Criminal justice should not be made a casualty for the wrongs committed by the investigating officers in the case

Ravikiran Shukre | Manikchand Pahade Law College, Aurangabad | 20th January 2020 

V. K. Mishra and Anr. V. State of Uttarakhand [Criminal no. 1247 of 2012]

Facts of the Case: 

1. Deceased-Archana was given in marriage to accused Rahul Mishra on 28.06.1997. Before marriage and after the engagement, Dr. Hirday Narayan Tripathi, father of the deceased, had given a sum of Rs. 50,000/- each on three occasions and Rs. 63,200/- on 11.07.1997 and also gifted jewellery worth Rs.2,00,000/- to Archana. Archana, after return from honeymoon, visited her parents’ house and complained several times to her father, mother and brother about the continuous harassment and torture meted out to Archana by her in-laws and husband and that they used to abuse her in connection with demand of dowry.
2. On 13.08.1997, PW1-Dr. Hirday Narayan Tripathi visited various institutions to find job for Archana. On the same day, Archana was admitted in the hospital as a suspected case of poisoning and she died due to poisoning. FIR was registered against the accused in FIR Case No.571/1997 under Sections 306 and 498A IPC at P.S. Kotwali, Dehradun. After investigation, charge-sheet was filed and charges were framed against the appellants-accused by the trial court under Sections 304B, 498A IPC and under Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.
3. Prosecution has examined 14 witnesses. When the accused were questioned under Section 313 Cr.P.C. about the incriminating evidence and circumstances, the accused denied demand of any dowry and pleaded that they are innocent. Upon consideration of evidence, trial Court-Additional Sessions Judge, Dehradun vide judgment dated 04.02.2002 convicted the appellants under Section 304B IPC and sentenced them to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life. The appellants were also convicted under Section 498A IPC and each of them was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years with a fine of Rs. 2,000/- each with default clause. They were also convicted under Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act and were sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year with a fine of Rs. 1,000/- each with default clause. All the sentences were ordered to run concurrently. Aggrieved by the verdict of conviction, the appellants preferred an appeal before the High Court which came to be dismissed confirming the conviction and sentence imposed on the accused by the trial court.

Judgment:

1. The learned counsel for the appellants contended that in the FIR lodged by the father of the deceased or in his earlier statement recorded by the police neither there was mention of any dowry demand made by the appellants nor of any harassment meted out to his daughter. It was contended that PW2- Santosh (brother of the deceased) made a false statement for the first time on 18.08.1997 i.e. five days after the death of Archana stating that the parents-in-laws of the deceased were raising dowry demand of Rs.5,00,000/- and also made allegations regarding cruelty and harassment in connection therewith. It was submitted that PW-2 kept silent for about eight days from the date of the alleged dowry demand and the cruelty and while so, the trial court and the High Court erred in placing reliance upon the evidence of PW-1 (Fatther of deceased) and PW-2 to record the verdict of conviction. It was contended that entire investigation was flawed as regards the suicide note and the letter written by the deceased to her brother-in-law and no detailed investigation was carried out viz. the inland letter dated 10.08.1997 received by the deceased which according to the appellants contained threats from a dejected lover and sample of vomitus taken was either changed or tampered. It was vehemently contended that the courts below were not right in recording the conviction based on the evidence of PW-1, PW-2 and PW-3 which were purely hearsay and full of contradictions and thus lacked credibility apart from being clearly an afterthought.
2. Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the prosecution adduced cogent and consistent evidence to prove the dowry demand and that deceased-Archana was highly educated girl and very sensitive who ended her life only due to the appellants greed for dowry and the appellants subjecting her to cruelty and harassment in connection with the demand of dowry.
3. On proof of the essential ingredients mentioned above, it becomes obligatory on the court to raise a presumption that the accused caused the dowry death. A conjoint reading of Section 113B of the Evidence Act and Section 304B IPC shows that there must be material to show that soon before her death the victim was subjected to cruelty or harassment. There must be inexistence a proximate live link between the facts of cruelty in connection with the demand of dowry and the death. 
4. In the FIR, though, there is no specific mention about the demand of dowry, cruelty and torture alleged in the FIR could have been only in connection with demand of money or jewels. 
5. FIR is not meant to be an encyclopaedia nor is it expected to contain all the details of the prosecution case. It may be sufficient if the broad facts of the prosecution case are stated in the FIR. Complaint was lodged within few hours after the tragic event. Unless there are indications of fabrication, prosecution version cannot be doubted, merely on the ground that FIR does not contain the details.
6. It cannot be held as a rule of universal application that the testimony of a witness becomes unreliable merely because there is delay in examination of a particular witness. In Sunil Kumar & Anr. vs. State of Rajasthan^[1], it was held that the question of delay in examining a witness during investigation is material only if it is indicative and suggestive of some unfair practice by the investigating agency for the purpose of introducing a core of witness to falsely support the prosecution case. As such there was no delay in recording the statement of PW-2 and even assuming that there was delay in questioning PW- 2, that by itself cannot amount to any infirmity in the prosecution case.

^[1] (2005) 9 SCC 283