Ronita Biswas | National Law University, Orissa | 11th January 2020
Jasraj Lalaji Oswal v. Raziya Mehboob Patel (Writ Petition No. 4294 of 2018)
In 2014, Vijay Rahatkar filed a civil suit against Shamrao Kulkarni. He wanted the defendants to communicate the fair rent for the property in his occupation. Otherwise, he wanted the Trial Court to decide it. He also wanted the defendants to execute a fresh registered lease deed of the suit property for another 99 years in favour of him. Vijay Rahatkar, finally, wanted the Trial Court to injunct the defendants against forceful dispossession.
The suit property lied within Pune Municipal Corporation limits. The owners originally leased it to Daji Hari Lele. It was subsequently sold to Vasudeo Eknath Mengale. In 1947, Vasudeo leased the ‘northern portion’ of the property to Umakant Joshi. In 1991, the heirs of Mengale, who purchased the leasehold rights in 1947, sold their rights to Jasraj Rathnakar (plaintiff’s father). The rights transferred include “ownership rights in the construction standing thereon with a right to recover the rent from the subleases and tenants kept by Mahadev Mengale.”
Disputes arose among the sub lessees (Ramesh Mutha and Ravindra Singhvi), which led to a compromise. Ramesh Mutha and Ravindra Singhvi agreed to transfer all their rights in the property acquired by them from Mengale family to Vijay Jasraj. Ramesh Mutha transferred Vijay Jasraj his rights up to 80.61%, through a registered sale deed along with a right to acquire the remaining leasehold rights from Ravindra Singhvi. A suit was filed for the specific performance of the agreement.
The Trial Court rejected the defendant’s application under 9A of the CPC and Order 7 Rule 11 of CPC. Aggrieved by the judgement, the defendants filed a Civil Revision Application before the High Court.
Petitioner’s contention
The Petitioner’s counsel argued that the Trial Court had not followed the procedure. According to him, it ought to have framed a particular issue and allowed the parties to lead evidence on the question of maintainability.
The Petitioner’s counsel contended that the dispute concerned a piece of open land and parties had no landlord-tenant relationship; both of which are sin qua non for the suit to be dismissed. The Plaintiff had filed the suit for specific performance of a contract that had already ended. It had nothing to do with any tenancy.
Lastly, the counsel submitted that both the orders (s. 9A and Order 7 Rule 11) were cryptic and devoid of any reasoning.
Respondent’s contention
The counsel for the Respondent had emphasized the cardinal principle of law: adjudication under either Section 9A or under Order 7, Rule 11 depends on the plaint pleadings and nothing else. Particularly, it does not depend on the defence. According to him, the merits of the matter cannot be prejudged. The counsel had submitted that the impugned order suffered from no legal infirmity and the present revision application deserved to be dismissed.
Held
The Court held that maintainability of any suit depends on the suit pleadings, not on the rival party’s defence. The Court observed that the plaint concerned tenancy disputes and there was a landlord-tenant relationship. Given the convoluted assignment and the apparent lack of privity of contract between the parties, as pleaded by the defendants, were matters of merit and were based on the evidence. The Court emphasized that it cannot prejudge the case; neither can it non-suit a plaintiff on the premise he has a very weak case, or the case he had set up is unconvincing or uninspiring. The Court refused to interfere with the Trial Court’s decision under s. 115 of CPC that concerns jurisdictional errors rather than the correctness of adjudication.
Leave a Reply