it will defeat the purpose of amendment as the main objective behind amendment was to grant equal rights to daughters as granted to sons. Irrespective of whether the original coparcener is alive as on 9-9-2005 or not the daughter is entitled to claim an equal share in the property
• With respect to prospective and retrospective application, the Court stated that the prospective statute operates from the date of its enactment conferring/granting new rights while the retrospective statute operates backwards taking away vested rights. It stated that Section 6 would be a retroactive statute, the one that operates in futuro, its operation is based upon an event which happened in the past, the antecedent event as per Section 6 is the right being given by birth hence, it confers rights to daughters at the time of their birth even if the birth takes place prior to the Hindu Succession Amendment Act, 2005.

Thus, the recent judgment by Supreme Court takes a laudable step thereby ending the gender injustice and implements Section 6 amendment of 2005 in its true spirit. It further puts an end to various divergent opinions by different Courts.

^[1] (2016) 1 SCC (Civ) 549

^[2] Shyam Sunder v. Ram Kumar, (2001) 8SCC 24.

^[3] (2018)3SCC 343

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Kalindi Damodar Garde Vs. Manohar Laxman Kulkarni

Facts:

Laxman was adopted by Saraswati along with his three sons Gangadhar, Dattatraya and Manohar in 1935. After the adoption, Kalindi (daughter) was born to Laxman and his wife. When the natural father of Laxman effected partition, he was excluded from the property of his natural father as he was gone to Saraswati in adoption. Subsequently, Saraswati died and Laxman inherited the property of Saraswati and this forms the subject matter of the present dispute. However, after the death of Laxman there was a dispute on the question of property between his sons and daughter. Kalindi had applied for mutation of revenue records and including herself as her mother as owners which was disputed by Manohar at various stages. After the death of Padmavati, she had left her property in the name of her sons. Thus, Dattatraya filed a suit for partition, separate possession and mesne profit against forcible possession by Kalindi. 

Issue:

Whether Laxman’s sons (Gangadhar, Dattatraya and Manohar) who were born prior to the date of adoption are entitled to the share in the property in dispute according to Hindu Succession Act, 1956?

Rules/Statues:

In the present case, the following provisions are involved:

Definitions:

3(a) agnates: one person is said to be an agnate of another if the two are related by blood or adoption wholly through males;

3(c) cognates: one person is said to be a cognate of another if the two are related by blood or adoption but not wholly through males;

Section 4 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956:

Overriding effect of Act. – Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act:

(a) any text rule or interpretation of Hindu law or any custom or usage as part of that law in force immediately before the commencement of this Act shall cease to have effect with respect to any matter for which provision is made in this Act;

(b) any other law in force immediately before the commencement of this Act shall cease to have effect in so far as it is inconsistent with any of the provisions contained in this Act.

Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956:

The property of a male Hindu dying intestate shall devolve according to the following provisions:

(a) firstly, upon the heirs, being the relatives specified in class I of the Schedule; (b) secondly, if there is no heir of class I, then upon the heirs, being the relatives specified in class II of the Schedule; (c) thirdly, if them is no heir of any of the two classes, then upon the agnates of the deceased; and (d) lastly, if there is no agnate, then upon the cognates of the deceased.

Analysis:

The Court rejected the interpretation of Hindu law as laid down in “Kalgavda Tavanappa Patil v. Somappa Tamangavda Patil & Anr”^[1] which stated that the children that are born before the respective adoption will not pass with the adoptee in the adopted family and thereby will not be entitled to any share in the property of the adopted family. It was stated that the situation has evolved over the years and has led to a significant transformation with the enactment of Hindu Succession Act, 1956. The present act nullifies all the text, rule, interpretation of the Hindu law or any custom or usage which was prevalent before the commencement of the Hindu Succession Act^[2], by way of Section 4. 

The Court also observed that it is a settled principle that as succession has opened after the commencement of the said Act, it should be done in conformity with the provisions of the said Act^[3] and not according to Hindu law, custom, usage etc. The Court also stated that Laxman’s sons (Gangadhar, Dattatraya and Manohar) and daughter (Kalindi) are agnates and related by full-blood as per Section 3(a) of the Act, they form Class 1 heirs.

Thus, Supreme Court emphasized that when there are was no restriction specifically denying the rights of natural son to the adoptee father, it concluded that in conformity with the Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act,1956 the son born before the date of adoption will not be denied his right of inheritance.

Conclusion:

With the evolution over the years, the Court has taken a modern liberal view in delving upon the question of inheritance of the natural son of an adoptee father. It can rightly be said that the Court has made a paradigmatic shift overriding Hindu customs and giving preference to the proposed enactment. With the absence of any specific restriction on denial of rights to the respective sons, it can be concluded that a just and fair interpretation has been made in this regard. Thus, there is no distinction made between the son born to a father before adoption or after adoption. 

^[1] 3 Ind Cas 809

[2] Bhaiya Ramanuj Pratap Deo v. Lalu Maheshanuj Pratap Deo (1981) 4 SCC 613

^[3] Bhanwar Singh v. Puran & Ors (2008) 3 SCC 87

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