PALANI GOUNDAN V. EMPEROR, MANU/TN/0395/1919

MATERIAL FACTS

With his wife, the appellant had an altercation. The appellant, infuriated throughout the disagreement, struck his spouse on the head with a ploughshare that caused the spouse to lose consciousness.
The appellant presumed she was mortally wounded and the accused attempted to manipulate with the facts and proofs of the scene of the crime in anticipation of being prosecuted for murder. Also, to establish the groundwork for the fabricated argument of suicide, which he eventually built, he managed to string her by a knot on a beam.
Subsequently, when the post mortem was carried out on the spouse’s body, it revealed that the first hit was not a lethal one and she managed to survive the ploughshare’s strike and was merely insentient then. The suffocation and oxygen deprivation by hanging, which was the appellant’s act, was the consequence of death.

ISSUE

Whether the accused is liable for the offense of Murder or is this case of Culpable Homicide?

LEGAL PROVISIONS

Sections 299 and 300 of Indian Penal Code, 1860

JUDGEMENT

The Hon’ble High Court overturned the session court’s decision and maintained that the appellant cannot be held liable for the offense of murder or culpable homicide. Conversely, he can only be held liable for the grievous hurt engendered when the ploughshare was being used to strike the victim and for interfering with proof.

ANALYSIS

One can infer from the findings in Palani Goudan v. Emperor that the appellant did not intend to cause the death of his wife when he struck her with the ploughshare. Asphyxiation was the catalyst for the victim’s death. A crucial factor of both meanings is the intention to trigger the death of an individual while reflecting on the explanations of culpable homicide and murder.

The victim had no intention of causing her death when he strung her up with a rope as he had presumed she was already dead and one cannot kill a dead person once again. This was not a case of murder or culpable homicide as the primary element of intention to cause death, was absent in both scenarios, when the accused hit the wife with a ploughshare and when he hanged her body.

Since the appellant had believed she was dead, he had no ‘mens rea’ of causing her death when he hanged her, as one cannot end the life of a person who is already dead. In both cases, when the appellant struck the spouse with a ploughshare and when he hanged her body, these were not the instances of either murder or culpable homicide as the main element of- ‘intention’ to trigger the death was missing.
Like in the commonly associated illustration of a shot fired at A (one individual) results in the killing B (another) or poison planned for A being consumed by another, B. It is not mandatory that intention should prevail with respect to the actual person whose death had been incurred. The requisite mens rea or intention persists even in such a case, and the homicide would contribute to murder. It is referred to as transferred mens rea.
Although, the intention is still a matter of fact and it may be an alleviating element and a valid consideration that the offender did not intend and plan to cause the injury which the victim endured, which saved the appellant from the charges of culpable homicide and murder, in the present case because no intention was proved from his side.
One can say that ‘causing death’ means to bring an end to one’s existence: and so all three intentions must be aimed either consciously to bring an end to one’s life or inflict any bodily injury that is likely to occur in causing the death of one’s life as per the knowledge of the offender. Knowledge must relate to the specific situations in which the offender is put. Undeniably, if a man stabs the heart of a human body, he performs an act which if it happens; he knows will bring an end to life.
It is evident that if a man kills someone by firing at what he thinks is a third individual he wants to kill, but which is actually the stub of a tree, he will be liable for culpable homicide. This is because he had such an intention towards what he considered to be a living human being, although he had no malicious intent towards any human being actually in life.

CONCLUSION

The inference that the intention of the offender must be determined is unavoidable, not only in the context of the real instances which took place but also in the sense of what the instances were intended to be. It implies that if one’s intention was exclusively guided to what he thought was a dead body; an individual cannot be convicted for culpable homicide/murder in this case.

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GHAPOO YADAV AND ORS. V. STATE OF M.P. AIR 2003 SC 1620, 11TH MARCH 1958

MATERIAL FACTS

Ramlal (hereinafter referred to as ‘PW-1’) was the father of Lekhram and Gopal (hereinafter referred to as ‘the deceased’). The accused Janku, Kewal, and Mangal Singh were the sons of the accused, Ghapoo Yadav. Deceased, the witnesses and the accused belonged to the same village and there was a land dispute between them.

