To attract section 300(4) IPC, the act should be utterly inexcusable

To attract section 300(4) IPC, the act should be utterly inexcusable written by Prapti Kothari student of Institute of Law, Nirma university

GYARSIBAI W/O JAGANNATH V. THE STATE AIR 1953 MP 61, MANU/MP/0011/1952, 23RD OCTOBER 1952

MATERIAL FACTS

The appellant, Gyarsibai, resided in the same house along with her spouse, her children, and Kaiserbai, her sister-in-law. There were neither any cordial relations nor any good terms between Kaiserbai and Gyarsibai. Moreover, they were in regular disputes, and often had heated confrontations between them. Jagannath, her spouse, used to hit and abuse Gyarsibai for bickering with his sister, Kaiserbai. On the morning of 14/9/1951, when Jagannath was not at home, one such disagreement occurred.
When Kaiserbai forced the appellant to get out of the house, Gyarsibai went away from the home with her three children aged 7 years, 5 years, and 1.5 years, stating that she would jump into a well together with her three children, right after leaving the home. Eventually, Gyarsibai and her three children were reported by the people of the village. Gyarsibai survived, but she lost her children on account of their deaths.

ISSUES RAISED

1. Whether the appellant is liable for the offense of murder of the three children?
2. Whether the appellant is liable for the offense of attempt to suicide?

LEGAL PROVISIONS

• Section 300(4) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860
• Section 309 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860

JUDGEMENT

The appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment under Section 302 of the Penal Code. The Hon’ble Court, however, advised the Government to mitigate the sentence of life imprisonment to one of three years of rigorous imprisonment. The appellant was sentenced to six months’ imprisonment for the offense of attempt to suicide under Section 309 of the IPC.

ANALYSIS

In the case of Gyarsibai v. The State, readers should note that it is simply not murder by merely causing the death of an individual, or by performing an act with the knowledge that is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all likelihood, cause the death of the individual. In order for an act carried out with such knowledge to constitute murder, it’s indeed important that it should be committed without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or injury to the body. An act, committed with the knowledge of its repercussions, is not murder prima facie; it becomes murder only if it can be proven unequivocally that there was no excuse.

The conditions of the section are not met by the act of murder being one of gross recklessness. It must, however, be utterly inexcusable. If even a risk of the most extreme possible nature is taken which would usually result in death, taking the risk is not murder unless it was inexcusable to take it. The court acknowledged that there was no reason to consider that the appellant could not avoid abuse at the hands of her sister-in-law, besides jumping with her three children into a well.

In deciding what is or is not an excuse, the state of mind in which the convicted individual was, must be kept in mind. The state of mind of a rational and lawfully sane individual must be taken into consideration and then assess whether the possibility of causing death might have been prevented.

Any sane person is assumed to have some understanding of the essence of his act-and in this case, one is bound to assume that the appellant was sane. Any psychiatric illness short of insanity does not refute this knowledge or understanding.
Such terms suggest that if undertaken to escape greater harm, the imminently dangerous act is not murder. Without doing the act, if harm can be prevented, then there can be no legitimate excuse for doing the act that is so imminently dangerous that it would, in all likelihood, trigger death or harm that is likely to cause death.

CONCLUSION

The Hon’ble High Court held that under section 300(4), the appellant was justifiably convicted, as she was neither an individual of unsound mind, nor she was in a position where she could not understand or know the consequences of her behavior. Jumping into a well wasn’t the only choice she had left with. Thus, there was no excuse for her conduct, so under section 300(4) and it was reasonable to prosecute her.