Age of the juvenile should be the decisive factor and not heinousness of the offences

Age of the juvenile should be the decisive factor and not heinousness of the offences written by Prapti Kothari student of Institute of Law, Nirma university

DARGA RAM V. STATE OF RAJASTHAN AIR 2015 SC 1016

MATERIAL FACTS

The Complainant had arranged a Jagran somewhere on the fringes of the village in Rajasthan. Until midnight there were about fifty (50) individuals, including men, women, and children, including Kamala (the 7-year-old victim) and Darga Ram (the appellant). Kamala went to sleep in a nearby location with the other children. When the complainant, the victim’s father, went to the house, he discovered that Kamala was missing.
The search was then carried out on the periphery of the village, and one of the members of the village found her dead body. Upon further investigation, Kamala was found to have been raped and killed by smashing her head with a heavy stone. A case was registered under Section 302 and Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code. Darga Ram, who was a deaf, dumb, and uneducated teenager, was further interrogated and arrested by the police on the grounds of the injuries found on his intimate (or rather private) parts, along with bloodstains that matched with the victim’s blood group.
In addition to a fine of Rs. 1000/- and a default sentence of one month with rigorous imprisonment, the trial court ultimately found the appellant guilty and thus convicted him and sentenced him to incarceration for a term of ten years. Correspondingly, he was sentenced to life imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 3000/- and a default term of three months of rigorous imprisonment for the crime of punishment for murder.
An appeal was subsequently lodged by the appellant seeking to raise a plea that, at the time of the commission of the Act, the appellant was a juvenile and thus entitled to the benefit from the provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000.

ISSUES

1. Whether the appellant was a juvenile when the offense took place?
2. Whether the appellant is entitled to get benefits from the provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000?

LEGAL PROVISIONS

• Sections 302 and 376 of Indian Penal Code, 1860
• Rule 12(3)(b) of Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007

JUDGEMENT

The Hon’ble Court ordered the Principal, Government Medical College, Jodhpur, to set up a medical examination board of doctors, including a radiographic examination of the appellant, to ascertain the age of the appellant as at the time of the offense in April 1998, took place because the appellant had no historical evidence, such as a school or other certificate. On the evidence of the Medical Board’s calculation, it was determined that, on the date of the incident, the juvenile was just 17 years, 2 months, and entitled to benefit from the provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000.
The appellant was thus deemed a juvenile in this case and the sentence awarded to him was set aside and was released from prison.

ANALYSIS

The reality that the appellant who was found guilty of the rape and murder of an innocent young child and been in prison for almost 14 years, was acquitted on the basis that he was a juvenile at the time of the commission of the offense. One is forced to believe, like the prosecution that the appellant has engaged in sexual abuse, which at the level of his growth may be a normal manifestation of natural sex. Although, his cognitive abilities were not improbable, his potential to comprehend desire, sexual arousal, and its limits could be severely impaired.
Since the appellant was illiterate and had no historical evidence, such as school or some other certificate. The question must be posed as to why hearing and speech impairment and lack of education weren’t treated as a cause for extenuating circumstances until the age of seventeen years. It was interesting why the appellant did not seek protection under Section 2(b) of the Equal Protection Act of Persons with Physical Disabilities, 1995, and why he was not protected under Section 2(d) (iii) of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000

In such cases, the age of the juvenile should be the decisive factor and not the heinousness of the offenses a juvenile who was a minor during the commission of the offense and should not be held accountable as there was an inadequate development of cognitive faculties and decision-making abilities.

CONCLUSION

Law and social norms have always been aware of a widespread perception that children and young people are not even completely developed, they are in the cycle of development. Their brains experience a phase of great plasticity triggered by the hormonal transition of adolescence, in which the socio-emotional system that governs emotions and rewards sensitivity grows faster than the cognitive control mechanism that regulates planning, rationality, and self-discipline.
Consequently, their roles should be distinct and primarily motivated with a view to fostering rehabilitation rather than irreversible separation from society to the greatest extent possible.