The deceased, the witnesses, and the accused resided in the same village, and between them, there was a conflict regarding land. The assessment of the land was carried out by the revenue authority upon a proposal made by PW-1. Land belonging to the accused Mangal Singh was reported to be in the custody of PW-1 and a berry tree stood over the said land. While, originally, the tree was in possession of PW-1, he disjoined with its possession after assessment.

The family members of PW-1 had cut the aforementioned tree a day before the eventuality.
On the date of the incident, that is, 9/6/1986, the accused Janku asked the deceased why the tree had been cut. Lekhram answered that the tree was theirs and was planted by members of their family. The deceased asserted that the tree had not been removed by him. This resulted in heated arguments and confrontations between them. Besides, the accused individuals attacked the deceased, resulting in the rupturing of his leg.

PW-1 and Lekhram sped away from the scene of altercation and returned subsequently with the other inhabitants. The deceased, who was then fighting for breath, was taken to Maharajpur Police Station on a crib. They sent him for diagnosis. The doctor reported 7 wounds on his body upon due examination. Afterward, on 10/6/1986, the deceased died at 2.00 a.m after saying his final words. His dying statement was registered. The trial court observed, on account of the facts on hand, that the accused persons were culpable and subsequently charged and imprisoned them.

ISSUE

1. Whether the appellant was liable for the murder of the complainant under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as I.P.C.)?
2. Whether exception 4 to section 300 of the I.P.C. is applicable?

JUDGEMENT

Exception 4 to section 300 was granted and made applicable. Nonetheless, the appellants were sentenced and a 10-year prison term and fine, under section 304 of the I.P.C., as imposed by the trial court earlier served the purpose of justice.

ANALYSIS

The case of Ghapoo Yadav v. the State of M.P. deals with the applicability of exception 4 to section 300 of I.P.C. It was acknowledged that not only must the defense be able to demonstrate that the crime was committed without premeditation in a sudden conflict in the heat of passion after a sudden dispute in order to trigger Exception 4 to Section 300, but more significantly, it must be demonstrated that the perpetrator ‘did not take undue advantage and did not behave in a cruel or unusual way’.

The sudden fight must accompany a sudden argument or quarrel. A ‘sudden fight’ means mutual aggression on both parts. In such a fight, the issue of who attacks and who defends is totally entirely irrelevant and relies on the strategies adopted by the respective rivals. There can be no possibility of a sudden fight in the context of the court’s direct finding that the aggressor was one of the parties.

If there is ample time for passion to dissipate allowing the accused time to premeditate and the fighting takes place afterward, the accused will disqualify the Exemption for gaining benefits as the killing amounts to murder with premeditation. It is a matter of fact and whether or not a quarrel is sudden must ultimately depend on the evidence proven in each case.

The perpetuation of the injuries and their existence indicates the intention of the accused-appellants, but it should not be considered that the cause of such injuries is either cruel or abnormal for not benefiting from Exception 4 to Section 300 I.P.C., meaning that the number of injuries sustained during the incident is not a determining factor, but what is relevant is that the incident must have been sudden and the perpetrator must have behaved in a fit of rage. The perpetrator must not, for example, have taken an unfair advantage or have behaved in a cruel way.

CONCLUSION

Therefore, after taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances, exception 4 to Section 300, of the I.P.C. was perspicuously pertinent. This indicates that the accused had inflicted injuries to the deceased in the heat of passion after a sudden argument preceded by a fight, but had not behaved in an unfair or unnatural way.

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CASE BRIEF ON VIRSA SINGH V. STATE OF PUNJAB AIR 1958 SC 465

MATERIAL FACTS

The appellant, Virsa Singh, formed an unlawful assembly together with five other individuals and assaulted one Khem Singh with a spear. His abdomen was ruptured as a consequence of injury and three coils of intestine came out of the wound that resulted in his death, which was around two and a half inches. The doctor confirmed, pertaining to the Post Mortem Report, that the injury was deep enough resulting in gushing out of digested food from the cuts and was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.

ISSUES

1. Whether any offense has been committed by the appellant?
2. Whether an individual can get away with the punishment for the injury caused which resulted in death when there was a lack of intent?

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

The appellant argued that the intent of the first part of section 300, thirdly, “if done with the intention of causing bodily harm to any person”, would not be adequate to fall under this section. For the second part, an additional condition of intent, i.e. “and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted which should be sufficient to cause death (in the normal course of nature)” is also required.

