CHURCH OF GOD (FULL GOSPEL) IN INDIA V. K.K.R. MAJESTIC COLONY WELFARE ASSOCIATION AND ORS. AIR 2000 SC 2773

MATERIAL FACTS

The Church of God (Full Gospel) in India (hereinafter referred to as the appellant) was a Pentecostal Christian hall of worship. For the presentation of their prayers, it employed loudspeakers and read-aloud prayers with drums, guitars, and other instrumental objects. The appellant was situated in the same area as the welfare association of K.K.R. Majestic Colony (hereinafter referred to as the respondent). The respondent filed a grievance to the Tamil Nadu Pollution Control Board alleging that noise pollution was caused by the church and thus created inconvenience for the residents.

Depending on the grievance, a check of the noise pollution in the area was carried out by the Joint Chief Environmental Engineer of the Board. The evaluation exhibited that the noise emission was owing to the locomotion of the vehicles. The respondent then appealed to the High Court for a criminal petition requesting authorization to the Superintendent of Police and the Inspector of Police to take measures in that respect.

The High Court maintained that in its requests, the respondent was reasonable. The study indicated hardly anything more than that the appellant was not exclusively liable for noise pollution, but that it had contributed to the current noise pollution problem. The Court ordered both the SP and the Inspector to take the appropriate measures to minimize noise pollution by initiating steps toward noise-causing vehicles and to maintain the Church’s speakers at a lower volume. The appellant, aggrieved by this ruling, moved to the Supreme Court.

ISSUES

• Whether the right to religion can supersede the right to an environment free from pollution?
• Whether the directions of the High Court undermine the right to profess and practice Christianity guaranteed under Art. 25 and Art. 26 of the Constitution?
• Whether the HC’s (i.e. Appa Rao’s case) judgment allowed the authorities entrusted to intervene in religious practices?

RULE OF LAW

• Article 25 and Article 26 of the Indian Constitution
• Madras City Police Act, 1888
• Madras Towns Nuisance Act, 1889
• Noise Pollution (Regulation and Control) Rules, 2000
• Environment (Protection) Act, 1986

ANALYSIS

This case addresses some rather critical issues: whether a single group or faction of that community can assert the right to contribute to noise pollution on the grounds of religion, in a nation with many religions and diverse cultures or belief systems? Is it reasonable to bang on drums or recite prayers using mics and loudspeakers to interrupt the neighborhood’s equilibrium or peacefulness?

The Court observed that it was not necessary to cope with the claim with regard to the rights under Articles 25 and 26 in-depth. It claimed that no religion mandates or professes that prayers must be conducted by amplifying the voice or banging drums. In that case, if the practice exists, the rights of everyone else should not be negatively impacted. It also justified that no right is unconditional to possess. The contentment of one’s rights must be compatible with the gratification of everybody else’s rights.

The court adopted the perspective that the issue at hand had no obligation to attach religious context to it. Yes, the judgment on which the High Court depends (Appa Rao’s case) authorized the entrusted officials to undertake steps on the basis of the directions established. The principles established in the case of Appa Rao were centered on the acts cited above.

Where it is not within reach to call forth voluntary equilibrium in the unrestricted movement of social powers, the State must intervene in order to correctly determine the tension between conflicting interests. A specific fundamental right does not reside in a sealed enclosure in seclusion. The fundamental right of an individual will also have to live side by side, in accordance with the fundamental right of others, with a fair and legitimate operation of power by the State in the context of the Directive principles, for the promotion of public welfare.

CONCLUSION

Therefore, the appeal was dismissed and it was held that the right to religion provided pursuant to Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution is subject to public order and morality and that no religion may preach on large amplifiers or loudspeakers to pray, triggering discomfort and damage to other people’s health.

Practices that bother, elderly or ill people, pupils or kids sleeping in the early hours or throughout the day, or individuals engaging in other pursuits, cannot be tolerated in a functioning society in the guise of religion. It should not be overlooked that infants are accredited to retain their natural right to sleep in a healthy environment. A student studying for his test is supposed to focus on his learning without the neighbors becoming an unwanted nuisance. Likewise, individuals are required to embrace fair peacefulness during their recreational hours without any noise pollution problem. It is recognized that some of them are quite sensitive to noise, whose rights should therefore be acknowledged and protected.

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DHANPAT SETH AND ORS. V. NIL KAMAL PLASTIC CRATES LTD. CITATION: AIR 2008 HP 23

MATERIAL FACTS

On 11/07/2005, the plaintiffs (appellants) lodged a complaint against the defendants for infringement of their patent No .195917. The patent was a tool that enabled agricultural products to be manually transported. For its characteristics as well as layout, a patent was issued. The product’s inventor was Mr. Dhanpat Seth. The defendants, Nilkamal Plastic Ltd., are manufacturers of numerous plastic goods in several states throughout India. The defendant began to manufacture and distribute a device that was identical to the patent of the plaintiffs which thus resulted in the filing of this lawsuit.

