Sarthak Khandelwal | Kirit P. Mehta School Of Law, NMIMS University, Mumbai | 24th December 2019
State of Odisha & Ors Vs. Bichitrananda Das| Civil Appeal No. 9521 of 2019
Facts of Case:
On 30.09.81, a lease of a plot of measuring 75 feet by 100 feet in Mouza-Nayapalli, Bhubaneswar, was granted to the respondent by the State Government in the General Administration(GA) Department for a period of ninety years under the Government Grants Act 1895.
On 18.07.03, the State government formulated a scheme to allow conversion of residential leasehold plots under the General Administration(GA) Department within the area of Bhubaneswar Municipal Corporation into freehold land.
On 15.09.03, the respondent applied for conversion of the leasehold plot to freehold. Against the application, the Revenue Inspector in the GA Department recorded on 22 November 2003 that the lessee has encroached Govt. land (which was kept as open space) in front of the plot (60 x 63), by way of illegible fence and Garden. Lessee may be asked to vacate the encroachment.
On 13.05.04, the respondent was directed by the Land Officer in the GA Department to vacate the area of unauthorised occupation and report within 15 days.
On 06.08.08, the respondent addressed a communication to the Land Officer with reference to the letter dated 13.05.04, stating that he had already sent a reply on 19.04.06, a copy of which was enclosed stating that there existed no barbed wire fencing and no encroachment now exists.
On 21.12.009, the respondent wrote a letter to the Directorate of Estates stating that no barbed wire fencing or encroachment existed at present around his plot. On 28.12.09, proceedings were initiated against the respondent by issuing a notice under Section 4(1) of the Orissa Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act 1972 Act. And the respondent was called upon to show cause as to why an order of eviction should not be made.
The GA Department was directed to re-enquire. On 30.06.10 in reference to the letter dated on 21.12.09 and during this visit the encroachment reported that land has not been vacated now.
On 11.11.10, the respondent once again sought a decision on his application for conversion. There is no construction on that area. The area is covered with some green plantation. And the vacant area is always available to G.A. Department.
On 09.04.14, the Director of Estates called upon the respondent to submit an affidavit that he had not encroached on government land nor would he claim possession in future. The respondent submitted an affidavit on 21.04.14.
Permission for conversion of land from leasehold to freehold was granted on 05.05.14, conditional on a deposit of an amount of Rs 13,25,758.
A writ petition was filed before the High Court of Orissa challenging the communications dated 05.05.14 and 09.12.14 as the plea of the respondent was rejected for recomputing the conversion fees on the basis of the rate prevalent in 2003. A counter affidavit was filed by the State.
The High Court, by its impugned judgment and order, allowed the writ petition and directed the State to recompute the conversion fees as on the date of the making of the application on 15.09.03.
HELD:
The Supreme Court relied on the decision of Chennai Metropolitan Development Authority v Prestige Estates Project Ltd(2019), which says that submission of an application does not confer a vested right for permission. The applicant must comply with the terms of the policy. One of the terms in the policy in question is that the applicant should not have encroached on government land. An applicant who seeks the benefit of the policy must comply with its terms.
The Supreme Court said that in their view there was no justification for the High Court to direct that the rate for the computation of conversion charges should be that which was applicable on the submission of an application on 15.09.03.
The respondent would necessarily have to pay the conversion charges on the date when a final decision was taken after due verification that there was no encroachment and after scrutinizing the declaration which was filed by the respondent.
A period of nearly twelve years has elapsed in the meantime. It is significant that the respondent moved the writ proceedings before the High Court only in 2015. If the grievance of the respondent was that the State had not taken any action on his representations, he ought to have moved the writ proceedings at an earlier point of time seeking a decision on his application.
Based on the above reasons we allow the appeal and set aside the impugned judgment and order of the High Court. The writ petition filed by the respondent shall stand dismissed. However, we direct that in the event that the respondent complies with the directions contained in the communication of the State government by which the conversion charges were computed and makes the necessary payment, the application shall be processed expeditiously so as to facilitate the grant of conversion of land from leasehold to freehold.
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