Furthermore, the appellant referred to the case of R v. Steane (1947) in which the Chief Justice ruled that “where a specific intent must be charged, that specific intent must be proved” and sought to expand the position of intent in the act in question. The appellant cited another paragraph from the same case where it was asserted that the accused should be acquitted in case of doubt as to the concern of intent and put the responsibility on the prosecution to prove the intent beyond a reasonable doubt.

It was argued that the above-mentioned facts do not reveal an offense of murder under section 300, thirdly because the prosecutor has not proved that there was intent to inflict a bodily injury that was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. Lastly, the appellant linked the case to Emperor v. Sardarkhan Jaridkhan (1917), which said that it is challenging to figure out what the accused actually meant when death is caused by a single blow.

JUDGEMENT

The appeal was dismissed and the appellant was convicted under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC).

ANALYSIS

In ascertaining whether an act is a murder or not, analyzing the intent becomes essential. However, when a single blow has caused murder, determination of intention becomes difficult; which happened in the present case. In the ordinary course of nature, whether it was necessary to cause death is a subject of interpretation from the established facts about the complexity of the injury and has little to do with the issue of intention.

In the case of Virsa Singh v. the State of Punjab, readers should note that when a case is falling under the realms of section 300 of IPC, and when there’s contention as to whether firstly or thirdly of the said section would be applied, the following aspects should be taken into account. The condition is erroneous where the accused should have the intention or knowledge to cause injury, which is necessary to cause death in the ordinary course, meaning, as long as the death results from deliberate bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. When the intention to cause the bodily injury is genuinely found and the same is established in the court of law, then the remaining part of the investigation process is solely objective and the only concern is whether, as a matter of purely objective inference, the injury is enough to cause death in the ordinary course of nature.

The injury caused should be the cause of death. It is clearly a matter of fact whether a specific injury is enough in the ordinary course of nature to cause death or not. The perpetrator, who caused the injury deliberately, maybe oblivious that the injury is sufficient or capable of causing death.

The real analysis of this section indicates that it is not enough to establish that the injury identified to be existing is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature, but it must also be established or rather proved that the injury found to be existent was the same injury intended to be incurred. However, if his intention to inflict the injury is known and the injury sustained is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, then the perpetrator is guilty of murder for culpable homicide.

CONCLUSION

No individual has a permit to roam scot-free, while causing injuries that are sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death and argue that they are not guilty of murder, meaning that, they must confront the repercussions if they inflict injuries of that kind, and they can only get away if it can be established or rather fairly deduced that the injury was accidental or otherwise unintended.

In order to bring the case under clause thirdly of section 300, of the IPC, the court gave a four-point test that the prosecutor must observe and prove: which is used as precedents in many other succeeding cases. Justice Vivian Bose’s reflections on the four-point test have been known as ‘locus classicus’. The test set out in the case of Virsa Singh for the scope of the clause “thirdly” is now embedded in our legal framework and has become an integral part of the system.

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GYARSIBAI V. THE STATE 1953 CRILJ 588

INTRODUCTION:

In the instant case, the appellant after having a fight with her sister-in-law left the house with her three minor children and jumped into the well. After some time she was found on the edge of the well and her three children dead inside the well by some villagers. Though there is no eye-witness of the appellant jumping in the well herself, her own statement along with that of her husband and sister-in-law is conclusive proof itself of the fact that she jumped into the well on her own. The Trial Court held her guilty for murder under Section 300 but no clause was decided. Hence, the present appeal is made to the Madhya Pradesh High Court.

ISSUES:

The issue before the Court was to decide whether or not the appellant is guilty of the offense of murder (Sec 300 of IPC) of her three children as well as of attempted suicide (Sec 309 of IPC)?

JUDGEMENT:

The Sessions Judge in the following case found her guilty under Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code but didn’t give the clause under which she was charged. When the matter came to the Madhya Pradesh High Court, the judge decided that Gyarsibai should be held guilty under clause 4 of Section 300. The other three clauses of Section 300 i.e. 1, 2, and 3 deal with cases when the murder of some party is done with the “intention” of doing so but in the present case it can be clearly seen that no intention exists on the part of Gyarsibai to murder her children and hence she cannot be held liable under any other clause of Section 300.