ISSUES

• Whether the appellant is qualified to issue a decree for a permanent prohibitive injunction prohibiting the defendant in some way from violating Patent No.195917?
• Whether the appellant is qualified to compensation as prayed for on account of gains and mesne profits?
• Whether the products delivered by the defendant are subject to seizure and destruction by a violation of the patent?

RULE OF LAW

• Section 2(1)(j) of the Indian Patents Act, 1970
• Section 2(1)(ja) of the Indian Patents Act, 1970
• Section 3(p) of the Indian Patents Act, 1970

ANALYSIS

The patented device was fairly similar to the Kilta device conventionally employed, and it was merely the invention of a new type of a common material. The device developed by the appellants was essentially a Kilta, but instead of bamboo, it was made of synthetic polymeric material (which is widely acknowledged as plastic). The only noticeable distinction is that the device now being produced has adjustable buckled nylon straps. The nylon straps currently attached were practically iterations of even the ropes employed in the traditional Kilta. The simple implementation of buckles does not lead to an invention or advanced stimulation being considered a new device. In addition, the appellants were unable to prove that the patented device had the effect of improving the functionality of the historically used Kilta device.

It was also noted that, since prehistoric times, Kilta has been utilized in agriculture to transport agricultural products in hill regions, in particular in the State of Himachal Pradesh, and that it could not be claimed that the invention was new and innovative. At first sight, pictorial comparisons of the three products show that the products created by the appellants and the defendant are simulated replicas of the conventional Kilta. The invention was a part of the transparent neology provided under Sec 3(p) of the Patents Act and thus was not an invention.

The fact that the innovation is an innovative move is invalidated because it is conventional knowledge. While plastic is the raw material used, the invention is merely a replication of Kilta and reinforces its established characteristics. The court, therefore, overturned the patent given to the appellants under Sec 64 r/w Sec. 13 of the Act ‘A System for Physically Transporting the Agricultural Product’.

Nowadays, traditional objects produced out of wood, iron, metal, leather, and other organic materials have been substituted by plastic. For instance, chairs, desks, containers, accessories, and many other things have historically been made of natural materials but are now made from plastic. The simple fact that the product is made of polymeric substance instead of bamboo is, thus, not an innovative move featuring any ingenuity or creativity. There is hardly anything innovative about the method of making the traditional Kilta from synthetic material than making from natural material.

Therefore, on the basis of past usage, the supposed patent was held invalid. As part of their conventional knowledge, it was reported that the natives were already employing such a tool classified as ‘Kilta’. Therefore, it falls short of creative and innovative execution. There was, hence, a breach.

CONCLUSION

It is essential to take into account that in the desire to be patentable, advancement on something actually existing or synthesis of multiple items already recognized should be more than a simple enhancement of the facility; and the criterion of innovation or an “inventive step” must be specifically fulfilled. A new product or a superior or affordable product than before must be created in order for the innovation or the product to be patentable. The composition of existing recognized fractions may be incorporated in such a way that they generate a new mechanism or enhanced result through their functioning. The issuance of a patent does not compensate for the mere set of more than one fraction or objects, not requiring the operation of any creative or innovative faculty.

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SK. MANIRUDDIN V. SOMA BANERJEE MANU/TN/7669/2018

MATERIAL FACTS

The parties, verified under the Marriage Registrar, Chinsurah, Hooghly, tied the knot on 05.01.1998 under the Special Marriage Act. On the basis of cruelty and desertion, the wife (respondent) pleaded for divorce. The respondent’s case was that, by practice, she was a Hindu, whereas the husband (appellant) was a Muslim and both became associated with each other through their mutual friend and eventually grew intimate towards one another.
It was also the scenario that the respondent had been dwelling at her father’s place after 1998, whereas the appellant was residing in his house, and had seldom expressed any interest in moving her to his family home. It was also argued that while Rs. 50,000/- (Rupees Fifty Thousand) was received by the appellant as salary per month, he hardly provided any amount for her maintenance.
Furthermore, by hiding material evidence, the appellant married her and he also harassed her directly as well as via his men and that both parties had been residing independently for more than fourteen (14) years and that the matrimonial bond had irrevocably dissolved and a divorce order could consequently be issued in her support.

ISSUE

Whether the decree of divorce can be granted?

