GYARSIBAI W/O JAGANNATH V. THE STATE AIR 1953 MP 61, MANU/MP/0011/1952, 23RD OCTOBER 1952

MATERIAL FACTS

The appellant, Gyarsibai, resided in the same house along with her spouse, her children, and Kaiserbai, her sister-in-law. There were neither any cordial relations nor any good terms between Kaiserbai and Gyarsibai. Moreover, they were in regular disputes, and often had heated confrontations between them. Jagannath, her spouse, used to hit and abuse Gyarsibai for bickering with his sister, Kaiserbai. On the morning of 14/9/1951, when Jagannath was not at home, one such disagreement occurred.
When Kaiserbai forced the appellant to get out of the house, Gyarsibai went away from the home with her three children aged 7 years, 5 years, and 1.5 years, stating that she would jump into a well together with her three children, right after leaving the home. Eventually, Gyarsibai and her three children were reported by the people of the village. Gyarsibai survived, but she lost her children on account of their deaths.

ISSUES RAISED

1. Whether the appellant is liable for the offense of murder of the three children?
2. Whether the appellant is liable for the offense of attempt to suicide?

LEGAL PROVISIONS

• Section 300(4) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860
• Section 309 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860

JUDGEMENT

The appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment under Section 302 of the Penal Code. The Hon’ble Court, however, advised the Government to mitigate the sentence of life imprisonment to one of three years of rigorous imprisonment. The appellant was sentenced to six months’ imprisonment for the offense of attempt to suicide under Section 309 of the IPC.

ANALYSIS

In the case of Gyarsibai v. The State, readers should note that it is simply not murder by merely causing the death of an individual, or by performing an act with the knowledge that is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all likelihood, cause the death of the individual. In order for an act carried out with such knowledge to constitute murder, it’s indeed important that it should be committed without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or injury to the body. An act, committed with the knowledge of its repercussions, is not murder prima facie; it becomes murder only if it can be proven unequivocally that there was no excuse.

The conditions of the section are not met by the act of murder being one of gross recklessness. It must, however, be utterly inexcusable. If even a risk of the most extreme possible nature is taken which would usually result in death, taking the risk is not murder unless it was inexcusable to take it. The court acknowledged that there was no reason to consider that the appellant could not avoid abuse at the hands of her sister-in-law, besides jumping with her three children into a well.

In deciding what is or is not an excuse, the state of mind in which the convicted individual was, must be kept in mind. The state of mind of a rational and lawfully sane individual must be taken into consideration and then assess whether the possibility of causing death might have been prevented.

Any sane person is assumed to have some understanding of the essence of his act-and in this case, one is bound to assume that the appellant was sane. Any psychiatric illness short of insanity does not refute this knowledge or understanding.
Such terms suggest that if undertaken to escape greater harm, the imminently dangerous act is not murder. Without doing the act, if harm can be prevented, then there can be no legitimate excuse for doing the act that is so imminently dangerous that it would, in all likelihood, trigger death or harm that is likely to cause death.

CONCLUSION

The Hon’ble High Court held that under section 300(4), the appellant was justifiably convicted, as she was neither an individual of unsound mind, nor she was in a position where she could not understand or know the consequences of her behavior. Jumping into a well wasn’t the only choice she had left with. Thus, there was no excuse for her conduct, so under section 300(4) and it was reasonable to prosecute her.

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GYARSIBAI V. THE STATE 1953 CRILJ 588

INTRODUCTION:

In the instant case, the appellant after having a fight with her sister-in-law left the house with her three minor children and jumped into the well. After some time she was found on the edge of the well and her three children dead inside the well by some villagers. Though there is no eye-witness of the appellant jumping in the well herself, her own statement along with that of her husband and sister-in-law is conclusive proof itself of the fact that she jumped into the well on her own. The Trial Court held her guilty for murder under Section 300 but no clause was decided. Hence, the present appeal is made to the Madhya Pradesh High Court.

ISSUES:

The issue before the Court was to decide whether or not the appellant is guilty of the offense of murder (Sec 300 of IPC) of her three children as well as of attempted suicide (Sec 309 of IPC)?

JUDGEMENT:

The Sessions Judge in the following case found her guilty under Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code but didn’t give the clause under which she was charged. When the matter came to the Madhya Pradesh High Court, the judge decided that Gyarsibai should be held guilty under clause 4 of Section 300. The other three clauses of Section 300 i.e. 1, 2, and 3 deal with cases when the murder of some party is done with the “intention” of doing so but in the present case it can be clearly seen that no intention exists on the part of Gyarsibai to murder her children and hence she cannot be held liable under any other clause of Section 300.

The bone of contention that lies here is whether she should be charged under Section 299 of IPC which deals with ‘culpable homicide’ or Section 300(4) which deals with ‘murder’. The third sub-part of Section 299 states that when death is caused ‘with the knowledge that by such act he is likely to cause death’ is termed as ‘culpable homicide’ and Section 300(4) states that a person is guilty of murder if he had the knowledge that his act is ‘imminently dangerous’ and moreover that the act was committed ‘without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury’. In the present case it is clearly established through facts and evidence that Gyarsibai should be considered as a sane person and every sane person ‘knows’ that the act of jumping into the well will result in death only. Moreover, no solid evidence has been found or revealed which could establish the fact that jumping in the well with her children was the only way to save herself from her sister-in-law’s harassment hence the essential element of ‘having no valid excuse’ is ticked as well and therefore she is rightly held liable under Section 300(4) of the IPC.

Moreover, the facts and evidence are straightforward to hold Gyarsibai liable for the attempt to suicide as well. But the judges found that the punishment of murder as per Section 302 would be too rigorous for her and hence only awarded her the imprisonment of only 6 months under Section 309 i.e. Attempt to Suicide.

CONCLUSION:

So, through this case as well as through the case of Emperor v. Dhirajia [ILR (1940) All 647] the differentiating factor between Section 299 (3rd part) and Section 300(4) is highlighted. While both the section focus on ‘knowledge’ of the accused, there lies a slight difference between them. The ‘knowledge’ factor differentiates them from the rest of Section 299 and all the other 3 clauses of Section 300 but what differentiates from one other is the phrase ‘without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury’. This phrase of Section 300 states that the accused did the erroneous act of which he had knowledge that it will either cause the death of the victim or some serious bodily injury without any excuse and valid reason, he could have resorted to some other mean but still, he chose to do that particular act. While under Section 299 on the other hand, the accused does know that his act is dangerous and is likely to cause death to the particular individual but he/she still undertake it because they have no other choice other than to perform that act.

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