The bone of contention that lies here is whether she should be charged under Section 299 of IPC which deals with ‘culpable homicide’ or Section 300(4) which deals with ‘murder’. The third sub-part of Section 299 states that when death is caused ‘with the knowledge that by such act he is likely to cause death’ is termed as ‘culpable homicide’ and Section 300(4) states that a person is guilty of murder if he had the knowledge that his act is ‘imminently dangerous’ and moreover that the act was committed ‘without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury’. In the present case it is clearly established through facts and evidence that Gyarsibai should be considered as a sane person and every sane person ‘knows’ that the act of jumping into the well will result in death only. Moreover, no solid evidence has been found or revealed which could establish the fact that jumping in the well with her children was the only way to save herself from her sister-in-law’s harassment hence the essential element of ‘having no valid excuse’ is ticked as well and therefore she is rightly held liable under Section 300(4) of the IPC.

Moreover, the facts and evidence are straightforward to hold Gyarsibai liable for the attempt to suicide as well. But the judges found that the punishment of murder as per Section 302 would be too rigorous for her and hence only awarded her the imprisonment of only 6 months under Section 309 i.e. Attempt to Suicide.

CONCLUSION:

So, through this case as well as through the case of Emperor v. Dhirajia [ILR (1940) All 647] the differentiating factor between Section 299 (3rd part) and Section 300(4) is highlighted. While both the section focus on ‘knowledge’ of the accused, there lies a slight difference between them. The ‘knowledge’ factor differentiates them from the rest of Section 299 and all the other 3 clauses of Section 300 but what differentiates from one other is the phrase ‘without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury’. This phrase of Section 300 states that the accused did the erroneous act of which he had knowledge that it will either cause the death of the victim or some serious bodily injury without any excuse and valid reason, he could have resorted to some other mean but still, he chose to do that particular act. While under Section 299 on the other hand, the accused does know that his act is dangerous and is likely to cause death to the particular individual but he/she still undertake it because they have no other choice other than to perform that act.

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Paul vs the State of Kerala

Facts:

Jessy, the wife of the appellant was subjected to cruelty and brutality by the appellant and his mother. On 11.10.1998, the deceased was confronted with intolerable behavior by her mother-in-law, because of whom she felt harassed and insulted. She left the house in search of her husband, whom she found consuming alcohol with his friends and was assaulted by him in front of all. Thereafter, she was found dead the same night by throttling of her neck. However, the husband had set up a false case by attributing death as a suicide. The appellant and his mother were acquitted by the trial court and the High Court of Kerala held guilty under Section 302 and sentenced him to rigorous imprisonment for life along with a fine of Rs. 10,000/-. The State filed a criminal appeal against acquittal.

Issues:

Whether the appellant is guilty of murder?

Legal Provisions:

• Section 300, The Indian Penal Code – Murder
• Section 302, The Indian Penal Code- Punishment for murder
• Section 304, The Indian Penal Code– Punishment for culpable homicide not amounting to murder
• Section 105, The Indian Evidence Act, 1872-Burden of proof
• Section 313, The Criminal Procedure Code

Appellant’s Contention:

The learned counsel submitted that Jessy had aborted a child and was going through depression. Although there was a quarrel and assuming that the appellant had set up a scene of suicide, he must be extended the benefit of exception 4 of Section 300.

Respondent’s Contention:

The respondent in her submission made mention of the deceased being subjected to mental and physical cruelty by the appellant and his mother. After examination of several witnesses and chemical analysis reports, it entailed abrasion and contusion on various parts of the body of the deceased. Therefore, the decision of the High Court should standstill.

Observations of the court:

The judgment revealed that the High Court had found an incomplete examination by the Sessions Judge under Section 313 of the CrPc and pointed out the necessity of Section 106 being taken into account. The appellant had contended that there was no one except him in the bedroom when the incident took place which places the burden of proof on him under Section 105. Therefore, he palpably set up a false case depicting suicide committed by the deceased. Even if the appellant was intoxicated, he is still liable for the actions he took. If the said act would not have amounted to murder then it would have taken the scope of Section 304. The bruise, abrasion, and contusion make the case more evident.

Judgment:

The court concluded that the appellant had made a false plea and caused the death of his wife by throttling. The act amounts to murder defined under Section 300 of the IPC and does not draw any exceptions to it.

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