RULE OF LAW

Section 24 of the Special Marriage Act, 1954

ANALYSIS

Apart from the plea on the basis of cruelty for an order for divorce under Section 27 of the Act, the facts of the wife (respondent) as P.W. 1 and her cross-examination explain that the appellant threatened and abused her on several occasions. For such claims, nevertheless, there was also no substantial proof on paper. P.W. 2 is the respondent’s father and throughout his questioning, he did not testify regarding anything about some occurrence of physical abuse or suffering.
Conversely, the claim made by the respondent, whatever it is, does not seem to be persuasive at all. Thus, on account of the proof of P.W. 1 and from P.W. 2 it can be inferred that there was no mental or physical cruelty in the actions of the appellant or the husband. As a consequence, the facts of the present case do not pose any question of cruelty, whether physical or mental.
With respect to desertion, the proof of P.W. 1 during her cross-examination shows that the respondent submitted multiple complaints to get away from the marital tie and that she married the appellant (husband) out of the former love relationship between them, but she sought to get out of the matrimonial bond by bringing various cases on numerous charges because her family members did not support such relationship. Therefore, based on the above facts, one can conclude that the respondent has faltered to show that the appellant deserted her for no reason whatsoever.

CONCLUSION

In order to allow the parties to establish a common arrangement with trust and dignity and to practice their independent choice and conscience in the case, the court proposed going for an alternative relief such as an order for legal separation. Therefore, a divorce order for the dissolution of the marriage was not a legal option available to the respondent/wife, and at present, there was no legitimate basis for the same.

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OM PRAKASH VS. RELIANCE GENERAL INSURANCE AND ORS. AIR 2017 SC 4836

MATERIAL FACTS

The Appellant Insured Truck was stolen. The Appellant submitted the insurance claim to the Respondent Company and the fact of the fraud was verified by an investigator authorized by the company. Subsequently, the Corporate Claims Manager granted the Appellant’s amount for the aforementioned claim.
The Appellant subsequently made a range of appeals and queries to the Respondent-company requesting, inter alia, timely approval and disposition of its insurance claim, and the Respondent-company rejected the Appellant’s insurance claim, making reference to the violation of the Imminent Knowledge Condition relating to the loss/theft of the vehicle.
The appellant subsequently sent a complaint to the District Forum, the State Commission, and the National Commission. The National Commission had rejected this petition. In the present appeal, the Appellant challenged the lawfulness and validity of the aforementioned decree.

ISSUES

Whether the National Commission correctly dismissed the revision petition on the basis that, after a delay of 8 days from the incidence of theft, the Appellant filed his claim?

RULE OF LAW

Section 379 of the Indian Penal Code
Section 12 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986

ANALYSIS

It is a universal understanding that an individual who has lost his vehicle will not go to the insurance company immediately to demand compensation. He will initially make attempts to track the vehicle. Such a claim cannot be dismissed on the basis of delay unless the justification for the delay in submitting a claim is sufficiently and satisfactorily clarified.
It is also important to acknowledge here that dismissing legitimate statements that have previously been checked and established by the investigator to be right would not be fair and rational. The delay state shall not be a refuge for the repudiation of insurance claims which have already been exhibited to be valid and true. The purpose of the Consumer Protection Act is to deliver stronger protection for consumers’ interests. It is a favorable statute worthy of egalitarian development. Although contemplating the contentions made under the Act, this meritorious purpose should not be ignored. In the case at hand, the Appellant offered coherent explanations for the 8-day delay in notifying the Respondent of the occurrence.

The Investigator had evaluated that the loss was credible and the Corporate Claims Manager authorized the compensation for the claim, which was fair and reasonable. Without taking into consideration the reason for the delay, the National Commission was not rational in dismissing the Appellant’s argument. The appeal was therefore approved and the appellant was qualified to claim compensation. Directions are given by the National Commission, the State Commission, and the District Forum were set aside.

CONCLUSION

It is completely true that the owner must instantly notify the insurer after the theft of the vehicle. This situation should not, nevertheless, preclude the settlement of legitimate cases, especially when the gap or the delay in intimating or presenting documents is due to inevitable conditions. The insurer’s determination to deny the claim has to be centered on legitimate and valid reasons. The procedural denial of claims on a solely technical basis would contribute to the deterioration of faith of insured people in the insurance sector. Such a claim cannot be dismissed on a technical basis if the explanation for the delay in making a claim is sufficiently stated.
The Respondents were therefore ordered to pay the sum with interest to the Appellant from the filing date of the petition until the payment date.

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BANK OF INDIA V. BRINDAVAN AGRO INDUSTRIES PVT. LTD. MANU/SC/0238/2020

MATERIAL FACTS

An account with the Appellant Bank was operated by M/S Brindavan Agro Industries Pvt Ltd. (respondent). The bank debited the relevant transaction costs, namely the TEV study and the service tax fees, to the consumer’s account. The penultimate request for approval was sent to the Head Office which had the appropriate authority to grant the approval for such loans of substantial value.

