Making Laws For Specific Categories Does Not Violate Article 14

Making Laws For Specific Categories Does Not Violate Article 14

Asmita Kuvalekar | Government Law College, Mumbai | 20th March 2020. 

RAM KRISHAN GROVER AND ORS V UNION OF INDIA AND ORS (CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8597 OF 2019 ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO 26925 OF 2011) 

FACTS OF THE CASE: 

This appeal questions the constitutionality of Section 13-B of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) along with additional connected issues. The appellants being tenants of various residential and non-residential buildings in the urban Punjab Area and the union territory of Chandigarh, challenge the Act on grounds of violating Article 14 of the Indian Constitution.

Section 13-B of the Act confers a right to non-resident Indian owners to evict tenants from their buildings for repossession. The principal argument raised against Section 13-B in this appeal, is that it doesn’t provide a remedy to the affected tenants. Furthermore, the Section is assailed on the grounds of being a discriminatory policy in favour of a particular class, namely, non-resident Indians. 

The case assumes importance as the Supreme Court interprets the provision in detail and elucidates the freedom of the Legislature to make laws for particular communities. 

ISSUE: 

  1. Whether Section 13-B of the Act is void on account of arbitrariness and non-availability of a remedy to tenants? 
  2. Whether the Legislature can make laws that create rights in favour of certain specific communities? 

JUDGEMENT: 

With respect to the question of non-availability of a remedy to the tenants in cases where non-resident Indian owners called for eviction, the Apex Court promptly highlighted Section 19(2-B) of the Act. This provision renders punishable with imprisonment, fine, or both, any eviction where the same is not followed by immediate possession by the owner. Creation of a new tenancy right in the property for persons other than the evicted tenant has been made equally punishable. 

Similarly, the Court noted that Section 18-A provides affected tenants a right to contest the eviction in the manner specified therein. In fact, under this Section, High Courts of States have been empowered to call for records of proceedings before the Collector so as to reassure itself of the fairness of the eviction procedure. The Court also recognized that the object of the Act is to ensure a speedy procedure of bonafide repossession for non-resident Indians and a simplified procedure for landlords does not presuppose a lack of remedy to the tenants. To that end, the Court highlighted an observation made in an earlier case, namely Baldev Singh Bajwa v Monish Saini1 where it was held that, “These provisions indicate that in order to obtain leave to contest the application of the landlord, the tenant has to file an affidavit taking the grounds on which he wants to contest that application. If the affidavit filed by the tenant discloses such facts as would disentitle the NRI landlord from obtaining an order for the recovery of immediate possession, the Controller would grant leave to the tenant to contest the landlord’s application for eviction…” 

The Court further clarified that the requirement of the landlord has to be authentic and urgent to call for such summary eviction. Moreover, it has to be for the personal use of the landlord. It follows therefore that if such essential prerequisites are not fulfilled, it would be open to the tenant to dispute the same according to the relevant provisions of the Act. Thus, the Court summarized the nature of the remedy as “strong-inbuilt checks” against any frivolous eviction. Therefore, the criticism of arbitrariness raised by the appellants was held to be without substance and was duly dismissed. 

On the legal question of Section 13-B laying down a discriminatory policy, the Supreme Court made a reference to its judgement in Ram Krishna Dalmia v Justice S.R Tendolkar2 whereby the two-pronged test for every legislative classification was laid down. According to this test, any specific classification or categorization made by the Legislature must pass the following two criteria so as not to violate Article 14. Firstly, the classification must be based on intelligible differentia i.e. a common denominator of the favoured class as against the persons so left out and secondly, the differentia must have a rational nexus with the intended object of the statute. Thus, if the law-making body clearly intends to create rights for a specific class, no challenge on grounds of discrimination can stand the abovementioned test. Elected representatives, more than anyone else, have a better understanding of the needs of the people and therefore have been afforded ample freedom to make laws that will bring about their welfare, whether collectively or separately. As long as a classification is in line with the purpose and object of the statute making it, the classification should be able to pass the two-step barrier of constitutionality. Any possible hardship that may result from such a classification cannot be a valid ground to contest the legal tenability of the law. 

As explained in the Baldev Singh Bajwa judgement, the object of the Rent Act is to ease the challenges faced by NRIs upon their return to India. The Act was a result of numerous representations detailing the obstacles of settling down and starting a business in India after returning from a foreign country. Rent Control legislation essentially being a social legislation, the effect of the creation of a special class of NRI landlords was the furtherance of their welfare in light of the genuine difficulties they faced. Thus dismissing the appellants’ second contention as well, the Supreme Court underlined the legislature’s prerogative to make laws for specific classes of people. It further qualified its decision by pointing out that the tenants have been given sufficient remedy and therefore the landlords’ rights are not excessive or unfettered in nature. On that basis, no challenge to the Act can be legally upheld. 

  1. (2005) 12 SCC 778
  2. 1959 SCR 279: AIR 958 SC 538
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LexForti Legal News and Journal offer access to a wide array of legal knowledge through the Daily Legal News segment of our Website. It provides the readers with the latest case laws in layman terms. Our Legal Journal contains a vast assortment of resources that helps in understanding contemporary legal issues.

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