The consumer raised objections; however, to the deduction of transaction fees because the bank was only entitled to do so once the loan had been approved. Due to the purported delay of the bank in permitting access to credit as well as the fact that the consumer had obtained financial assistance from other banks, the consumer demanded a refund of the specified amount on the basis of losses incurred.

Again, through e-mails, he recapitulated his demand application. The access to credit was, nonetheless, granted within three months of the final revised application. When the bank’s officers confronted the customer with the demanded letter of sanction for the credit facilities, the consumer manifested the letters of sanction granted by the other banks. The consumer lodged an application that authorized the State Commission in ordering the Bank to pay the balance of the transaction costs besides the interest. However, the appeal against such an order was dismissed before the National Commission.

ISSUE

Whether the Respondent was entitled to transaction costs debited by Bank?

RULE OF LAW

Section 17 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986

ANALYSIS

The court, therefore, observed that the decisions of the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (SCDRC) and National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC) endured from patent illegitimacy and that their directions were subsequently set aside. The Bank decided, however, to reimburse some amount, from the transaction costs by intimating the customer through an email but in its e-mail, the customer had not approved such an offer.
Accordingly, the Consumer was qualified to a reimbursement of the amount conveyed to the Consumer by the Bank’s decision instead of an exemption of TEV charges in its totality. The demand was to award half of all the fees, thus the total sum of the fees to be taken into account and not the fees under a specific heading. In addition, the bank was ordered to provide a refund within two months of the date of the order.

CONCLUSION

The Bank’s facilities were used for cash credit services, which in turn entitled the respondent to hold a position of ‘consumer’ under the Act.
The consumer was evidently an old and a regular customer of the appellant bank, who requested more than Rs. 40 crores of credit facilities and it was shocking that he was oblivious of the Bank’s operation, policies and procedures because for many years he had been affiliated with the bank. It was not acceptable to acknowledge unfamiliarity with the Bank’s process and its Circular. The customer was conscious of the transaction costs and demanded that the transaction costs be waived; thus, the transaction costs were debited by the bank in accordance with the authorization granted by the consumer.

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DARGA RAM V. STATE OF RAJASTHAN AIR 2015 SC 1016

MATERIAL FACTS

The Complainant had arranged a Jagran somewhere on the fringes of the village in Rajasthan. Until midnight there were about fifty (50) individuals, including men, women, and children, including Kamala (the 7-year-old victim) and Darga Ram (the appellant). Kamala went to sleep in a nearby location with the other children. When the complainant, the victim’s father, went to the house, he discovered that Kamala was missing.
The search was then carried out on the periphery of the village, and one of the members of the village found her dead body. Upon further investigation, Kamala was found to have been raped and killed by smashing her head with a heavy stone. A case was registered under Section 302 and Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code. Darga Ram, who was a deaf, dumb, and uneducated teenager, was further interrogated and arrested by the police on the grounds of the injuries found on his intimate (or rather private) parts, along with bloodstains that matched with the victim’s blood group.
In addition to a fine of Rs. 1000/- and a default sentence of one month with rigorous imprisonment, the trial court ultimately found the appellant guilty and thus convicted him and sentenced him to incarceration for a term of ten years. Correspondingly, he was sentenced to life imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 3000/- and a default term of three months of rigorous imprisonment for the crime of punishment for murder.
An appeal was subsequently lodged by the appellant seeking to raise a plea that, at the time of the commission of the Act, the appellant was a juvenile and thus entitled to the benefit from the provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000.

ISSUES

1. Whether the appellant was a juvenile when the offense took place?
2. Whether the appellant is entitled to get benefits from the provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000?

LEGAL PROVISIONS

• Sections 302 and 376 of Indian Penal Code, 1860
• Rule 12(3)(b) of Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007

JUDGEMENT

The Hon’ble Court ordered the Principal, Government Medical College, Jodhpur, to set up a medical examination board of doctors, including a radiographic examination of the appellant, to ascertain the age of the appellant as at the time of the offense in April 1998, took place because the appellant had no historical evidence, such as a school or other certificate. On the evidence of the Medical Board’s calculation, it was determined that, on the date of the incident, the juvenile was just 17 years, 2 months, and entitled to benefit from the provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000.
The appellant was thus deemed a juvenile in this case and the sentence awarded to him was set aside and was released from prison.

ANALYSIS

The reality that the appellant who was found guilty of the rape and murder of an innocent young child and been in prison for almost 14 years, was acquitted on the basis that he was a juvenile at the time of the commission of the offense. One is forced to believe, like the prosecution that the appellant has engaged in sexual abuse, which at the level of his growth may be a normal manifestation of natural sex. Although, his cognitive abilities were not improbable, his potential to comprehend desire, sexual arousal, and its limits could be severely impaired.
Since the appellant was illiterate and had no historical evidence, such as school or some other certificate. The question must be posed as to why hearing and speech impairment and lack of education weren’t treated as a cause for extenuating circumstances until the age of seventeen years. It was interesting why the appellant did not seek protection under Section 2(b) of the Equal Protection Act of Persons with Physical Disabilities, 1995, and why he was not protected under Section 2(d) (iii) of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000

In such cases, the age of the juvenile should be the decisive factor and not the heinousness of the offenses a juvenile who was a minor during the commission of the offense and should not be held accountable as there was an inadequate development of cognitive faculties and decision-making abilities.

CONCLUSION

Law and social norms have always been aware of a widespread perception that children and young people are not even completely developed, they are in the cycle of development. Their brains experience a phase of great plasticity triggered by the hormonal transition of adolescence, in which the socio-emotional system that governs emotions and rewards sensitivity grows faster than the cognitive control mechanism that regulates planning, rationality, and self-discipline.
Consequently, their roles should be distinct and primarily motivated with a view to fostering rehabilitation rather than irreversible separation from society to the greatest extent possible.

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MOBARIK ALI AHMED V. THE STATE OF BOMBAY, AIR 1957 SC 857

MATERIAL FACTS

Mr. Louis Anton Cornea, the complainant, was a businessman residing in Goa and also the director of a trading firm namely, Colonial Limitada, which was doing business in import and export. Due to the scarcity of rice at the time in Goa, the complainant was anxious about the import of rice and thus, got in contact with Mr. Jassawla, a commission agent under Universal Supply Corporation. Mr. Mobarik Ali Ahmed, the appellant, was a businessman residing and trading in Karachi, Pakistan under name of Atlas Industrial and Trading Corporation and Ifthiar Ahmed & Co. The appellant was contacted by Mr. Jasawalla. Series of telegrams, phone calls, and letters were exchanged between Mr. Jasawalla and the complainant, and Mr. Jasawalla and the appellant after a contract was formed for the sale and purchase of 1200 tons (later 2000 tons) of rice at the price of 51 pounds per ton.
25% of the payment was paid in advance to Mr. Jasawalla and the rice was to be shipped from Karachi to Goa. After the quantity was raised to 2000 tons, 50% of the payment was paid in advance after the appellant had given assurance of complete arrangements. After the delivery was delayed, the complainant requested for his money to be returned but the appellant denied getting any payments.

ISSUES

• Whether the appellant, a Pakistani national, doing business in Karachi who wasn’t present in India pre or post the occurrence of offense can be put on trial by an Indian court or not?
• Whether the exchanged telegrams and letters be admissible in court or not?
• Whether the appellant is convicted for the offenses under Section 3(2) of the English Extradition Act, 1870 or not?
• Whether the conviction of the appellant is justifiable under section 420 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 or not?

JUDGEMENT

Taking into consideration the arguments, the evidence, and facts presented before the court, the appeal was dismissed and the decision was taken to convict the appellant Mobarik Ali Ahmed under section 420, read along with section 34 of the IPC.

ARGUMENTS PRESENTED BY THE APPELLANT

The learned counsel by raising contention denied the exchange of letters or telegrams between the complainant and the appellant and argued that the telegrams and letters which were being relied upon are inadmissible in the court and that there exists no intimate acquaintance who can validate the signatures.
By relying on the case of Shreekantiah Munipalli v. The State of Bombay, which held that “the acts done by several persons in furtherance of common intention”, the learned counsel argued that as per section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, the appellant wasn’t even present in Bombay but was in Karachi for the commencement of the offense. Thus the appellant did not join the actual doing of the act and merely planning is not sufficient to hold someone liable and should not be tried under section 179 of the Code of Criminal Procedure because he has not committed any offense under the Indian Penal Code.
The appellant had surrendered himself for the offense of forgery and under Section 3(2) of the English Extradition Act, 1870, is protected and cannot be tried for other crimes without giving the opportunity to return.

ARGUMENTS PRESENTED BY THE RESPONDENT

Under section 415 of the Indian Penal Code, cheating is defined with its essentials as fraudulent misrepresentation to a person and inducing that person thereby to deliver property. And it is evident from the facts that all the elements of cheating are present and thus the appellant had intended to cheat. The appellant had submitted a statement stating that he had continued to live in India till July 1950 and established himself as a citizen of India. Under article 5 of the Indian, Constitution read with article 7, the appellant was a citizen of India at the time of commencement and commission of the offense. The claim of the appellant being a foreigner cannot help true under article 9, till he shows that he voluntarily acquired citizenship of a foreign country, and in the present scenario; he didn’t have any proof of acquiring citizenship of Pakistan.

ANALYSIS

The court held that the telegrams and the letters were authentic and thus were admissible in the court of law and thus were considered as important and direct evidence, article 45 and 47 of the Indian Evidence Act were referred. Testimony of 3 witnesses was taken into consideration, witnesses being the complainant, Mr. Jasawalla, the mediator, and Sequeria who was an ex-employee of the appellant.
Relying on H. N. Rishbud v. The State of Delhi, it was observable that section 3(2) of the English Extradition Act, 1870 had no effect as the appellant had surrendered himself. The court emphasized that under the section of the Indian Penal Code, any foreigner who commits any offense in India can be punished without any limitations because the exercise of criminal jurisdiction is dependent on the offense itself and not the nationality of the said offender. The court also said that the case of Shreekantiah Munipalli v. The State of Bombay, on which the council of the appellant was relying, affected the present case, judging by the facts.

CONCLUSION

Although if the crime took place in Bombay while the appellant was not evident to be present in India throughout the execution of the crime, his conviction was justifiable under the Indian Penal Code, as all the elements which constitute the offense of cheating under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code were carried out in Bombay.

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SHREYA SINGHAL V. UNION OF INDIA, AIR 2015 SC 1523

MATERIAL FACTS

Shaheen Dhada and Rinu Srinivasan were arrested by the Mumbai police in 2012 for posting comments showing their dissent at a bandh organized following the Death of Shiv Sena Chief Bala Saheb Thackery, on their Facebook profile. Even though the two arrested girls were later discharged and criminal charges against them were dropped, a nationwide protest was started based on the presumption that the police abused their power by invoking Section 66A and that Section 66A was infringing the Fundamental Right of Speech and Expression. Moreover, in January 2013, the central government brought an advisory under which no person can be arrested without the police having prior approval of the inspector general of police or any other senior officials to him/her. A writ PIL was filed under Article 32 of the Indian Constitution seeking to declare Section 66A, Section 69, and Section 79 of the IT Act, 2000, by the Petitioner. Under a single PIL case known as “Shreya Singhal v. Union of India,” the Apex Court compiled the whole petition pertaining to the constitutional legitimacy of the information technology act or any provision within it.

ISSUES

1. Whether sections 66(A), 69, and 79 of the IT Act, 2002 and section 118(d) of the Kerela Police Act are required to be declared unconstitutional for violating Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India?
2. Whether Section 66A arbitrarily, excessively, and disproportionately invades the right to Freedom of Speech and Expression? And if it creates a chilling effect on Freedom of Speech and Expression.
3. Whether Section 66A of the IT Act, 2002 is protected under article 19(2) as a reasonable restriction to freedom of speech and expression?
4. Whether Section 66A infringes Article 14?

ARGUMENTS BY THE PARTIES

It was contended by the petitioner that Section 66A infringes the Right to the Freedom of Speech and Expression guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) and shall not be protected by the reasonable restrictions provided under Article 19(2). And that it creates a ‘Chilling effect’ on the Right of Freedom of Speech and Expression. And that there is no difference provided between, discussion, accuracy, and incitement of an expression. Section 66A is vague in nature, as it does not specifically define the terminology used in the law. Thus, it can be misused easily and arbitrarily. In addition, Article 14 has been violated as there is no intelligible differentia between information transmitted through the internet and other traditional sources. Thus, sections 66A, 69, and 79 of the Information Technology Act are in clear violation of fundamental rights given under Article 12-35 of the Constitution of India.
On the other hand, the respondent contended that there is at present no requirement of Courts to step in, and would be required only when a law is clearly violative of Part III and that there is a presumption in favor of the constitutionality of the law in question. Mere probability of abuse of provision cannot be a ground to declare a provision unconstitutional and that provision cannot be declared unconstitutional merely based on it being vague, also, the language is liberal in nature for the greater good.

JUDGEMENT

The Supreme Court of India repealed Section 66 of the Information Technology Act, in Toto, for violation of Article 19(1) (a) of the Indian Constitution and maintained that it cannot be guarded under Article 19 (2) anymore. Section 69A and the Information Technology Rules, 2009, were held to be within the legal powers of the Constitution and constitutionally valid. Contingent to the interpretation of Section 79(3)(b) of the IT Act, Section 79 was declared to be valid and lawful. The Hon’ble Court also annulled section 118(d) of the Kerala Police Act.

ANALYSIS

The right conferred by Art 19(1) (a) is neither absolute nor unchecked and it features rights with permissible restrictions. Each sub-clause of Art 19(1) is subjected to different kinds of restrictions, which are reasonable in nature. These restrictions are the rights and interests of others, which are also fundamental in nature. While the rights reflect claims of the individual, the limitation protects claims of other individuals, society, and the State. All citizens are fundamentally equal, and thus the welfare of each citizen is of equal importance to the society, meaning that an individual’s rights cannot override or transcend the rights of others in an ordered society. It’s the nature of democracy that needs Freedom of Speech and expression. Freedom of speech consists of several aspects, including the right to express one’s opinion unimpeded, by the fear of reprisal. It is one of the most fundamental elements of a wholesome democracy. It allows individuals to openly engage in the economic, social, and political decisions of their nation, but not at the cost of others’ rights.

CONCLUSION

The court acknowledged that the words used in 66A are entirely unrestricted and ambiguous and are not protected under Article 19(2) of the Constitution of India. In fact, Section 66A had no immediate relation with inflicting disruption to law and order or provocation to perpetrate an offense and was thus knocked down by the court.

The mechanism followed by the court was to secure the constitutional right to freedom of speech and expression, and by demanding the safeguard pursuant to Article 19(2) of the Constitution; the law could in no way undermine this right. Also, the court has abrogated only those parts which were ambiguous and contentious in nature by incorporating the law of severability. It is not necessary to hold the entire legislation void or unconstitutional.

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STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH V. NARAYAN SINGH AND ORS., AIR 1989 SC 1789

MATERIAL FACTS OF THE CASE-

Two Appeals involving the same questions of law were heard concurrently- The respondents, in the first appeal being lorry driver and two cleaners and in the second appeal being lorry driver and coolie, were carrying 200 and 170 fertilizer bags respectively in trucks from Indore, Madhya Pradesh to Maharashtra. They were stopped at a Sales Tax barrier near the border of Maharashtra.
The documents confiscated from them contained the invoices and other records but did not include permits given under the Fertilizers (Movement Control) Order, 1973. They were then taken to court for lacking a legitimate authorization under the FMC Order of 1973, set out in sections 3 and 7 of the Essential Commodities Act of 1955, for exporting fertilizers from Madhya Pradesh to Maharashtra.
The defendants did not deny that they were carrying fertilizer bags in their Lorries and that these lorries belonged to them. However, the defendants assert that they were oblivious of the nature of the documents seized from them and were not consciously involved in violating the rules and regulations laid under the F.M.C. Order by exporting the fertilizer bags from Madhya Pradesh to Maharashtra.

ISSUES

1. Whether defendants must establish “mens rea” on their part in exporting fertilizer bags lacking a valid permit and for obtaining their conviction under section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955?
2. Whether the facts on account only represented the preparation by the defendants in compliance with section 3 of the E.C. Act of 1955 on the export of fertilizer bags from one state to another without authorization and therefore not an attempt to export fertilizer bags?

LEGAL PROVISIONS

• Section 3 and 7 of Essential Commodities Act, 1955
• Fertilizer (Movement Control) Order, 1973
• Section 511 of the Indian Penal Code,1860

ARGUMENTS BY THE PARTIES

It was contended by the appellants that the key terms “whether knowingly, intentionally or otherwise” were laid down and incorporated in Section 7 in order to prohibit persons from committing offenses under the Act and avoiding prosecution on the grounds that the offenses were not deliberately committed. Hence, here the element of mens rea is not the only factor for convicting a person. Secondly, this was not a case of mere preparation. The export would have been an accomplished act and the fertilizer bags would have been effectively taken to Maharashtra State in breach of the F.M.C. Order if the defendants were not stopped at the Sendhwa sales tax barrier.
On the other hand, respondents contended that they were oblivious of the nature of the documents confiscated from them and they did not breach the rules and regulations laid under the F.M.C. Order by exporting the fertilizer bags from Madhya Pradesh to Maharashtra in a deliberate manner. They contended that the prosecution has lacked enough evidence to prove the accused were attempting to export fertilizer bags from Madhya Pradesh to Maharashtra. Moreover, they presented that the materials on record (invoice and other documents) only established mere preparation on their side.

JUDGEMENT

The judgment of the Trial Magistrate and the High Court on appeal was found to be arbitrary and unreasonable by the apex bench. It maintained that the defendants were guilty of the offense in violation of the Fertilizers (Movement and Control) Order, 1973 read with sections 3 and 7 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. Nevertheless, since the case was 15 years old and the defendants were discharged 15 years earlier, the Supreme Court granted the appeal without sentencing them.

ANALYSIS

ISSUE I- “Mens Rea”

The terms used in section 7(1) are “if any person violates whether, knowingly, deliberately or otherwise, any order provided under section 3” takes within its fold contraventions done on otherwise, i.e., inadvertently. Consequently, the ‘mens rea’ factor is not an essential element if the facts of the export or the attempt to export are determined by the corroboration on hand.

ISSUE II- “Preparation or Attempt”

There are four elements at the beginning of an offense- Intention, Planning/Preparation, Attempt, and Performance. The first two elements will not trigger culpability, but the third and fourth elements will unquestionably attract it. In the present context, if the interference had not occurred, the export would have been an accomplished act and in flagrant violation of the F.M.C. Order, the fertilizer bags would have been effectively taken to Maharashtra State.

CONCLUSION

Thus, the Trial Court and High Court are wrong in taking the view that mens rea needs to be proved. In 1967, these terms were introduced in section 7 in order to prevent people from avoiding prosecution and punishment on the grounds that the offenses were not committed intentionally and thus, it was not an instance of mere planning or preparation, that is, the defendants trying to obtain fertilizer bags from someone or attempting to employ a lorry (truck) to carry those bags to Maharashtra. Evidently, these were cases of attempted illicit export of fertilizer bags and not cases of simple preparation. Thus, the respondents were caught in the act of exporting.

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PALANI GOUNDAN V. EMPEROR, MANU/TN/0395/1919

MATERIAL FACTS

With his wife, the appellant had an altercation. The appellant, infuriated throughout the disagreement, struck his spouse on the head with a ploughshare that caused the spouse to lose consciousness.
The appellant presumed she was mortally wounded and the accused attempted to manipulate with the facts and proofs of the scene of the crime in anticipation of being prosecuted for murder. Also, to establish the groundwork for the fabricated argument of suicide, which he eventually built, he managed to string her by a knot on a beam.
Subsequently, when the post mortem was carried out on the spouse’s body, it revealed that the first hit was not a lethal one and she managed to survive the ploughshare’s strike and was merely insentient then. The suffocation and oxygen deprivation by hanging, which was the appellant’s act, was the consequence of death.

ISSUE

Whether the accused is liable for the offense of Murder or is this case of Culpable Homicide?

LEGAL PROVISIONS

Sections 299 and 300 of Indian Penal Code, 1860

JUDGEMENT

The Hon’ble High Court overturned the session court’s decision and maintained that the appellant cannot be held liable for the offense of murder or culpable homicide. Conversely, he can only be held liable for the grievous hurt engendered when the ploughshare was being used to strike the victim and for interfering with proof.

ANALYSIS

One can infer from the findings in Palani Goudan v. Emperor that the appellant did not intend to cause the death of his wife when he struck her with the ploughshare. Asphyxiation was the catalyst for the victim’s death. A crucial factor of both meanings is the intention to trigger the death of an individual while reflecting on the explanations of culpable homicide and murder.

The victim had no intention of causing her death when he strung her up with a rope as he had presumed she was already dead and one cannot kill a dead person once again. This was not a case of murder or culpable homicide as the primary element of intention to cause death, was absent in both scenarios, when the accused hit the wife with a ploughshare and when he hanged her body.

Since the appellant had believed she was dead, he had no ‘mens rea’ of causing her death when he hanged her, as one cannot end the life of a person who is already dead. In both cases, when the appellant struck the spouse with a ploughshare and when he hanged her body, these were not the instances of either murder or culpable homicide as the main element of- ‘intention’ to trigger the death was missing.
Like in the commonly associated illustration of a shot fired at A (one individual) results in the killing B (another) or poison planned for A being consumed by another, B. It is not mandatory that intention should prevail with respect to the actual person whose death had been incurred. The requisite mens rea or intention persists even in such a case, and the homicide would contribute to murder. It is referred to as transferred mens rea.
Although, the intention is still a matter of fact and it may be an alleviating element and a valid consideration that the offender did not intend and plan to cause the injury which the victim endured, which saved the appellant from the charges of culpable homicide and murder, in the present case because no intention was proved from his side.
One can say that ‘causing death’ means to bring an end to one’s existence: and so all three intentions must be aimed either consciously to bring an end to one’s life or inflict any bodily injury that is likely to occur in causing the death of one’s life as per the knowledge of the offender. Knowledge must relate to the specific situations in which the offender is put. Undeniably, if a man stabs the heart of a human body, he performs an act which if it happens; he knows will bring an end to life.
It is evident that if a man kills someone by firing at what he thinks is a third individual he wants to kill, but which is actually the stub of a tree, he will be liable for culpable homicide. This is because he had such an intention towards what he considered to be a living human being, although he had no malicious intent towards any human being actually in life.

CONCLUSION

The inference that the intention of the offender must be determined is unavoidable, not only in the context of the real instances which took place but also in the sense of what the instances were intended to be. It implies that if one’s intention was exclusively guided to what he thought was a dead body; an individual cannot be convicted for culpable homicide/murder in this case.

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